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Fred Feldman

endorse an old view that distributive justice can

best be understood as people getting what they deserve.
John Rawls has several famous arguments to show that such a

view is false.

I

criticize those arguments, but agree that

more work needs to be done on the clarification and

explanation of the concept of desert in order for the old
view to be more than a platitude.

I

then criticize

attempted analyses of the concept of desert by Feinberg,
Kleinig, and Miller.

primitive concept.

claim that desert must be taken as a

I

even though desert is

However,

primitive, there still needs to be some account of what
sorts of things make

a

person deserving (what sorts of

things count as desert bases)

Some proposed desert bases

.

include need, personhood, diligence, moral worth, autonomous
action,

and entitlement.

I

criticize George Sher's work on

autonomous action, diligence, and moral worth, then propose
and defend a modified version of the view that all

legitimate desert bases are either virtues or vices.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is a study of the nature of desert,

and an exploration of the possibility that some significant

principles about distributive justice can be formulated in
terms of it.

Here is one principle that

I

have in mind.

It

sets the limit for a perfectly just distribution of goods

and evils.
The Perfectly Just Distribution (PJD)

A distribution of goods and evils,

d,

over a population of people, p, is
perfectly just during time interval, tlt2, if and only if, under d, each person
in p gets what s/he deserves during t 1t2

John Rawls has argued that no such principle as PJD

could ever be true, because no conception of justice

involving desert would ever be chosen in the original
position.

He gives several arguments for this conclusion,

and this dissertation is a response to those arguments.

Most of the arguments he presents are fairly easily refuted,
and

I

take care of them in the second chapter.

However,

the

most challenging argument that Rawls suggests against desert
is that desert is too based on intuition to be of much use

in explaining distributive justice.

I

in the rest of the dissertation, where

answer this objection
I

examine several

alleged analyses of desert, discuss some of the principal
grounds of desert, and finally present my own principles

1

about desert.

Thus,

I

end up with a viable, desert-based

alternative to Rawls's principles of justice.
In the third chapter

analyses of desert.
terms of propriety,

I

First,

examine several purported
Feinberg's analysis of desert in

then Kleinig's analysis in terms of

evaluation of the agent, and finally Miller's analysis in
terms of an evocation of appraising attitudes.

I

acknowledge that each of these authors points out an
important feature of desert, yet none of those features can
serve to unify the bewildering array of desert claims (even

among those that each author explicitly accepts)

.

appears that desert is a deep, primitive concept.

Thus,

it

Examples

can be used to help people "get onto" the concept, but no

explicit analysis can be given.

Nevertheless, it is useful

to keep in mind the features pointed out by these authors as

general guideposts to the nature of desert.

Taking desert as

a

primitive concept does not rule out

saying something of importance about desert.
from the preceding chapter,
for desert.

As is evident

there are many possible grounds

If we can specify which alleged grounds are

actual grounds, then that would further our understanding of
desert.

Thus,

it will be useful to survey some of the

The most extensive treatment

literature about desert bases.

appears to be in the work of George Sher.

Sher tries to

provide arguments to show that autonomous action, diligence,
and virtue (among others) are legitimate desert bases.
2

In

the next two chapters,

I

examine his arguments for these

three alleged desert bases.

show that they are all

I

seriously defective.
Finally,

desert bases.

present my own view about the legitimate

I

I

show how my view, that all desert is

closely tied to virtues and vices, takes into account the
features pointed out by Feinberg, Kleinig, and Miller.
However, my account is unifying in a way that theirs is not.
It ties the concept of desert to that of virtues and vices.

Since it does so,

some account of the virtues and vices

appears necessary.

I

try to take a fairly non-committal

view that is open to several different conceptions of the
virtues and vices.

However,

I

do claim that there is an

important connection between the virtues and vices, and
desert bases.

I

claim that whatever the true virtues and

vices are, those are also the only desert bases (with a

couple of exceptions detailed in Chapter Seven)
of this chapter,

I

.

At the end

have answered the most serious challenge

to desert-based conceptions of justice by providing a fairly

plausible account of desert.

3

CHAPTER

2

DESERT AND JUSTICE
In the seminal work of John Rawls,

A Theory of Justice

,

there is a section called "Legitimate Expectations and
Moral

Desert."

Rawls here suggests several arguments that might,

if sound,

show that justice cannot be explained with

reference to desert.

In this chapter,

I

refute all but one

of those arguments.

The last argument is refuted in

Chapter Seven, where

I

present my view about desert.

Rawls notes that it

a

common sense view that justice is

distribution according to desert.
There is a tendency for common sense to suppose
that income and wealth, and the good things in
life generally, should be distributed according to
moral desert.
Justice is happiness according to
virtue
1

Of course,

this is probably an unattainable ideal, but

it is what people should at least aim for.

Rawls concedes

that this is an often held view; nevertheless, he rejects
"Such a principle would not be chosen in the original

it.

position.

There seems to be no way of defining the

requisite criterion in that situation." 2
I

think these few sentences suggest an argument against

desert based on the choice problem of the original position.
However, before stating the argument,

I

the desert principle that Rawls rejects.

want to formulate
Since Rawls's

approach to the study of justice differs somewhat from the
one

I

presented in my introduction, the principles in this
4

chapter are formulated a little differently from
other
chapters.

The major reason for the difference is that
Rawls

takes the main subject of justice to be the basic
structure
of social institutions rather than the distributions
of

goods and evils among the members of a population.

basic structure of

a

The

social institution is composed of a

political constitution and the principal economic and social

arrangements

3

"They [the principles of justice] are to

.

govern the assignments of rights and duties and to regulate
the distribution of social and economic advantages

Therefore,

in this chapter,

justice will have the form,

." 4

principles about distributive
"An institutional framework is

distributively just if and only if..."

Many things can be distributed, but Rawls is interested
in the distribution of primary social goods
short)

.

('psgoods'

for

It is the way that an institutional framework

distributes these that determines whether it is just or not.
Psgoods are primary goods because they are the goods that
"every rational man is presumed to want.

normally have
life

." 5

a

These goods

use whatever a person's rational plan of

Psgoods are social goods because their production

and distribution is primarily controlled by social

institutions.

This is in contrast to primary natural goods,

such as health and intelligence, which can occur

independently of social institutions.

According to Rawls,

the psgoods are "rights and liberties, opportunities and

5

powers,

income and wealth,

psgood is

a

"

and an especially important

sense of one's own worth. 6

Using the concepts of institutional frameworks and
psgoods,

and understanding virtue as moral worth, the

following principle of distributive justice can be derived
from the passage,

"the good things in life generally,

be distributed according to moral desert.

happiness according to virtue."

7

should

Justice is

Here then is the Principle

of Distributive Justice according to Moral deserts.

PDJm An institutional framework is
distributively just if and only if it
leads to distributions of psgoods in
which each person's receipt is equal to
her/his moral deserts.
Here is the Original Position argument that

think

I

Rawls suggests.
Persons in the original position would
not choose PDJm.
If persons in the original position
would not choose PDJm, then PDJm is not
true
Therefore, PDJm is not true.

(1)
(2)

(3)

Lines

(1)

and

(3)

are pretty clearly implied by the

text of §48, but nothing like
However,

I

think

(2)

the argument valid,
truth.
§4.

(2)

is mentioned there.

is the most straightforward way to make

and

I

think that Rawls would affirm its

He discusses the original position at some length in

There he pretty much states the contrapositive of

(2),

"We shall want to say that certain principles of justice are

justified because they would be agreed to in an initial
situation of equality [the original position]."
6

8

I

think

Rawls would allow that it follows from this that
if a

principle of justice would not be chosen in the
original
position,

then it is not justified (and so presumably not

true)

Rawls's justification for the original position is that
it is a device "to make vivid to ourselves the restrictions

that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments for

principles of justice, and therefore on these principles
themselves."

9

Ideally,

these restrictions are widely held,

weak presumptions, such as that all parties in the original

position have equal rights in formulating, defending and
choosing principles. 10

Rawls attempts to show that of the

conceptions of justice up for consideration, only his two

principles of justice are fully consistent with
statement of the original position.

a

complete

Therefore, they would

be chosen. 11
The explanation for premise

(1)

substance of the original position.

requires appeal to the

Putting aside the

acceptability of premise two for the moment, it seems that
to establish the truth of

Rawls needs to show that a

(1),

full statement of the original position will lead to the

rejection of PDJm.

Three of the twelve elements that

summarize the original position seem most relevant to this
job.

12

Keeping Rawls's numbering, they are,
(7)

The choice of
Knowledge and Beliefs:
principles is made from the standpoint
11
of the veil of ignorance.

7

(

8

)

(9)

Motivation of the Parties: The parties'
motivation is characterized as mutual
disinterestedness 14
Rationality:
Each person in the
original position is assumed to be
rational in the following sense. S/he
takes effective means to her/his ends
with unified expectations and objective
interpretation of probability. 15

A person chooses so to speak, "from behind" the veil of
ignorance when the following conditions obtain.

She chooses

without knowledge of particular facts about herself, such as
what is her class position, income level, wealth,
intelligence, strength, talents.

Nor does she know her own

rational life plan, what social class she lives in, nor even

details of her psychological makeup.
facts about human sociology,

She does know general

such as principles of economic

theory and human psychology. 16
The parties' mutual disinterestedness amounts to this:

each bargains to get as much psgoods for himself as
possible, but without envy.

"The parties do not seek to

confer benefits or to impose injuries on one another; they
are not moved by affection or rancor." 17
Lastly, Rawls claims the rationality presupposed here
is the standard model from social theory.

Each person wants

But she does not know what

to advance her own interests.

those are, so she goes for as much of the psgoods as she can
get.

Then,

no matter what her rational life plan is,

she

will be in as good a position as is possible to achieve it.
"[The parties]

know that in general they must try to protect
8

their liberties, widen their opportunities,
and enlarge
their means for promoting their aims whatever
these are ." 18
From these three elements of the original
position, it
seems possible to argue why PDJm would not be
chosen there.
As

I

quoted above, Rawls says,

"There seems to be no way of

defining the requisite criterion in that situation ." 19

Then

on almost the next page, he says "The idea of rewarding

desert is impracticable ." 20

The context here is a

discussion of how hard it would be to figure out how much of
a

person's good fortune arises from his hard work, and how

much from his natural abilities (which he does not deserve)
In short,

it appears that PDJm is not practical

21
.

It would

not be possible to construct an institutional framework that

would be able to make the delicate judgments of moral worth
required for the distributions of psgoods.

Since the

persons in the original position are rational, and have
general knowledge about human nature, they know that it is

often difficult, if not impossible, to figure
actual moral worth.

the psgoods,

a

thorny philosophical problem in its

Since an institution has to actually distribute
it must make some determination of what each

person's moral worth actually is.
unworkable.

person's

This is independent of knowing what

makes for moral worth,
own right.

a

Thus,

This certainly seems very

it is easy to envision the participants

in the original position rejecting PDJm.

9

Rawls mentions this practicality criterion in
two other

places as

a

reason to reject possible PDJ's.

The first

place is the last paragraph of §24:
... one conception of justice is to be preferred
to another when it is founded upon markedly
simpler general facts, and its choice does not
depend upon elaborate calculations in the light of
a vast array of theoretically defined

possibilities. 22
Rawls puts this forward as one reason to favor his two

principles of justice over classical utilitarianism. 23

It

sounds like Rawls is here borrowing a widely used criticism
of classical utilitarianism in the realm of morality,

adapting it to the arena of justice.

and

The criticism of

classical utilitarianism is that no one could ever calculate
all the utilities required to evaluate a course of action,
so at least in many cases,

a

person cannot determine which

of her several alternatives is morally permissible.

If

classical utilitarianism was adopted in the original
position, then the institutional framework would have to

regulate distributions the choice of which would "depend
upon elaborate calculations in the light of

theoretically defined possibilities."

a

vast array of

Clearly this would be

highly impractical, and so one reason to prefer Rawls’s
principles to classical utilitarianism.
The second place Rawls appears to use the

impracticability criterion is in §47:
No attempt is made to define the just distribution
of goods and services on the basis of information

10

about the preferences and claims of particular
individuals 24
,

One reason is that such information is not available
in
the original position, but Rawls goes on to say,

and in any case, it introduces complexities
that cannot be handled by principles of tolerable
simplicity to which men might reasonably be
expected to agree. 25
.

.

.

It sounds like he is saying that very complex

principles would not be accepted by persons in the original
position.

because

a

But surely not just because they are complex, or

certain amount of time is required to grasp their

implications.

After all, Rawls's own two principles take

much of his book to be explained.
to me.

They seem pretty complex

So it seems to me that the reason that Rawls claims

such principles would be rejected is not just their

complexity, but instead because of the difficulty of putting

them in practice.

In this case,

it would be very difficult

to actually find out each person's preferences and claims in

order to figure out how much psgoods each should get.

So it

seems reasonable to take Rawls as claiming that certain

complex PDJ's are impractical, and so wouldn't be chosen in
the original position.
So it appears that again and again Rawls uses a

criterion of practicality to judge PDJ's.

Perhaps this can

be justified from the original position in light of the

stated aim of

(9),

that rational people attempt to take

effective means to achieve their aims. 26
11

It is plausible

that it would be hard to set up institutional
frameworks so
that they would effectively track individual
preferences and
claims, or calculate the long-term utilities of
a variety of

alternatives, or accurately take into account a person's

moral worth.

premise

(1)

This seems to be ample reason to believe
of the Original Position argument.

However,

I

think these considerations miss the point of

deliberation about PDJ's.

The point is to formulate true

principles of justice, not merely to formulate principles
that are practical for use in distributing psgoods among

large numbers of people.

The quest is for principles that

reveal general justice-making properties, not for principles
that will easily be enforced by some standard legal system.
It seems to me that this latter task is a matter for

economists, political scientists and legal scholars.

One of

their tasks is to figure out how to get institutional

frameworks to embody PDJ's.
problem,

This is certainly no small

and is just as important as the one

to be embarked upon.

different.

Still,

I

I

take myself

think their emphasis is

They presuppose some theoretical conception of

justice, and then try to figure out how to construct the

constitution of a country to bring about this justice,
whereas Rawls and myself are working on the theoretical

conception itself.

Note that Rawls cannot accuse me of

being "overly ideal."
a

That is, he cannot consistently fault

theory that shows what the ideals of
12

a

perfect social

system are without giving us much insight into
how such
system could be brought into being by an institutional
framework.

a

For he himself limits his theory to a system

where strict compliance holds, and says that,

"the nature

and aims of a perfectly just society is the fundamental
part
of the theory of justice." 27

Of course there is some

overlap between the tasks of developing
and trying to apply it, but

I

a

theory of justice

think it is important not to

place too much emphasis on the practicality of
of justice.

Thus,

premise

I

(2)

if premise

(1)

is true,

conception

a

then

I

reject

do not think that the original position is

the final arbiter of which principles are justified.

It

relies too much on practical contingencies. 28
There is another reason to believe that premise

might be true, but it is not suggested by Rawls.
(8)

and

(9)

(1)

Elements

of the original position state that persons are

mutually disinterested and rational agents.

They each try

to get as much of the psgoods as possible.

Some have taken

these elements as equivalent to stating that the persons in
the original position are downright selfish.

If so,

then

this would be reason to suppose that they would not choose
PDJm.

Since they know general principles of human

psychology, these agents would know that not too many people

have high moral worth. 29

So each might figure that his

chance of getting as many of the psgoods as he wanted would
be diminished were he to get only the amount of psgoods that
13

corresponded to his moral worth.

it seems that persons in

the original position would agree on this at
least:

none

wants to see goods distributed according to moral
worth.
But this seems to point out another defect of the
original

position.

For if a bunch of greedy tightwads agree not to

choose PDJm, this seems an argument for it rather than
against.

Thus one who accepted premise

(1)

because it seems

that the original position requires selfish behavior, would

probably reject premise

It would seem to such a one

(2)

that selfish people cannot conceive of justice. 30

Rawls considers and rejects this objection.

He points

out that though persons are mutually disinterested in the

original position, that has no bearing on their character
traits in the real world. 31

Also,

though the agents are

mutually disinterested, they are not envious.

"He is not

downcast by the knowledge or perception that others have
larger index of primary social goods." 32

a

Furthermore,

though the agents may be selfish, they still will comply

with whatever is agreed upon in the original position, and
each knows this of each other.

compliance requirement.

This is the strict

So selfishness will not cause one

to try to get away with disobeying a PDJ.

Finally,

it is

unlikely that Rawls would agree that general principles of
human psychology imply that most people are selfish.

He

would probably argue that the principle, if true, is not
general or universal enough to make it through the veil of
14

ignorance.

It is probably just a contingent fact due
to the

way our social system operates, and persons in the
original
position do not know anything about their societies in
the

real world.

Thus,

an agent in the original position would

not be making any guesses about the probability of her
being

selfish in the real world.

At any rate this seems to be

just the kind of contingent knowledge that Rawls wants to
rule out with the veil of ignorance.

He argues that because

the agents are operating without knowledge of specifics,

their selfishness does no harm.

The fact that each agent

operates from the motive of mutual disinterestedness but
from behind the veil of ignorance "forces each person to
take the good of others into account ." 33

Though each person

wants the best for himself, he knows so little about who he
is that the only way to accomplish this is through making

sure everyone is as well off as possible.
I

think that Rawls has here missed some subtle ways in

which selfishness can affect people's behavior, even behind
the veil of ignorance.

Michael Slote also thinks the

stipulation that people in the original position are selfish
is a mistake,

because if the people there are faced with

a

hard lot, they may rather accept an unjust principle that
helps them rather than

them

34
.

a

just principle that does not help

To see how selfish people could choose differently

than altruistic people, even from behind the veil of
ignorance,

imagine that they are faced with a choice between
15

two sets of principles about justice.
the first set of principles,

Imagine that under

institutions will be set up to

distribute the psgoods so that fifty percent of the
people
will be moderately well off, twenty-five percent of
the

people will be very well off, and twenty-five percent of the
people will not be well off at all, but will suffer
amount.

a fair

Under the second set, everyone will be roughly

equally well off, and

a

little better off than the

moderately well off people under the first set.

An

altruistic person might very well prefer the second set of
principles, because no one in that state would suffer much

more than anyone else
is concerned)

.

(as

far as distribution of the psgoods

But a selfish,

rational risk-taker might

well prefer the first set of principles.

She might reason

that the risk of being in the worst-off group is adequately

offset by the risk of being in the best-off group, and that
the overall chances of landing in a good or very good

situation versus
she is selfish,

group,

a

bad situation are three to one.

Since

so long as she is not in the worst-off

she will not be very concerned about the people who

are in that group.

Thus,

it seems to me that the

selfishness of the people in the original position is

a

good

reason to think that the principles chosen by those in the

original position are not necessarily the just principles.

16

Circularity and Co-Dependence
Rawls suggests another argument against moral
desert.
He says,

the concept of moral worth does not provide a
first principle of distributive justice.
This is
because it cannot be introduced until after the
principles of justice ... have been acknowledged 35
.

.

.

.

Note that in this passage, Rawls writes of moral worth, but
earlier, he wrote about moral desert

.

I

think this is

because Rawls has the view that desert is determined by
moral worth.

Thus,

since justice is determined by desert,

and desert is determined by moral worth (on his view)

,

if

there is a problem with moral worth, then there is a problem

with desert (which Rawls often describes as moral desert,

I

think because of his view that moral worth determines
desert)
Now,

Rawls says moral worth is defined as having a

sense of justice.

"We have now defined this notion in terms

of the sense of justice,

the desire to act in accordance

with the principles that would be chosen in the original

position ." 36

Rawls's talk of definitions might suggest that

he thinks there is a formal circularity in PDJm.

But Rawls

never actually uses the term 'circular'; in any case, PDJm
is not a definition,

it is a substantive principle,

cannot be formally circular.
property.

so it

Only definitions can have that

Nevertheless, there is a kind of circularity

(perhaps 'co-dependency'

is a better term)

that principles

can have, and while their having it does not show them
17

false,

it does significantly decrease our philosophical

interest in them.

Here are three principles that

are co-dependent:

PDJm, MW1 and SJ1.

I

think

PD Jm An institutional framework is
distributively just if and only if it
leads to distributions of psgoods in
which each person's receipt is equal to
her/his moral deserts.
I

think that MW1 and SJ1

(below)

embody the sense of

moral worth that Rawls discusses in the following passage
about a well-ordered society.

Also,

it is important to

remember that Rawls thinks that desert is determined by
moral worth.
Its members also have a strong sense of justice,
an effective desire to comply with the existing
rules... We have now defined this notion [moral
worth] in terms of the sense of justice, the
desire to act in accordance with the principles
that would be chosen in the original position. 37

MW1

A person has moral worth equal

to the

strength of her/his sense of justice.
SJ1

The strength of a person's sense of
justice is determined by how often s/he
succeeds in acting in accordance with
the true PDJ's. 38

The three principles are co-dependent in the following
sense.

One cannot determine which institutional frameworks

are just unless one knows the desert of each person.

Since

the desert of each person is determined by the moral worth

of each person, one cannot determine the moral desert of a

person unless one knows the strength of that person's sense
of justice.

One cannot determine the strength of a person's

sense of justice unless one knows
18

(among other things)

which

institutional frameworks are just.

But the question of

which institutional frameworks are just is the one
that
started the whole process.

Thus,

it appears that a person

cannot come to know which institutional frameworks are
just

by studying PDJm, MW1, and SJ1.

formulating them.

Yet that was the purpose of

Here is a Co-Dependency argument that

incorporates this reasoning.
(1)
(2)
(3)

PDJm, MW1 and SJ1 are co-dependent.
If (1), then PDJm cannot be a first
principle of distributive justice.
Therefore, PDJm cannot be a first
principle of distributive justice.

Though

I

think

(1)

is justified,

the conclusion seems to be by (2),

weak.

First of all,

the only way to get to

and that line is very

since it is the three principles that

together are co-dependent, it is not clear why PDJm should
be the one to go.

Since the co-dependency would be broken

if any one of the three principles were given up,

rather choose MW1 or SJ1.

In fact,

I

I

would

think MW1 is highly

implausible as an account of moral worth.

Having a sense of

justice is surely an important factor in determining moral
worth, but just as surely it is not the sole factor.

It is

possible to be too motivated by justice, and we would say of
one who is justice-motivated to the exclusion of other
feelings,

"he was just but hard-hearted in his refusal to

ever grant mercy."
just,

Imagine this guy had many chances to be

and many chances to be merciful, and assume that in

all those cases he could not be both.
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39

If he always chose

the just when he had the chance,

merciful,

and never chose the

then though his sense of justice contributed

positively to his moral worth,

I

contributed negatively to it.

There are other gualities

think his lack of mercy

besides mercy and justice which contribute towards

person's moral worth:

compassion,

conscientiousness, diligence, etc.

a

forgiveness, honesty,
However,

think there

I

is a trivial revision of MW1 which will seem far more

plausible, and yet still let the argument go through.

Here

it is

MW 2

A person's moral worth

is partially
determined by the strength of his/her
sense of justice.

So long as the sense of justice is at all important to

moral worth, there will be co-dependency among the
principles, because determining moral worth will rely, at
least in part, on knowing which institutional frameworks are
just.

Since MW2 is plausible, and PDJm is not to be

abandoned until necessary, that means that there is one last
solution.

Give up

In fact

give it up.

I

S J1

think SJ1 is implausible, so

I

am happy to

When Rawls presents his "definition" of moral

worth, he does so in the context of an ideal social system,

whose members are lucky enough to know which principles were

chosen in the original position, and are also lucky enough
to know that whatever principles get chosen in the original

position are true.

For such individuals,
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it may be that SJ1

is correct about the conditions for the
possession of a

sense of justice.

But we are not in that situation, and

likely no one will ever be in that situation.

We do not

know what the true PDJ's are for certain, in the way
that
those in Rawls's ideal social system would.

So

I

think that

to have a sense of justice it is not required that a person

act in accordance with the true PDJ's.

It is enouqh that

the person act in accordance with what s/he rationally

believes to be the true PDJ's.

After all, it makes sense to

speak of a person from a different country than one's own
(whose members have a different perception of the just)

having
I

a

as

,

sense of justice.

think a person can have the virtue of honesty even on

occasions when that person mistakenly gives you

misinformation. 40

So long as the correct intent was there,

and the person had good reason to believe he was right,

I

would accept his misinformation as "an honest mistake."
Similarly, a person can have a sense of justice without

always acting justly.

So

I

would replace SJ1 with SJ2 as

stated below.
SJ2

The strength of a person's sense of justice
is determined by how often s/he succeeds in
acting in accordance with what s/he
rationally believes to be the true PDJ's.

With this revision of SJl

principles that
moral worth:

I

I

have achieved two

think capture an important element of

MW 2 and SJ2.

dependent with PDJm.

Thus,

Furthermore, they are not coI

think that when it is
21

correctly formulated, by substituting MW2 for MW1
and SJ2
for SJ1,

false.

the first premise of the Co-Dependency argument
is

This argument has not shown that PDJm must be

rejected as

candidate for

a

a

first principle of justice.

The Common Sense Precepts of Justice
In §47 Rawls considers whether his two principles of

justice (PDJr
and unjust.

)

satisfy "our intuitive ideas of what is just

In particular we must ask how well it accords

with common sense precepts of justice." 41

Rawls thinks that

although he has so far ignored the common sense precepts in
his formulation of PDJr,
them.

4

^

it nevertheless accounts for

Here are some of the common sense precepts of

justice that Rawls discusses.
CPJc Other things equal, it is more just that
a person's receipt level is equal to
his/her contribution. 43
CP Jt Other things equal, it is more just that
a person's receipt level is equal to
his/her talent. 44

CPJn Other things equal, it is more just that
a person's receipt level is equal to
his/her need. 45
CPJe Other things equal, it is more just that
a person's receipt level is equal to
his/her conscientious effort. 46

By the end of §47,

I

think Rawls is satisfied that RPJ

accounts for the CPJ's as much as it needs to.

He has also

argued that none of the CPJ's could be elevated to the
47
status of a first principle of justice.

22

It is plausible

that here Rawls is presenting moral desert not
as a first

principle of justice, but as

a

common sense precept.

There is a tendency for common sense to suppose
that income and wealth, and the good things in
life generally, should be distributed according to
moral desert. 48

Here is PDJm expressed as a common sense principle rather

than as a first principle of justice.
CP Jm Other things equal, it is more just that
a person's receipt level is equal to
his/her moral desert.

Expressed in this form CPJm is covered by Rawls's
argument in §47, that no CPJ could plausibly be raised to
the status of a first principle of justice.

Here is one way

that the Non-Accommodation of CPJ's argument can be

formulated.

Any true first principle of justice must
account for all our CPJ's.
PDJm does not account for any CPJ other
than CPJm.
Therefore, PDJm is not a true first
principle of justice.

(1)
(2)
(3)

I

(1)

already presented the passage where Rawls assented to

above,

and in any case it seems a plausible premise.

Rawls presents a couple of reasons to believe
he shows that PDJm and CPJc conflict.

(2)

First,

According to CPJc,

a

person's receipt should match her contribution to the social
system.

But the amount a person contributes is partly

regulated by supply and demand.

Clearly

a

worth does not vary with supply and demand.

person's moral
"No one

supposes that when someone's abilities are less in demand
23

...

his moral deservingness undergoes a similar
shift." 49

Rawls also points out that PDJm and CPJn conflict. 50
seems clearly true.

This

The moral worth of a person seems

mostly independent of his need.

It certainly does not vary

with the occurrence of natural disasters though need often
does.

So

(2)

seems true as well. 51

This argument appears

successful
However, premise

(1)

of the argument is quite powerful.

It not only shows the implausibility of PDJm,

the plausibility of RPJ.

but threatens

Here is the Non-Accommodation

Argument Against RPJ.

Any true first principle of justice must
account for all our CPJ's.
RPJ does not account for CPJm.
Therefore, RPJ is not a true first
principle of justice.

(1)
(2)
(3)

Rawls admits the truth of

conflict between CPJn and CPJm,

(2)

in a discussion of the

"Nor does the basic

structure tend to balance the precepts of justice [CPJn and
CPJm]

so as to achieve the requisite correspondence behind

the scenes.

It is regulated by the two principles of

justice which define other aims entirely." 52

Clearly,

if

RPJ accommodates CPJn and CPJc, and these conflict with
CPJm,

then RPJ cannot also accommodate it.

argument,

it is not enough for Rawls to show that PDJm is

not a first principle of justice.
false.

To reject this

He must show that CPJm is

This is much harder than just showing that CPJm

cannot plausibly be raised to a first principle, and none of
24

Rawls’s arguments

I

have so far examined, even if sound,

would seem sufficient to the task.
that PDJm is not true.
that CP Jm is false,

so

They would at most show

However, Rawls does appear to think
I

will consider his argument in the

next section.

Deserving to Deserve
Rawls appears to claim that moral worth is not the

correct basis of desert,

from which it follows that CPJm

must be false, because CPJm is based on moral desert, which
is based upon the view that desert is determined by moral

worth.

Rawls claims that no one deserves the abilities,

talents, or defects that one is born with,

"any more than

one deserves one's starting place in society." 53

much of

a

Certainly

person's character, and moral worth, is determined

by early childhood circumstances:

one's family, education,

natural inclinations toward good or evil, etc.

These are

things for which one can take no responsibility, and so one

cannot deserve them.

Rawls says that a man does not deserve

his superior character because it is in large part

determined by circumstances "for which he can take no
credit." 54

If credit is understood as moral responsibility,

this suggests the following Lack of Responsibility argument.
(1)

(2)

Our moral worth is determined by our
inborn talents, childhood experiences,
education, and natural inclinations,
none of which we can be said to be
responsible for.
If (1), then we cannot deserve anything
on the basis of moral worth.
25

If we cannot deserve anything on the
basis of moral worth, then CPJm is not
true
Therefore, CPJm is not true.

(3)

(4)

The rationale for premise

discussed.

Premise

(2)

(1)

has already been

seems based on the ideas that desert

requires moral responsibility and that one is not morally

responsible for one

s

own moral worth.

Premise

(3)

is true,

because CPJm is based on moral worth as the sole basis for
desert
The problem with this kind of argument is well noted in
the literature

and (2).

Jb

JJ

Few philosophers would accept both

(1)

Most of those who accept strict determinism, and

therefore would accept line

(1),

do not claim that as a

reason to deny moral responsibility, so it is not likely
that they would accept

(2)

It is standard practice for

compatibilists to base moral responsibility on something
other than freedom from strict determinism.
hand,

an incompatibilist who found

likely reject line (1).

(2)

On the other

plausible would

Just because your childhood

circumstances contribute to your character, it does not
follow that all decisions are bereft of free will.

So while

there is some influence of childhood circumstances on

a

person’s moral worth, they are not usually decisive.

In the

final analysis,

one’s own self.

a

good portion of a one’s choices stem from
As Nozick points out, one can hardly

believe that Rawls really thinks of persons as just mindless
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automatons reacting to external stimuli strictly
according
to how they were brought up as children.
So denigrating

person's autonomy and prime
responsibility for his actions is a risky line to
take for a theory. .that founds so much (including
a theory of the good) upon person's choices. 57
a.

.

In addition,

well.

line

(2)

seems false for another reason as

It is not the case that all desert requires personal

responsibility.

Imagine poor Jim going about his everyday

life working hard for his money, until one day a bolt of

lightning causes

destroy it.

a

nearby tree to fall onto his home and

He deserves some recompense.

But Jim was

certainly not responsible for that tree hitting his house.
In fact,

this seems to be an instance that proves just the

reverse of (3):

if Jim had been responsible for the tree's

destruction of his house, he would not deserve recompense. 58
So the Lack of Responsibility argument fails.

the passage

I

quoted above from Rawls has suggested

different argument to some philosophers. 59

However,
a

It is a more

general argument about the nature of deserving, and does not

mention responsibility or determinism, so it deserves
separate consideration.

Alan Zaitchik notes that all

deserving must be in virtue of some justifying grounds; and
that Rawls argues that the grounds of desert must be

deserved as well.

Zaitchik takes Rawls to say that if

someone claims desert on grounds that just happen to be
true,

then the claim must be false.
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For the fact that the

grounds are true of him is "arbitrary from
view."

a

moral point of

Thus,

The man who deserves something must be able to
claim credit, as Rawls puts it, for the ground's
being true of him. But this means that he must
deserve .. .whatever is specified in the ground. 60

Zaitchik formulates the following Infinite Regress of
Desert argument.
(1)
(2)

(3)

All desert must be in virtue of some
ground or other.
X deserves Y in virtue of having ground
Z only if X deserves to have ground Z.
Therefore, no one ever deserves
anything 61

The conclusion follows because in order for a person to

deserve something, she must deserve its ground, but also the
ground's ground, and the ground's ground's ground, and so
on.

Such conditions cannot be fulfilled, so no one ever

deserves anything.
This is an argument whose conclusion is sweeping enough

that if the argument were sound, my project would be

completely derailed.
For one thing,

However,

line

(2)

seems clearly false.

to say that a ground needs justification

seems to misunderstand its nature.

A fact grounds

person's desert claim when it justifies it.
needed.

Otherwise it is unclear why such

a

a

Nothing more is
fact would be

said to ground its claim.
It certainly seems that people in ordinary language

speak of desert with the understanding that there are

possible circumstances in which it occurs.
28

Yet if

(2)

were

true desert would not just never occur, it would
be

impossible.

Furthermore, poor Jim's circumstances as

described above seem to provide

a case of

grounds "just happen" to be true of him.
injustice:
his house,

I

desert where the
That is the

he did not deserve to get a tree smashed into
it just happened to him.

Desert and Intuition

While

I

may have shown that Rawls's project requires

more than just the falsity of PDJm, one might think that
since the non-accommodation argument seems successful, that

PDJm is false, and that therefore my project is scuttled.
But this is not so,

for my project does not depend upon

My project is to account for justice in terms of

PDJm.

desert.

But though

I

do think that desert is based

primarily on virtues and vices, my view of them is
fundamentally Aristotelian, so my view of desert is more

broad than Rawls's concept of moral desert, which is
determined solely by moral worth.

I

will show that effort

and need, which are not accounted for according to moral
worth,

are accounted for under my view

62
.

Thus,

I

would

present my first principle about the justice of
institutional frameworks not as PDJm, but as PDJd, below
PDJd An institutional framework is
distributively just if and only if it
leads to distributions in which each
person's receipt is equal to his/her
desert

29

63
.

So,

if Rawls did show that CPJm is false,

then that

would derail some of my particular view about the
what the
legitimate desert bases are, but it would not show that

PDJd

is false.

For though

I

think that virtues and vices are the

primary grounds for desert, there are those who hold
pluralist view about the legitimate grounds

64
.

a

A version of

PDJd would still be left to compete with RPJ.
The last objection to explaining justice in terms of

desert is suggested by Rawls’s discussion of intuitionism.

According to Rawls, intuitionism is the doctrine that,
there is an irreducible
principles which have to be
another by asking ourselves
considered judgment, is the
.

.

.

family of first
weighed against one
which balance, in our
most just 65
.

Desert-based theories of justice are intuitionistic,
according to Rawls.

In his list of alternative theories for

consideration in the original position, those involving
desert considerations are placed in the category of

intuitionistic conceptions

66

The problem with

.

intuitionistic views is
the especially prominent place that they give
to the appeal to our intuitive capacities unguided
.

.

.

by constructive and recognizably ethical
criteria 67
.

Thus,

even if Rawls's other arguments against desert

are unsatisfactory,

there is still one final alleged problem

with the concept of desert.

If desert is merely a

collection of unrelated intuitive principles, then although
something like PJDd could be

a
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possible alternative view to

RPJ,

or classical utilitarianism,

be especially insightful.

such a principle would not

We would be using a fairly

mysterious concept, desert, to explain justice, and this
would be of only minor interest.
I

do not see this objection as unanswerable, but as a

challenge.

The challenge is to come up with a concept of

desert that is at least somewhat unified and explanatory, so
that in PDJd the concept of desert is not more mysterious

than the concept of justice that it is supposed to explain.
The rest of my dissertation takes up this challenge.
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CHAPTER

3

THE ANALYSIS OF DESERT
In this chapter

desert.

I

I

examine three alleged analyses of

show that those analyses are either just plain

wrong, or else that although some alleged analysis may

provide

a

useful glimpse of some aspect of the concept, it

is far too sketchy to be a true analysis.

Having shown the

defects of previous attempted analyses, and having no

satisfactory candidate of my own, my only option will be to
take the concept as primitive.
some original,

desert

(in

Nevertheless,

I

can give

substantive principles about the concept of

Chapter Seven), and this will have to serve to

make the concept more intelligible.
The difficulty of the task at hand can perhaps be

better understood when

a

catalog of some of the main kinds

of various uses of 'desert' has been presented,

for it will

show the widely diverse uses to which the word has been put.

Before presenting such

a catalog,

there is a little bit of

background work about the structure of desert claims to be
done.

Consider the claim,

"Mary deserves a free lunch."

This claim has a truth value, but before we can begin to

ponder what its truth value might be, we need more
information.

The answer to the question,

"Why does Mary

deserve a free lunch?" is of primary importance for

evaluating the original claim,
lunch.

that Mary deserves a free

A "negative" answer to the question why the subject
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is deserving:

"No reason,

she just deserves a free lunch,"

always indicates that the original desert claim is false.
It is never true that a subject is deserving for
no reason

at all.

This point is emphasized by several philosophers,

and disputed by none that

I

have read. 68

Thus the structure

of complete desert claims always includes a subject

(the

thing that deserves), a desert (that which the subject
deserves)

,

and a justification or desert base 69

(the alleged

reason why the subject deserves the desert)
Given this structure, it can be seen that there are
three main kinds of differences among desert claims:

they

can differ with respect to subject, desert and desert base.

Here is a list of some desert-attribute sentences that each

seem typical and noncontroversial

70

Some Desert Claims
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

7.
8.

9.

Jones deserves her success; she has
worked hard for it.
Smith deserves more success than he had;
he gave it his all.
Walters deserves the job; she is the
best qualified applicant.
Wilson deserved to be disqualified; he
knew the deadline for applications was

March 1
Jackson deserves more than minimum wage;
her job is important and she does it
well
Baker deserves to win; he has played
superbly.
Miss Vermont deserves to win; she is the
prettiest entrant.
Simpson deserves the death-sentence; he
planned the murder.
Brown may have known she would not be
caught, but she still deserves to be
punished.
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10

.

11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

17

.

18.
19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.
26.
27.

28.
29.

30.

Goldman deserves some compensation; he
has suffered tremendous loss from the
murder of his son.
Lee deserves a reward; she risked her
life
Benson deserves some good luck; he is a
fine person.
Gordon deserves some good luck; she has
had only bad.
McArthur deserves a hearing; he is an
expert on the subject.
Cleveland deserves better publicity; it
is an interesting city.
That painting deserves to be in a
museum; it is a great work of art.
This problem deserves careful
consideration; a wrong solution could
spell disaster for our business.
Legislative bill n. 113 deserves passage
into law; it is fair and just.
The villain deserved to be crushed in
the landslide; she had never been
punished for her crimes.
Peters deserves to get good weather for
his holidays; he has planned everything
so carefully.
Smith deserves a breakthrough; she has
been working at that problem for years
now.
Martin deserves to be punished; he lied
to Jackson and Burns about ringing up
yesterday.
Nolan deserved the prize for her
efforts; her painting was by far the
best
Furthermore, Nolan deserved every bit of
the $500 she got for 1st prize.
McKenzie deserves to go to jail; he
robbed that old lady.
Furthermore, McKenzie deserved about 5
years jail for his offence.
Menzies deserves to be honored; she made
important contributions to Commonwealth
relations
Furthermore, Menzies deserved at least a
K.C.M.G.
Pike deserves $50; that amount was
offered to anyone who climbed this peak,
and Pike did.
Haiti deserved the sanctions imposed
upon it; its military government was
illegitimate and corrupt.
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31

.

32.

Monkeys, dogs and cats do not deserve
the pain they receive in laboratory
experiments; they are at least nearpersons, and so should be treated
similarly, especially with respect to
causing them harm.
American Indians deserve a national
holiday.
(From a bumper-sticker.)
The Subjects of Desert

As the length and variety of this list shows, desert

claims come in a wide assortment of flavors, sizes and
colors.

typically

Although the subject of
a

person, claims

a

(15-18)

where the subject is a city,

desert claim is most
and

(30)

a country,

a

present examples

work of art, a

legislative bill, or

a

are "near-persons."

Since my interest in desert is

problem.

connected to justice, and

primarily among persons,

I

I

In claim

(31),

the subjects

think that justice is of concern
am willing to ignore claims where

the subject is clearly not a person.

Maybe the force of

those claims comes from suitable paraphrases where reference
to the non-person is replaced by reference to a suitable

person.

For instance,

construed as

a

claim (30), about Haiti, can be

claim about the actual military leaders

— they

are the ones who deserved harm for their illegal ouster of

President Aristide, and the subsequent human-rights

atrocities which they encouraged or permitted.

Claim (16),

about the painting deserving to be in a museum, can perhaps
be construed as a claim about the public (understood as a

group of persons)

the public deserves access to that

painting (through its being in
35

a

museum; it is a great work

of art and should be seen.

However,

I

do not greatly care

if such reconstructions do not always work.

It seems to me

that so long as all the people get what they deserve,
then

justice is not furthered or lessened by mere objects
getting
(or failing to get)

what they deserve.

If non - personal

objects do deserve anything, it is not in the important
sense that people deserve, and so has no bearing on justice.
It might be thought that in addition to individuals,

groups should also get what they deserve.

My view is that

groups are not entities over and above their members.
Furthermore, a person never deserves anything because of

group-membership alone.

Instead,

talk about desert due to

group-membership is to be understood as talk about an
individual's desert because she possesses

a

relevant feature

that makes, or at least helps to make, the group deserving.
For instance,

consider Slowpoke, who is

winning relay team.

a

member of a prize-

Suppose Slowpoke did not run a very

good leg, but the team won the race anyway.
Slowpoke deserves
efforts,

a

Clearly,

share in the prize, because Slowpoke's

though they may have been slowest, were still good

enough to help the team triumph.

Near-persons are

matters to justice.

a

different story.

I

think claim

(31)

Objects with some but not all of the

attributes of personhood should receive some justice.

Consider two worlds that are the same with respect to the
deserts of humans, but differ with respect to the treatment
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of monkeys.

In world A,

the monkeys are raised strictly for

the purpose of torturing them to a slow,
In world B,

wild,

agonizing death.

the monkeys are allowed to live life in the

facing natural dangers, but no torture is inflicted by

humans.

Assuming that there are no other near-persons

besides monkeys in either world A or
more unjust than B.

I

A is clearly far

think that in world A, the monkeys

are not getting what they deserve,

injustice there.

B,

This is why

I

and this leads to the

wrote above that justice is

only "primarily" concerned with persons.

It is also

concerned with near-persons, and so they are appropriate
candidates to be the subjects of desert claims.
The Deserts Themselves

The things that subjects can deserve are quite varied,
at least at first glance.

Anything from "some good luck,"

as in claims

(12-13),

to "every bit of the $500," as in

claim

However,

it may seem that all of these various

(24)

deserts can be categorized as either something which is
pleasant, or something which is unpleasant.
Kleinig,

for instance,

"Anything which is pleasant or

unpleasant can be said to be deserved,
say,

So says John

"

and he goes on to

"Deserved treatment is not something toward which we

remain indifferent." 71
position.

This seems to echo Joel Feinberg's

Here is his view about the various kinds of

deserts
They are varied, but they have at least one thing
they are generally "affective" in
in common:
37

character, i.e., favored or disfavored, pursued or
avoided, pleasant or unpleasant.
The deserved
thing must be something generally regarded with
favor or disfavor, even if, in some particular
case, it is regarded with indifference by a
person
said to deserve it.
If we were all perfect
stoics, if no event were ever more or less
pleasing to us than any other, then there would be
no use for the concept of desert 72
.

with

I

see in this passage a proposal about deserts,

a

little argument to support it.

along

The proposal is

similar to Kleinig's view above, that all deserts must be

pleasant or unpleasant.
view,

present here

I

though

I

To show the import of Feinberg's

precisif ication of Kleinig's view;

a

do not mean to imply that Kleinig would or should

accept this as equivalent to his original statement.

(I

will speak of states of affairs as the things which may
serve as the deserts of a subject.)
Dl

State of affairs e cannot be a desert
for subject S at time t unless e is
either pleasant or unpleasant to S at

t.

The problem with Dl is that though a person might be

indifferent to
occasion,

a

state of affairs on some particular

it still can be exactly what the person deserves

on that occasion.

For instance,

suppose a marathoner learns

of death of his father just before going on to race and win

the Boston Marathon.

Because of his grief for his father's

demise, he is indifferent to the accolades he receives.
he still deserves them.

not change his desert.

But

His indifference to the desert does

Feinberg at least makes it clear

that such situations as the marathoner's are to be
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considered legitimate cases of desert.

His proposal might

be precisified as follows.
D2

E cannot be a desert for S at t unless e
is either pleasant or unpleasant to most
people, most of the time.

Since most people, most of the time, would find the

accolades given the marathoner pleasant, the fact that in
this one special instance he was indifferent to them would

not affect the appropriateness of the accolades for his

accomplishment
One other minor point is that both D1 and D2 treat

positive and negative deserts on

a par.

That is,

for a

state of affairs to be a desert, it must be generally

pleasant or unpleasant--i

.

e

.

,

not generally indifferent.

But this has the result that a flogging (an unpleasant state
of affairs)

can be at least considered as a desert for a

person's bravery in the line of duty (an action for which
only pleasant states of affairs are appropriate candidates
as deserts)

.

This seems at least as incorrect as the

proposal that some state of affairs to which the person is

indifferent can serve her/his desert.

Thus,

I

would follow

Scott Hestevold, and treat positive deserts and negative

deserts separately. 73
PD

E cannot be a positive desert for S at
unless e is pleasant to most people,
most of the time.

t

ND

E cannot be a negative desert for S at
unless e is unpleasant to most people,
most of the time.

t
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All of these proposals are supported by the
little

argument that Feinberg gives, that if we were
indifferent to
every event, then there would be no use for the
concept of
desert.

This is supposed to support the contention that
no

state of affairs can be a desert unless it has a pleasant
or

unpleasant character.
unpersuasive.
too much.

I

find Feinberg'

For one thing,

I

s

argument

think that it would prove

It would show not only that the concept of desert

reguires non-stoics, but that all moral concepts, including
the concept of morally right action,

have the same requirement.

etc.,

judgments of character,

However,

there is

a

distinguished tradition that holds that the morally right
action is morally right not because it is pleasant, but

because it is morally right, in the famous words of

Moore

74

G.

E.

Even if no event were ever more or less pleasing

.

to any person,

desert:

there might still be a use for the concept of

to record the truth about justice.

Feinberg

himself makes this point in his discussion of grades as
deserts when he says,
... a grade as such is simply a way of ranking
something ... an appraisal which may be put to some
future uses or may simply be put on the record for
no other purpose than to register the truth 15
.

So

I

do not think that Feinberg has given a reason to

think that perfect stoicism would obviate need for desert.
On the other hand,

point.

Feinberg may be making

a

metaethical

He may be simply stating his belief that preferences

determine goodness.

He may be a preferentist with respect
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to desert,

just as some utilitarians are pref erentists
with

respect to what they think should be maximized.
of fact,

I

would disagree with Feinberg.

I

As a matter

would say that

part of what is required of a state of affairs to be
a

positive desert, is not that it is generally found to be
pleasant, but that it is actually good.

Persons can be

misled as to which state of affairs are good, and they may
erroneously conclude that they have not got their
appropriate deserts when in fact they have.

So,

is possible for all people to be perfect stoics,

though it
and not

find either their good deserts pleasant, or their bad

deserts unpleasant, it is still true that some deserts are
good,

while others are bad.

opinion,

I

However,

though

will not argue for it here.

I

am of this

Suffice to say that

Feinberg has not given any reason to think that desert is

different from other moral concepts such that one who is not
a

preferentist about goodness when considering morally right

action should become

a

preferentist about goodness when

considering deserts.
Finally,

I

think Feinberg'

s

discussion of grades shows

that it is not the case that all desert must be pleasant or

unpleasant, good or bad

grade may be neutral.
rank,

-

in some contexts the deserved

The grade simply serves to record the

which may itself be neutral.

an "A" is a good or pleasant desert,

For instance,

although

and an "F" a bad or

unpleasant desert, it seems plausible that there is some
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grade in between which is neither good nor bad,
pleasant nor
unpleasant, but simply neutral.
Thus, I think that the

attempt to restrict possible deserts to things which
are
either pleasant or unpleasant fails.
fails because

I

Partly

think it

I

think that goodness is not (or not merely)

pleasure, but even if Kleinig were right about the nature
of
goodness,

I

think he is wrong about the requirement that all

deserts be positive or negative.

when speaking of deserts,

I

Some are neutral.

would say,

So,

"the person who

does/is good deserves good deserts, the person who does/is
evil deserves evil deserts, and the person who does/is

neutral deserves neutral deserts."
Cosmic and Person-Bestowed Deserts
There is another parameter along which the deserts in
the list of claims above differ.

It seems clear that some

deserts are bestowable by persons; for instance, those
deserts in claims

(3-5),

But some deserts,

such as those mentioned in claims

(13),
(6),

(19-21),
(7),

(8),

(10),

(11),

(14-18),

and perhaps also those mentioned in

(22-31).
(12),
(1),

and (9-11), seem not to be the kind that are

bestowable by persons.

A landslide or bad weather are not

the kinds of things generally under control of people.

occur whether or not we wish or intend them.
e.g.

(2),

They

Some deserts,

success, may be partly under control of people, partly

uncontrollable
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Feinberg concerns himself only with deserts
that are or
could be bestowed by persons. Kleinig’s discussion
of

deserts does not rule out "cosmic" desert, that is,
desert
that is not bestowed by another person.
Indeed, claims (20)
and (21), which mention the deserts "good weather"
and "a

breakthrough,

"

are adapted from examples mentioned by

Kleinig in his article.

Most other writers do include

cosmic deserts in their discussion, and Feinberg gives no

reason for his rejection of them. 76

Here is a reason to

think that Feinberg may be correct.

Consider two worlds,

very similar in most respects, but quite different in one
significant way.

The inhabitants of Sunnyskye are morally

excellent, and also see to it that insofar as possible each

person there gets his or her deserts.

In addition,

people there have good weather all the time.

the

The same is

true of the inhabitants of Naturaldisaster with respect to

moral worth and person-bestowed deserts; however, the

unlucky denizens of that inhospitable sphere are plagued
with frequent hurricanes, tornados, earthquakes and tidal
waves.

If cosmic deserts are true deserts,

then it is

reasonable to suppose that Sunnyskye-people are deserving of
the good weather they receive.

On the other hand,

the poor

Naturaldisasterians are not deserving of the terrible
weather that they receive.

In fact,

they also deserve good

weather, and through no fault of their own do not get it.
So,

assuming that the person-bestowed deserts of Sunnyskye
43

are the same as those of

Naturaldisaster, but that the

cosmic deserts are skewed as outlined here, and

relating the justice of

a

a

principle

world to the deserts therein in

a

straightforward manner; then it turns out that Sunnyskye is
a

more just world than Naturaldisaster.

me.

This seems wrong to

It is just not true that Naturaldisaster is any less

just than Sunnyskye.

After all, the people in the former

world treat each other as justly as do the people in the
latter world.

Granted, Naturaldisaster may be less happy,

and we might say of its inhabitants, that they are less
lucky, but this does not seem relevant to the justice that

goes on in that world.

So perhaps this example furnishes a

reason why cosmic deserts should be disallowed by

a

suitable

analysis of desert.
However,

someone who does not think that deserts play

a

very large role in justice may think that my example shows
that desert should not be used to understand justice.
a one

may say,

Such

"This just shows that desert and justice are

not connected in the way that you think.

For though

Naturaldisaster is not less just than Sunnyskye because of
some bad weather,

it is still true that the

Naturaldisasterians do not deserve their bad luck.

The

deserts of the two worlds are not the same."

My view is that just as there are two types of deserts,
cosmic and personal, so are there two types of justice.

Naturaldisaster is cosmically less just than Sunnyskye, but
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is its equal in personal justice.

In some contexts it may

be more useful to consider strictly personal
justice (and,

therefore,

strictly personal desert)

.

For instance,

the

framers of a constitution may find it impractical
to allow
laws which would punish thieves only in the absence
of

natural disasters befalling them.
As the above catalog shows, there are many different

proposed bases for deserts.

Conscientious effort, actual

contribution or success, moral worth, beauty, innocent
suffering, bad luck, premeditated evil, need, past receipts,

entitlement, personhood, talent.

These are some of the

major proposed bases for desert.

Not all these bases are

accepted by every philosopher.

Robert Young accepts moral

merit, value of contribution, and effort
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Wojciech

.

Sadurski argues that effort is the only legitimate basis for
desert
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Feinberg says that the desert basis of

.

a

prize is

the pre-eminent possession of the skill singled out as a

basis of competition; the desert basis of

a

grade is the

actual possession to the appropriate degree of the quality

assessed

79
.

Several philosophers,

including Feinberg, Sher,

Miller and Kleinig, also try to provide more general
analyses of desert bases.
The above paragraph only alludes to the problems that

need to be worked out.

What desert bases are there?

there a general analysis of the concept of a base?

Is

Can it

adjudicate between competing accounts of what bases there
45

are?

As the discussion of desert bases requires
detailed

treatment,

I

will deal with it in several individual

chapters after this one.
The catalog of desert claims is meant to show the

diversity of such claims.

But

I

do not expect that any

analysis would have to accept all of those claims, so

I

want

to extract a few that are likely candidates for any analysis

we might encounter.
the catalog,

Below

I

have extracted four claims from

in descending order of likelihood that each

would be accepted by most analyses of desert.
Jones deserves her success; she has
worked hard for it.
Simpson deserves the death-sentence; he
planned the murder.
Walters deserves the job; she is the
best qualified applicant.
Baker deserves to win; he has played
superbly.

1.

8.

3.
6.

While they are in need of some elaboration,

think

I

these claims do present some of the strongest evidence for
the importance of the concept of desert.

A satisfactory

analysis of desert should either confirm claims such as
these,

or if it rules some out,

at least shed light on why

each appears plausible at first glance.
Desert as Propriety
In the first paragraph of Joel Feinberg's famous

article,

"Justice and Personal Desert,

"

Feinberg states that

his "direct aim" is to provide an analysis of the concept of
"Having

desert; and some twenty-two pages later he writes,

presented this analysis of the concept of desert,
46

I

shall

conclude

.
.

b0

According to Feinberg, desert can be

.

understood as

a

certain sort of propriety.

"To say that a

person deserves something is to say that there is
sort of propriety in his having it." 81

certain

a

So an initial stab

at Desert Analysis could be as follows.

DAI

S deserves x =df. it is proper for S to
have x.

The obvious immediate question raised by A1 is the

meaning of 'proper.'

Feinberg notes that there are other

kinds of propriety than that conferred by desert.

For

instance, eligibility and entitlement can confer propriety.
It is by means of contrasting these kinds of propriety with

the kind conferred by desert that Feinberg attempts to

elucidate the analysis of desert.

According to Feinberg, eligibility is

a

"minimal

qualification, a state of not being disqualified," for some

prize or office.

Entitlement is stronger.

A person

is

entitled to some prize or office when s/he satisfies certain
conditions.

Eligibility and entitlement are rules-based

concepts, only applicable when there is an existent set of

rules governing social intercourse.
something,

However, to deserve

"one must be qualified in still a third sense;

one must satisfy certain conditions of worthiness which are

written down in no legal or official regulation." 82
Take the presidency as an example.

To be eligible to

run for president, one must be at least thirty-five and a
U.S. citizen born in the U.S. or one of its territories.
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To

be entitled to be president, one must be eligible,
and one
must have received the most electoral votes (there
are some

other legal methods of becoming president, such as
being the

vice-president when the president dies, etc.).

But to be

deserving of the presidency, one must (and this list will
vary according to the standards of individual voters) be
intelligent and honest, have

a

plan for the job, be a

consensus-builder, or be a leader, and so on.

conditions are not specified by any rule,

These

"At best,

they are

conditions ’required' by the private standards or principles
of a sensitive voter." 83

This discussion suggests the

following analyses for eligibility, entitlement, and
desert. 84

The analyses of eligibility and entitlement seem

pretty straightforward, but there are at least two analyses
of desert suggested.

I

will present both and then discuss

the merits and defects of each. 85

ELG

there exists
some social institution, I; the rules of
I specify that no one who does not
satisfy conditions C shall be allowed to
compete for x; S "participates" in I, 5
satisfies C.

ENT

S is entitled to x =df. S is eligible
for x; the rules of I specify that if
one has quality Q, then one gets x; S
participates in I; S has quality Q.

DA2

S is entitled to x;
there are further conditions, F, not
written down, that constitute the reason
or point of I; S satisfies F.

DA3

there exists some
social institution, I; in addition to
the written rules of I, there are

S is eligible for x =df.

S deserves 2 x =df.

S deserves 3 x =df.
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further conditions, F, not written down,
that constitute the reason or point of
I; S satisfies F.
The difference between DA2 and DA 3 is that the
former

makes entitlement

a

latter does not.

The textual evidence for DA2 comes from

the sentence,
in still

a

necessary condition for desert, and the

"To deserve something,

third sense ...” 86

one must be qualified

This sentence follows a

discussion of how eligibility is

a

weak qualification, which

is embodied in the stronger qualification of entitlement.

The natural progression would be that desert is the

strongest qualification, which embodies the previous two,
plus something else.

DA2 allows us to make sense of the

following statement:

"the man who was just elected

president of the U.S. did not deserve it."

This would be

true when it was the case that although he won the election,

and so was entitled to the presidency, he did not fulfill
the further unwritten conditions needed for desert.

However, DA2 suffers from two defects, one of which, at
least,

is devastating.

First of all, DA2 appears to fly in

the face of a statement earlier made by Feinberg,

analysis will suggest that,

that his

"desert is a 'natural’ moral

notion (that is, one which is not logically tied to
institutions, practices, and rules)." 87

DA2 on the

contrary, does appear tied to rules, because one of its

requirements for desert is entitlement.
must be entitled to be deserving, and
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S

According to DA2,
can not be entitled

S

to anything unless there is an institution with
rules and S

participates in that institution. The second criticism
of
DA2 is even worse.

Feinberg makes it clear that it is not

only reasonable to say of someone who actually won the
election,

that he did not deserve to, but that it is also

reasonable to say that someone who did not win the election
did deserve to.
statement.

Yet DA2 does not allow the second type of

According to DA2, to deserve to win, one must be

entitled to win.

In other words,

must have already won.

Thus,

to deserve to win,

one

DA2 clearly fails to capture

an important part of the nature of desert:

that a person

could deserve something without having already achieved it.
DA3 does not suffer from the defects so far discussed
of DA2

.

It is not tied to the written rules of an

institution, and it does allow that a person who has not

achieved something could deserve it.

However, the

connection between rules and desert is complex, and it is
not clear that DA3 has correctly captured it.
thing,

DA3 is still tied to social institutions in a way

that it seems Feinberg'

But

I

s

above quotation would not allow.

will not try to further resolve the connection between

rules and desert here.
next,

For one

Kleinig's analysis, to be examined

takes up the issue of raw versus institutionalized

desert claims, and this matter can be put off until then.
DA3 and DA2 have in common the part about desert

requiring satisfaction of conditions not written down in any
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institution's rules.

I

think

I

can show that this

requirement is unsatisfactory in an analysis of desert
without having to resolve further questions of the

connection between rules and desert.
First,

I

think that the requirement for satisfaction of

conditions that are explicitly not written down in the

institution

s

rules,

is defective.

Presumably, since we can

talk about cases of desert, it is possible to know what the

point of some institution is.
the point of an institution,

But if it is possible to know

then it seems that it is

possible to write down that point

-

even to incorporate that

point into the written rules of the institution.

Thus

I

think that DA3 is too strict in its requirement that the

desert conditions must be unwritten.

As a matter of fact,

they often are unwritten, but that is merely contingent, and
not necessary to the concept of desert.

remedied in DA4
DA4

,

This defect is

below.

5 deserves x =df.

there exists some
social institution, I; there are
conditions, P, that constitute the
reason or point of I; S participates in
I, S satisfies P.

The defect of DA4

(and all the previous incarnations of

Feinberg's analysis of desert as well), can be highlighted

by the following desert claims.
I.

II.
12.

Jones deserves her success; she has
worked hard for it.
Lee deserves a reward; she risked her
life
Benson deserves some good luck; he is
fine person.
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a

Gordon deserves some good luck; she has
had only bad.
McArthur deserves a hearing; he is an
expert on the subject.
The villain deserved to be crushed in
the landslide; she had never been
punished for her crimes.
Peters deserves to get good weather for
his holidays; he has planned everything
so carefully.
Smith deserves a breakthrough; she has
been working at that problem for years
now
Monkeys, dogs and cats do not deserve
the pain they receive in laboratory
experiments; they are at least nearpersons, and so should be treated
similarly, especially with respect to
causing them harm.

13.
14.
19.

20.

21.

31.

None of these claims is specifically tied to an
institution.
DA4

So none of these claims could be true given

While some of the claims about luck may not carry too

.

much weight, claim
claims.
so

I

is from my select group of target

(1)

It is the type of desert claim made all the time,

think that any analysis that disallows

wrong.

(1)

must be

The fact is that many desert claims are not tied to

institutions, as Feinberg noted.

The problem is that while

Feinberg originally noted this fact, he seems not to have

sufficiently allowed for it in his subsequent treatment of
desert.

I

think any attempt to accommodate these desert

claims along Feinberg'

s

lines will weaken the analysis so

much as to make it useless.
DA5

For instance,

DA5 below.

5 deserves x =df. it is proper for S to
get x, and this propriety is independent
of any rules, institutions, or

practices
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DA5 suffers from two significant defects.

First,

analysis corrects too far the problem of DA4 et al.

this

The

problem with those analyses is that they left out many
legitimate cases of desert that were independent of
institutions.

But DA5, while allowing those cases, does not

take account of the fact that some deserts are tied very

closely to institutions.

For instance,

in competitions,

awarding of prizes is typically rule-based.

the

Even more, the

competitive activities themselves would not even be engaged
in if it were not for the competition.

Consider Carl

Lewis’s four Olympic gold medals in the 1984 Games.
he deserves them.

Suppose

The propriety of his receiving them just

as clearly is not independent of any institutions or rules.
If there were no Olympics,

it would be bizarre to say that

Carl Lewis deserved Olympic gold medals.

Indeed,

it is hard

to see how he could deserve any kind of athletic award if

there had been no institutionalized competition so that he

would make the effort to develop his skills and prove he was
the best.

One of the truisms of professional football is

that on any given day, any given team can beat any other.
So it seems sensible that at least part of the desert for

winning a game comes from having actually won it.
not always the case, but

I

This is

think it is generally the case,

or we would not need to use games to determine which team

deserves the Super Bowl trophy each year.
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So DA5 fails to account for a considerable
class of

institutionalized deserts.
worse.

But its second failing is even

DA5 analyzes one opaque concept

(desert)

in terms of

another concept that is no less opaque (propriety)

It is

.

not at all clear what kind of propriety it is that

constitutes desert.

The only information about propriety

given in DA5 is that it is supposed to be independent of
institutions, and that is not even quite correct.

Thus,

while we may have some better ideas about desert, we do not
have enough to claim

a

satisfactory analysis.

I

will turn

to other philosopher's writings to try to shed more light on

the subject.

Desert as Evaluation

John Kleinig notes that some desert claims arise only
in rules-based contexts, while others arise in contexts

which could not be said to have such

a

connection to rules.

The former he characterizes as institutionalized desert
claims, while the latter are raw desert claims. 88

However,

Kleinig thinks that the two types of desert differ only in
the fact that "institutionalized desert claims at least

implicitly prescribe a dispenser of deserts," whereas the

responsibility for fulfilling raw desert claims does not
rest on any particular person or authority. 89

In fact,

Kleinig claims that desert is not created by satisfying
conditions of

a

Anyone who thinks they are,

legal system.

is confusing desert with entitlement.
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90

Thus Kleinig'

analysis should work for desert claims both in
institutional
and in non-institutional settings.
Below is my

interpretation of Kleinig's analysis of desert, but let
me
note first the textual evidence for this analysis.
Kleinig
starts talking about "the analysis

I

have given,

"

the

paragraph after he says.
We can now state more clearly the type of grounds
[B) by virtue of which X is said to deserve A.
These must be such as evaluate (at least
implicitly) the characteristics possessed or
things done by X. 91

Again,

at the start of Section V,

he says,

So far I have suggested ... of a certain subject,
X, that it deserves A, where A is a form of
pleasant or unpleasant treatment, when X possesses
characteristics or has done something, B, which
constitute a positive or negative evaluation of
X.
I

92

have taken my reconstruction particularly from this second

statement
DA6

S deserves x =df. x is a form of
pleasant or unpleasant treatment; S
possesses characteristics or has done
something, B, which constitute a
positive or negative evaluation of 5.

Before discussing this analysis in depth,

I

would

change the part about pleasant or unpleasant treatment,

along the lines of what

I

said above

(p.

38)

about what

kinds of limits there are on the things that can be

deserved.

This requires a minor change in the part about

what kind of evaluations there can be, consistent with what
I

noted from Feinberg's discussion of grades, also discussed

above

(p.

41)

Here is the revised analysis.
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DA7

s deserves x =df. S possesses
characteristics or has done something,
B, which constitutes an evaluation
of

S.

The difference between DA 6 and DA7 takes
account of my

belief that evaluation of

a

thing is not only positive or

negative, but can be neutral, and that the deserts can
match
the evaluation.

They too can be either positive, negative,

or neutral.

DA 7 makes clear what might have been obscured in DA6,
that the desert,
In DA6,

x,

is not connected to the evaluation of S.

the only reason x is in the analysand is to put a

limit on what form it can take.
as in DA7

,

Once that limit is removed,

then it becomes clear that more is needed for the

analysis of desert.

In a desert claim,

it seems that there

is some special connection between x and S's past actions or

characteristics, such that in some sense they "match."

Although

I

have used vague language here, the idea should be

fairly clear.

It is that expressed when we say "the

punishment should fit the crime,

"

expanded to take account

of a wider variety of states of affairs than just those

where crimes have been committed.
To return to the Carl Lewis example that provided so

much trouble for Feinberg's attempted analysis, it does at
least appear that Kleinig's analysis has no problem with

institutional deserts.

Since evaluations can take place in

both institutional and non-institutional settings, DA7 can
take account of both institutionalized and raw desert
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claims.

To say that Carl Lewis deserved his four
Olympic

gold medals in 1984 is, according to DA7, to say
that Carl
Lewis possessed certain characteristics, or did
something,

which constituted an evaluation of himself.

In this case,

the evaluation took place in an institutional setting.
far,

so good for DA7

.

However,

So

this case provides a

concrete example of the above-mentioned deficiency of DA7
The analysis does not make it clear why, or even that, Carl

Lewis deserved four Olympic gold medals, as opposed to

anything else.

After all, in each of the events for which

Lewis got the gold, there were several other people who did
not get gold.

Yet,

each of the other competitors was in

a

situation where what he did constituted an evaluation of
himself.

So each of them deserved something,

too.

DA7 does

not provide an answer to the question of why the other

competitors did not deserve gold medals just as Carl Lewis
did.
So it seems to me that DA7 is not a full analysis of a

desert claim such as,
analysis of the claim,

"S deserves x."

Rather it is an

"S is deserving."

It should be

reformulated thus:
DA8

S is deserving =df. S possesses
characteristics or has done something,
B, which constitutes an evaluation of

S.

This is a better analysis than those suggested by

Feinberg,

since the concept of evaluation is not nearly so

opaque as the concept of propriety, or desert.
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So DA8 does

perhaps shed some light on the nature of desert,

However,

as Kleinig himself points out,

...if the claims of justice are to be fulfilled,
then not only the question of whether a person
ought to get rewarded, punished, compensated,
etc., but also the question of how much he ought
to get, must be settled by desert
93
considerations.
.

.

However, even without a full analysis of "S deserves
X,

"

there seem to be some significant problems with

Kleinig'

s

approach.

First of all, Kleinig'

'evaluation' is fairly broad.

from an innocent bystander.

punishment.

on Kleinig'

So,

Suppose

I

deserve

But this is surely a non-

Of course,

it may seem fairly

deserve punishment for my crime, but the act

of theft itself is not an evaluation.

something extra.

my character)

steal some money

I

view, my theft must have

s

standard use of 'evaluation.'
I

use of the word

It seems clear that

constituted an evaluation of me.

obvious that

s

.

The evaluation is

It is a judgment about my theft

In any case,

(or about

the evaluation is an act of

judgment that is made about the theft.

It is not the theft

itself
Furthermore,

it would appear that a person can be

deserving even when the person has not done anything that
could be even broadly construed as a self-evaluation.

Let

us return to the case of poor Jim, whose house was smashed

by the lightening-f elled tree.
this circumstance,

self-evaluation.

It is hard to say that in

Jim did anything that would constitute
Thus,

it is hard to say why,
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a

given DA8, we

should think that Jim is deserving of
compensation.
does appear to deserve something for his
house

Yet he

94
.

There is something about Kleinig's approach
that is

consistent with my own view that desert bases are
primarily
virtues and vices, since it is often on the basis
of virtues
and vices that a person's character is evaluated.
So, my
bases would constitute, in Kleinig's terms, an "evaluation"
of the person.

However, unless we are naturalists about

moral properties, we will not be able to simply "read off"
the evaluation from the action.

The judgment will be added

by the observer according to her or his moral scheme.
Perhaps
approach.

I

am unfair in my criticism of Kleinig's

You might think that though it is not literally

true that your acts are an evaluation of yourself, it is
true that they provoke evaluations in others
occasion,

(and,

on

in yourself as well); and this is what Kleinig's

approach emphasizes.

I

cannot disagree with this.

However,

to say that your actions provoke evaluation in others hardly

seems to get at the core of desert.
all,

After all, much, if not

of what we do provokes evaluation by people.

No one

would claim that desert is not an evaluative concept.

Thus,

this construal of Kleinig appears too broad to be of much

help
Desert as Attitude

David Miller develops his analysis of desert along
lines similar to Feinberg's and Kleinig's.
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His analysis

includes concepts of fittingness, evaluation,
and responsive
attitudes.
In a passage that I did not include in
my

attempted reconstruction of Feinberg'

s

view,

Feinberg says,

...then the kind of propriety characteristic of
personal desert. .is also to be likened or even
identified with a kind of "fittingness" between
one person's actions or qualities and another
person's responsive attitudes. 95
.

Responsive attitudes, according to Feinberg, include
such attitudes as recognition, admiration, the objective
stance,

gratitude,

remorse,

sympathy,

appreciation, resentment, disapproval,
and concern.

Indeed,

Feinberg goes so

far as to suggest that the true deserts are responsive

attitudes, and that the modes of treatment typically counted
as deserts are derivative.

They are merely an accepted way

of expressing the attitudes in a concrete form. 96

While it may seem plausible that all cases of desert
involve responsive attitudes as part of the desert, it

hardly seems correct to assert that responsive attitudes are
the sole true deserts.

If someone saves my life at some

risk to herself, she surely deserves my gratitude, though it

may not be clear that she deserves anything else.

However,

a look at the other kinds of desert claims shows that

responsive attitudes cannot be all that is deserved.
instance,
5.

8.

these desert claims:

Jackson deserves more than minimum wage;
her job is important and she does it
well
Anderson deserves his twenty-year
sentence; he planned the murder.
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For

While it may be true that in addition to her
wages,

Jackson deserves our admiration, or recognition for
her

well-performed important work, it is certainly not true
that
she deserves only those attitudes.

Similarly, though

Anderson deserves our disapprobation for his premeditated
evil deed, he deserves more than just our attitudes.

attitudes do not punish him.
his wrong-doing.

They do not make him pay for

Similarly, our good attitudes toward

Jackson do not pay her rent.
them.

Our

She may not even know we feel

She deserves the money.
It might be thought that

Feinberg's claim.

I

am not doing justice to

Feinberg never claimed that people do not

deserve more than attitudes.

He only claimed that the modes

of treatment are "deserved only in a derivative way,

insofar

perhaps as they are the natural or conventional means of

expressing the morally fitting attitudes." 97

My view is

that the force of such claims as

is not captured

(5)

and

(8)

by any analysis of deserts that views responsive attitudes
as the "true" deserts and modes of treatment as merely

derived from them.
In any case,

Feinberg's talk of the nature of what is

deserved does not provide
of desert claims.

a

clear suggestion for an analysis

It seems to be merely a proposed

modification of the view of what kinds of things the deserts
themselves might be.

I

mention it here because Miller's

analysis makes extensive use of the concept of appraising
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attitudes, which appear to be very similar to that
of

responsive attitudes.
concepts,

Because of the similarity of the two

Feinberg's discussion may support, help clarify,

or at least presage Miller's view,

though Miller does not

credit Feinberg's paper in this connection.

Here is

a

summary that Miller makes about desert.
When we make a judgment of desert, we are judging the
appropriateness of this particular individual, with his
qualities and past behavior, receiving a given benefit
or harm--an appropriateness which is made intelligible
by considering the appraising attitudes that we may
take up towards the person. 98
This summary suggests the following analysis of

desert

99

DA9

S deserves x =df. (i) 5 possesses
characteristics or has done something,
B; (ii) there is an appraising attitude,
A, toward S; (iii) A is evoked by B, and
(iv) giving x to 5 would be an
appropriate way to express A. 100

Clearly,

appraising attitudes play

in this analysis.

are admiration,

a

fundamental role

Examples of positive appraising attitudes

approval, and gratitude. 101

judgments always require

a base,

Just as desert

so do appraising attitudes.

You cannot admire someone for no reason at all.
be some reason for your admiration.

There must

Further, the

restrictions on what kind of reasons are acceptable are the
same as the restrictions on what kinds of bases are

acceptable for desert judgments.

The reason

(or base)

must

consist of some feature or past action of the person toward

whom you hold the attitude (or about whom you make the
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desert judgment)

.

Miller makes several more key points

about appraising attitudes, which are summarized
below. 102
A)

It is contingent that people have
appraising attitudes.
There is no purpose in our having them,
we just have them because they are
"evoked" by the situation.
If there were no appraising attitudes,
then there would be no use of the
concept of desert.
The word would have
no meaning 103
The range of desert bases coincides with
the range of bases for appraising
attitudes
Appraising attitudes make intelligible
the connection between a desert judgment
and its base.

B)

C)

.

D)

E)

Note the switch in roles of attitudes from Feinberg to
Miller.

Feinberg wrote that responsive attitudes are the

true deserts.

Miller does not make this claim.

He thinks

that the appraising attitude explains the connection between
a

desert claim and its base.

Still,

this role makes

appraising attitudes more fundamental than desert claims.
Point

(C)

above, makes this very clear.

the attitude, but it is possible

Miller)

Desert requires

(and not ruled out by

that there could be attitudes without desert.

While not as precise as we might like, DA9 is specific

enough that certain possible desert bases are ruled out.

In

particular. Miller claims that entitlement and need are not
true desert bases.
claims,

In addition to those more controversial

DA9 allows Miller to rule out such possible bases as

belief, preference, and interest.
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Miller thinks that legal rights (entitlements)
are not
true desert bases because they do not make essential

reference to the individual's personal characteristics. 104
Needs are disqualified as desert bases because they do
not
evoke appraising attitudes.
[needs],

"No one wishes to have them

or admires others for having them." 105

ruled out by clause (iii) of DA9

So needs are

Similarly, we do not

.

admire people for possessing beliefs, preferences and
interests.

100

Thus,

they too are ruled out by clause (iii).

The reason that entitlements are ruled out is,

also clause

Miller.

(iii)

I

think,

But this is not explicitly stated by

.

What he does say is that the reason has something

to do with the fact that rights can be apportioned "without

essential reference to personal qualities." 107
example shows why

I

think that Miller is making an appeal to

the principle embodied in clause
29.

The following

(iii)

of DA9

Pike deserves $50; that amount was
offered to anyone who climbed this peak,
and Pike did.

The ostensible base for desert claim (29)

is of the

kind that Miller thinks is really just entitlement, and not
a

desert base after all.

To become entitled to the $50,

Pike had to do was climb the peak.

all

The offer existed before

Pike decided to climb the mountain, and so falls under the

rubric of claim-rights 108 or legitimate expectations. 109
to decide if Pike deserves the $50,

But

"we should have to

investigate several other matters, such as the difficulty of
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the climb," as well as Pike's individual qualities
as a

climber.

Actually, according to DA9, what matters is

whether Pike's fulfilling the conditions of the offer
evoked
an appraising attitude toward Pike.

believes that Pike's fulfilling
any appraising attitudes.

a

I

think that Miller

contract would not evoke

But his having certain

characteristics, combined with his climbing of the peak,

would evoke such attitudes (assuming certain characteristics
in Pike and the climb)

That is the reason Miller wrote

.

that we would need to investigate the rock-climbing in more

detail before we could decide about the deserts.

Thus,

entitlement, need, and the possession of interests,

preferences, and beliefs are excluded from desert-basehood

by appeal to the claim that appraising attitudes would not
be evoked in the relevant situation.

Miller's analysis of desert makes an interesting
connection between appraising attitudes and desert claims.
It seems,

at least initially,

problem.

However,

I

a

plausible approach to the

think there are several serious

problems that need to be addressed before this analysis
could be truly viable.

The most fundamental problem is the

need for an analysis of appraising attitudes, because of the
amount of conceptual work they do in DA9.

reasons

I

list here three

think that much more work needs to be done on

appraising attitudes.
below.

I

First,

I

I

will deal with them in more detail

do not think that Miller's analysis
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eliminates the possible bases that he says it does,

I

can

think of situations where an appraising attitude
might very
well be evoked by a person’s beliefs, or by her having

fulfilled

a

legal contract.

Second,

I

do not see why the

fact that an appraising attitude is evoked is so important.
I

have in mind cases where the appraising attitude is evoked

in an evil or sick person.

It seems to me that more than

mere evocation is needed; the attitude must somehow be
"appropriate."

Third,

the information provided by Miller on

appraising attitudes (and summarized above) is not adequate
to characterize which of our attitudes qualify as of the

appraising kind.

Even assuming the list of positive

attitudes is exhausted by admiration, gratitude, and
approval,

that still leaves negative appraising attitudes to

be covered.
In a footnote, Miller discusses an objection to his

claim that having

a

belief is not

a

desert base.

He admits

that "I admire him for being a Marxist," is an intelligible
claim.

things.

However, Miller deals with this by claiming two
First,

that there must be some special background,

such as that the person is being persecuted for his belief.
Second,

that what is actually admired is not the content of

the belief, but the courage shown in keeping the belief in
the face of that persecution

111
.

I

think that Miller's

explanation is, in many cases, plausible.
that it is possible to admire

a
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However,

I

think

person for the content of

her or his belief,

and not just for the circumstances under

which that belief is held.
love you.

For instance, my wife says,

You are the best husband in the world," and

grateful to her for those beliefs!

"I
I

am

(The other appraising

attitudes, admiration and approval, are also evoked in me.)
It is not just the circumstances under which she
holds the

beliefs,

and it is not just the fact that she holds the

beliefs, that evokes my appraising attitudes.
the contents of the belief:

It is also

that she loves me; that she

considers me the best husband in the world.
the Marxist from Miller's discussion.

Again,

consider

Maybe it is true that

the admiration evoked is due entirely to the person's

courage.

being

a

But the same person may say,

"I

approve of him for

Marxist," and this approval may be evoked because

the person approves of Marxism.

The content of the belief

evokes the approval, even while it is the courage shown in

maintaining the belief that evokes the admiration.

In fact,

we approve or disapprove of people all the time based on the

contents of their beliefs, their interests, and their

preferences.

This is evident in the way we go about making

friends and choosing the social groups we become affiliated
with.

We also feel gratitude, at least in part,

contents of people's beliefs.

So

I

for the

do not at all see why

Miller believes that the possession of beliefs, interests
and preferences cannot function as appraising attitude (and
thus also desert) bases.
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Needs are a bit different.

person

s

It seems unlikely that a

being in need would evoke either admiration,

approval, or gratitude.

Miller does admit that in an

extended sense of needs, people can be admired for
certain
needs,

such as the need of love from another human. 112

However,

even granting such needs as those, most desert

claims based on needs do seem ruled out by DA9.

The

question to be asked here, then, is what justification has

provided for claiming that DA9 is the right way to
go?

Instead of claiming that the range of desert bases is

delimited by the range of appraising attitude bases, and
thus ruling out most needs as bases, it might seem that it

should be admitted that the ranges of the bases for the two
concepts only imperfectly overlap.
are not appraising attitude bases,
course,

Thus,

and vice versa.

if in all other cases but needs,

overlapped, and if,

in addition,

some desert bases
Of

the ranges

appraising attitudes really

"make intelligible" the desert claims, then DA9 would get
the nod.

However,

I

think

I

can show that there are many

other cases than needs where appraising and desert bases do
not overlap,

Above

I

thus strengthening the case against DA9.

showed that several bases that Miller thought

were ruled out by DA9 actually are not ruled out.

The

possession of beliefs, interests and preferences can evoke
gratitude, admiration, or approval.
times,

But,

at least some

it does not seem that the evocations due to those
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bases are sufficient bases for desert.

For instance,

approve of my friend's interest in chess.

I

But it hardly

follows that because his interest in chess evokes
my
approval, he deserves anything.

Maybe that is just that

what he deserves is so minor, such as my verbal
expression
of approval

(he

cannot deserve my approval itself,

is something that is just evoked - see point

(B)

for that

above)

Nevertheless, there are certain instances where the

attitude evoked clearly does not correspond to
base.

For instance,

a

desert

in the case of admiration and approval

evoked in sick, twisted, or evil people.

In the past,

there

were many evocations of approval and admiration for the
beliefs,

interests, preferences, and actions of Hitler and

the Nazis.

There are still many today,

KKK movements.

in the Neo-Nazi and

Such positive appraising attitudes do not

correspond to any positive deserts for Hitler and Nazis!
Indeed,

this example brings to light what is to my mind

one of the serious flaws of Miller's analysis:

it places

too much emphasis on the attitudes actually evoked by

people.

Such attitudes are highly influenced by factors

which a thoughtful moralist would disregard.

For instance,

one who accepts DA9 must accept that when the residents of

Massachusetts approved of burning women for witchcraft, that
was their deserts.

Whereas these days, since people do not

approve of such barbaric practices, no one deserves to be
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burned as

a witch.

for a witch,

But surely no one deserved to be burned

then or now.

Furthermore,

in some cases people can hold the opposite

appraising attitudes at the same time, toward the same
person, evoked by exactly the same characteristic
or action
of a person.

What evokes Jack's approval is the very thing

that evokes Jill's disapproval.

Therefore, the very same

characteristic, described in exactly the same way at all
times,

can be a base for both positive and negative deserts.

The absurdity of these claims seems reason enough to reject
DA9.

There is yet another problem.

suggested by Kleinig (DA7 above)
of the deserved

s

this

(see point

(E)

Thus it has the same

in accounting for how much,

kind of thing is deserved given that

attitude is evoked.

like the analysis

does not make any mention

in the analysand.

(x)

problem as Kleinig’

,

DA9,

a

and what

certain appraising

Miller does have something to say about
above),

"The existence of appraising

attitudes makes intelligible the connection between

judgment and its basis." 113

a

desert

Since a desert claim includes

what (if not always how much)

is deserved,

I

think that

somehow the intent of what the sentence expresses should be,
if possible,

included in the analysis presented.

included in DA9 because
there,

I

It is not

was not certain how to get it in

and because the criticisms presented so far do not

depend on its presence or absence.
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Even if

could see how to get the intent of that

I

sentence into an analysis, though,
any more of a case for Miller.

I

do not think it makes

According to him, the

connection between "Smith deserves to win the mile,
"Smith has trained harder than anyone else,

"

"

and

is intelligible

because "we admire the kind of determination and effort
which goes into a course of training ." 114
There are two interesting senses of ’intelligible' that
I

think are relevant here.

The first is the sense expressed

when someone's behavior has

a

psychological explanation.

Given what is known about my beliefs, and the fact that

I

admire hard work, etc., then it is psychologically

consistent that

I

also believe that Smith deserves to win.

In this sense it seems clear that a person's belief in hard

work could help make intelligible her belief that Smith
should win the mile.
However,

the sense of 'intelligible' that is called for

in the connection between desert claims and their bases is

rather more normative.

Desert bases are supposed to justify

their desert claims, not just make them psychologically

understandable.

But as

I

have shown, above, the evocation

of an appraising attitude does not always show that a desert

base justifies its desert claim.

Thus

I

do not think that

Miller is right to base the analysis of desert on attitudes.
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Desert is a Primitive Concept
The alleged analyses of desert by
Feinberg, Kleinig,

and Miller all fail.

Although desert does seem related to

propriety, evaluation, and attitude, those
relationships are
not as simple as their analyses allege.
Furthermore, even
if there is a complex relationship
between desert and
propriety, or evaluation, or attitude, it is not
clear that
any one of them is enough to explicate desert.
Thus, I have
no analysis of the concept of desert.
I must present it as
a

primitive concept that is not further analyzable.

Nevertheless, there are some principles about desert that

make it more than

a

mere appeal to an obscure intuition.

These principles have to do with the nature of the desert

bases
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CHAPTER

4

EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES
In the last chapter,

analysis of desert.

I

was unable to provide an

However, by examining the alleged

desert bases, and presenting my own
view about which ones
are legitimate, I can at least
shed some light on the nature
of desert.
Once the true desert bases have been
enumerated,
it will be possible to show that
certain kinds of desert
claims are justified, and why, and that
certain kinds of

desert claims could never be justified, and
why.

This will

at least provide some understanding of
how desert works,

even if it is not as satisfactory as an
in-depth analysis.
Desert and Autonomous Action
In this chapter

I

consider the view that autonomous

action (freely-willed action)
desert.
Sher.

llj

is a legitimate ground for

This view is formulated and defended by George
I

will argue that his argument fails to establish

that autonomous action is a legitimate desert base. 116

This

leaves open the question of whether some other argument

might suffice.

Before addressing this question,

the formulation itself in some detail.

I

I

examine

show that Sher's

view is implausible independently of any argument for or
against it.

The view itself is flawed in such a way as to

make it seem unlikely that there is any account of
autonomous action that would make
autonomous action as

a

a

desert base.
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plausible case for
Finally,

I

argue that

autonomous action is not

a

desert base.

In part,

I

base

this on the failure of Sher's
account to stand up to any
serious examination; but I also argue
that the examples he

used to generate initial plausibility
for his view can be
explained by appeal to other, more
plausible desert bases.
Sher thinks there is an important
connection between
desert and free action. He thinks the link
goes beyond the

widely accepted notion that if there were
no free acts, then
no one would ever deserve anything 117
Sher says
that "the

.

value of

a

person's acting autonomously is somehow

transmitted to, or inherited by, what he is said
to
deserve ." 118 This transfer of value from free
action to
desert is what Sher thinks justifies the claim that

free

action is a desert base.
long and complex,
of it.

I

I

Since Sher's argument is rather

will first provide a lengthy quotation

will then try to summarize what

I

think he is

trying to say, and extract and explain an argument from his
text.

Sher starts by noting the value of autonomous action.
Few would deny that persons ought to be able to
choose and act freely, and indeed that their doing
so is of paramount importance ... But if the
opportunity to act freely has value, then so too
must its exercise. We can hardly say that it is a
good thing when someone can determine his own
fate, but not a good thing when he does 119
.

The next task for Sher is to show that the value of

autonomous acts is transmitted to particular outcomes.
Before acting, we typically weigh alternative acts
whose consequences extend from the present into
the intermediate and more distant future.
Our
deliberations thus encompass both possible initial
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and the various later events
we expect them
.Because we deliberate with an
eve to
consequences, our free choices must
encompass
not
just our immediate doings , but also
the later
^development t0 which we expect them to
ead.
Thus, at least one connection
between free
acts and their consequences is internal
to the
notion of free agency itself. And,
given this
connection, we can indeed see why any
value that
attaches to an autonomous act might carry
over to
t
t
Ct S consec u ences
Because (at least some
^?
pf
of) those consequences are part
of what an agent
chooses, it would be quite arbitrary to
say that
it is good that the agent perform the
act he has
chosen, but not good that he enjoy or
suffer the
act's predictable consequences.
Since choices
encompass both acts and consequences, any value
that attaches to the implementation of
choice
belong equally to both... In light of this, one must
natural reason for saying that free agents ought
to enjoy or suffer specific consequences
is that
those consequences, where predictable, have
acquired value from the fact that they are part
of
what the agent has chosen. And where the
consequences are what the agent intuitively
deserves, our belief that he ought to have what he
deserves will also fall into place 120
act's

to cause.

.

.

I

.

.

So Sher's reasoning seems to proceed something like

this.

Freedom has value, so actually acting freely is

valuable.
a

The concept of freedom is such that when you make

choice that has foreseeable consequences, then you can

legitimately be said to be choosing those consequences.
Thus,

since choosing freely has value, and the consequences

of a free choice are part of that choice,

also have that value.
freely,

the consequences

Because it is good that an agent act

it also good that an agent receive the consequences

of that act.

So the agent ought to receive the consequences

of her or his free action.

This sense of 'ought' is

captured by our intuitive notion of desert.,
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Therefore,

because freedom is good, we deserve
the consequences of our
freely chosen actions. Here is
the argument I extract from
Sher's text.
1

.

2

.

3.

4.

5

.

6

.

Freedom has value.
If freedom has value, then the
exercise
ot freedom has value.
If the exercise of freedom has
value,
then the expected consequences of the
exercise of freedom have value.
If the expected consequences of
the
exercise of freedom have value, then we
ought to receive the expected
consequences of our exercises of
freedom.
If we ought to receive the expected
consequences of our exercises of
freedom, then we deserve to receive the
expected consequences of our exercises
of freedom.
Therefore, we deserve to receive the
expected consequences of our exercises
of freedom.

Premise
freedom.

(1)

Premise

valuable.'

is alleged to be a basic intuition about
(2)

makes clear the meaning of 'freedom is

It really means

'free acts are valuable.'

The rationale for premise

complicated.

(3)

is a little more

Sher claims that free acts cannot be separated

from their expected consequences, because free acts would
not have value if their consequences did not occur.
If someone did not have to live with the
predictable consequences of his choices ... then
he would have only a semblance of freedom.
His
'autonomy' would be worth little; and if ours is
worth more, it is only because we do inhabit a
world in which choices have consequences. 121

—

—

He then appears to make use of something like the

following Principle About Value.
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PAV

if x has value n, and
y is part of X
then y has value n.

In this case,

x = autonomous action,
y = the

consequences of the autonomous action,
and n = the value of
the autonomous action.
Thus, the consequences of
autonomous
action have the same value as the
autonomous action itself.
I think the rationale
for premise (4) has to do with
the great value that Sher places on
free action.
He
says

that "free agents ought to enjoy or suffer
specific

consequences" because those consequences "where
predictable,
have acquired value from the fact that they
are part of what
the agent has chosen." ^
1

So,

if free acts ought to be done,

then their consequences ought to occur.
valuable, they ought to be done.

Thus,

Since free acts are
we ought to receive

the expected consequences of our exercises of freedom.
In premise

(5),

the sense of 'ought' used here is not

that produces moral obligations.
those,

desert.

It is weaker than

and is in fact captured by our intuitive concept of
Sher says,

"Like desert,

freedom impinges on our

moral scheme not primarily by creating tightly structured
sets of obligations, but rather as a value whose promotion

always tells for an act or institution." 123
I

think this argument is fundamentally misguided, and

that it commits several serious philosophical blunders.

There are serious objections to every premise except premise
(

2

)

.
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First,

the objection to premise

sher notes that

(1).

many people think it is "of
paramount importance" that
people be able to choose and act freely,
so freedom

has

value.

124

This is, unquestionably,

true.

In fact,

it is a

central premise in one of the most
popular responses to the
problem of evil for the existence of a
benevolent,
all-

powerful god.

It is obvious to many that a world
in which

people freely choose to do good is greatly
better than a
world in which people do good only because
they are robots
forced to follow deterministic laws.
has many practical consequences,

what we want to do,
freedom,

Furthermore,

freedom

such as allowing us to do

in the ways we see fit.

as when one is a slave,

Lack of

is terrible,

because one's

dignity is taken away, but also because of all the pain
that
the slave-owner can inflict.

For these reasons,

the value

of freedom is indisputable.

However,

the use of the premise as a starting point

shows that Sher makes a fundamental mistake about what kind
of value freedom has.

The plan of Sher's argument is to

show that the value of making a free choice can somehow be

transferred to the outcome of that choice.
clearly required that the making of

independently of its outcome.
value to be transferred.

a

it is

free choice have value

Otherwise, there would be no

Thus,

I

think premise

be rewritten as follows.
1'.

So,

Freedom has intrinsic value.
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(1)

should

While it is clear that

(1)

is true,

it is not clear

that making a choice freely actually
has value independently
of the outcome in which it results.
It is not clear that
d’) is true
For instance, we hold freedom to
be
-

so

valuable, because it is

what we want.

(allegedly) what allows us to do

When we do what we want to, we are
pleased,

and this is good.

Exercises of freedom often lead to

pleasure, so they are instrumentally, or
extrinsically good.
Similarly, the lack of freedom often leads to
pain, and so
is often instrumentally,

or extrinsically,

evil.

Nor does

the free-will response to the problem of evil
show that
freedom,
good.

independently of its consequences, is intrinsically

The free-will defense compares more complicated

states of affairs than choosing freely to choosing unfreely.
It compares freely choosing good, to unfreely choosing
good.
It is unlikely that it is just the mere fact of free choice

that is so important.

Instead,

it is freedom combined with

what is freely chosen that makes such a great good that many

theists believe freedom to be necessary in the best of all

possible worlds.
Since

(1')

is needed to make Sher's argument work,

and

since all the evidence about freedom is consistent with the

truth of

(1),

but the falsity of (1'),

reason to accept

(l

f
)

.

I

think there is no

So Sher's argument does not even get

off the ground, because he is working with a muddled concept
of the value of freedom which will not get him what he
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needs.
value,
I

But even if

I

am wrong,

and freedom has intrinsic

there are other grave problems with the argument.
have three objections to premise

First of all,

(3)

Sher's rationale for this premise undermines his
whole chain
of reasoning.
He wants to start with the fact that freedom
has value,

and then show that it can be transferred to the

free action's consequences.

But in his rationale for (3),

he says that freedom would not have value at all if its

consequences did not occur

.

A standard test for intrinsic

value is to consider whether the object is valuable

considered "in and of itself."
rationale for

(3),

then it appears that freedom does not

have intrinsic value.
(!'),

which

I

If we accept Sher's

So Sher's reason for

(3)

contradicts

argued above is the premise Sher needs to

start with if there is any chance to make his argument work.
However,

undermine

there is a way to justify
(1')

by appealing to

a

(3)

which does not

not-implausible

metaphysical view about the nature of actions.
view,

On this

there is one sense of 'action' that includes all of

its consequences, because they are causally connected to it.

For instance,

if

I

perform the action of crooking my finger,

and it happens to be on a gun's trigger at the time, then
that action includes the pulling of the trigger, the firing
of the gun,

the shooting of the bullet,

person who is hit by that bullet.

and the death of the

There is a very plausible

sense in which all of those consequences are part of my
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crooking my finger.
it can be said that

above,

So,
I

when

I

choose to crook my finger,

also choose those consequences listed

since they are causally connected to it.

coupled with PAV, could justify premise

(3)

This view,

without

contradicting (1').

A real problem with
thing,

(3)

is that PAV is false.

PAV is a form of the fallacy of division.

For one

This is

the fallacy that asserts that if a thing has property
x,

then its parts have property x.

To see that the properties

of an action are not generally the same as the properties
of
its parts,

consider an action that takes three hours to

occur.

certainly is not true that every (or indeed any

It

proper) part of that action takes three hours to occur.

So,

unless there is some reason to think that value is unique in

respect to the part-whole relation, it is not legitimate to
appeal to PAV to justify

In fact,

(3)

examples where the value of an action as
same as the value of its parts.
a

there are plenty of
a

whole is not the

For example,

a

doctor saves

person's life by removing his appendix just before it

bursts.

Many parts of that operation have negative value,

because of the pain they produce.
shot that delivered the anesthetic.

One such part was the

That shot was painful,

and so any extrinsic positive value that shot had (it led to
less pain during the operation) was at least somewhat offset

by its disvalue (it was immediately painful).

Clearly the

part of the operation consisting of the administration of
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a

painful shot and nothing else does not have
the same value
as the operation as a whole.
Indeed, the shot was, by
itself, useless--it did not do anything
to prevent the

appendix from bursting, nor did it help remove
the appendix.
Thus,

it is highly implausible that all the
parts of an

extended action have the same value as that action
does as
whole.
The Principle About Value is false, and so

a

there

does not appear to be any reason to accept premise
The third problem is this.

(3)

If we grant that a free

action includes its consequences, then there is no reason to

claim that it is only the expected consequences of the
action that have value.

Sometimes the expected consequences

of an action do not occur,

so they do not get any value from

the free choice.

the actual consequences "inherit"

that value,

Instead,

if anything does.

So it seems to me that Sher's

consideration of only those consequences that are expected
is not justified by the reasoning for

(3)

If that

justification works at all, it works for the actual
consequences of free actions, not the expected (except where
the two are the same, of course)

Here is my objection to premise

(4)

Consider a person

who freely donates a large amount of money to a charity.
The expected consequence is the construction of new

facilities, which allow the charity to do its business
better,
account,

thus benefitting many more people.
then,

On Sher’s

the donor ought to receive all of the value
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of the expected consequences of the donation.

seems wrong.

But this

Just because this consequence is the
expected

outcome of the donor's free act, it certainly
does not
follow that the donor ought to receive all of
this positive
value.

Indeed,

the reason the donor gave in the first place

was to help others.

So,

it seems ridiculous to think that

we always ought to receive the value of the expected

consequences of our free actions.
Finally,

in premise

(5),

Sher claims that because we

ought to receive the consequences of our free actions,

therefore we deserve to receive them.
notes,

As Sher himself

there are many different senses of 'ought,' and many

desert-claims do not correlate with moral obligations. 125
Thus,

we cannot just infer that because

a

person ought to

receive something, that therefore she deserves to receive
that thing.

In the case of receiving the consequences of

our free choices then,

it is incumbent upon Sher to show why

in this case the senses of the two concepts correlate.

He

does not show this; instead he seems to appeal to our

intuition that they are the same.
is very skeptical about desert,

Rawls.

But consider a person who

perhaps a philosopher like

He might agree that we ought to receive the

consequences of our free actions, but deny that we deserve
them.

So,

it appears that Sher's argument has not really

advanced the issue in such

a

way as to convince those who
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think that freedom is not a desert base,
that it really is
one
The Expected-Consequences Account

have already criticized Sher's argument for
free

I

action as

a

desert base.

This was a criticism of his

argument, not its conclusion.

justify the conclusion.

I

However,

do not think the premises

such criticism does not

show that the conclusion must be false.

In fact,

I

think

there is some plausibility to the notion of free action
as
one of several desert bases.

In this section,

my criticism on the actual proposal.

I

I

will focus

will show that

Sher's formulation does not work.
Sher never explicitly formulates what he calls "the

expected-consequences account." 126
he has made above,

However,

from the remarks

and his discussion of the various kinds

of alleged instances of desert grounded in free action,

think that EC1 is

a

I

natural first attempt at formulating his

account
EC1

S deserves X for action A if S freely
chooses A, and X is a predictable
consequence of A.

According to Sher, this account is consistent with the
fact that deserts do not confer obligations.

with many specific cases.

It also works

For instance, Wilson deserved to

be disqualified; he knew the deadline for applications was

March

1.

Further, Harris, who did not bring his raincoat,

now deserves to get wet; Simmons, who did not study for his
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exam,

now deserves to fail. 127

positive deserts.

Additionally, EC1 works for

Just as the non-bringer of the umbrella

deserves to get wet when the forecast is for rain,
so does
the bringer of the umbrella deserve to stay
dry.

More important, we believe that persons who
resourcefully seize opportunities deserve the
resulting benefits, that persons who carefully
make and execute plans deserve success... 128
EC1 accommodates all of these beliefs.
To deal with the problem of uncertainty in prediction,

Sher takes the expected-consequences model of choice from

decision theory and uses it to determine what is deserved.
Suppose the probability of rain is fifty percent, and

considering whether to bring my umbrella with me.

I

am

In such a

case what is chosen "is neither to get wet nor to stay dry,

but rather the combination of a certain risk of getting wet
and a certain chance of staying dry." 129

understood as follows:
home,

then what

I

if

think this can be

choose to leave my umbrella

I

deserve is

rained on with no umbrella)

I

.5
+

.5

(disvalue from being

*

*

(value of not carrying

around an umbrella when there is no rain)
EC1 only constitutes a partial analysis of desert.

So

saying it does not account for all cases is trivial and
easy,

and shows nothing wrong.

For instance,

a

criminal

deserves to be punished though it is predictable that he
will get away, or a worker deserves wages that she

predictably will not get; these cases show that there are
other principles of desert at work.
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130

Thus,

ECl is supposed

to be an account of sufficient but
not necessary conditions

for desert.

Problems occur when we can show that
someone gets what
is predicted, yet does not deserve it.
For
instance,

the

burglar who predictably gets away with the
robbery does not
deserve the spoils.
There are five types of case where
expected consequences seem undeserved. When the
consequences are:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Very easily acquired.
The disastrous results of merely
careless acts.
The spoils of wrongful acts.
The harmful effects of self-sacrificing
acts
The results of choices made under
threat, or in some other illegitimately
structured choice situation. 131

Consider alleged problems of type

(5)

If

I

surrender

my money at gunpoint, it may be rather predictable that
will not get it back.
lose it!

Nevertheless,

do not deserve to so

I

Such apparent objections are easy to solve,

such an act is not truly free.

I

for

It was made under duress.

Only the predictable consequences of freely-chosen acts are
deserved. 132

While alleged problems of type
too troublesome, problems of type

difficult.

Examples of type

papers to inherit
a

a

fortune,

1

(5)

(1)

do not seem to be

are a little more

include the person who signs

the person who chooses to keep

wallet full of money that was just found lying on the
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street,

and the entertainer who performs one concert
that

earns millions. 133
Sher says it is easy to show that these are
not actual

desert cases.

"What initially has value, and thus what

confers that value upon expected consequences, is
an agent's

genuine exercise of autonomy."

Sher claims that these are

not cases of "genuine exercises of autonomy."

Exercises of

autonomy
are surely more than unimpeded acts that will
obviously yield large benefits at little cost.
Where no more is involved where the agent neither
has to choose among real alternatives nor has to
exercise thought or ingenuity nor has to do
anything dif f icult--his choice is too easy, too
automatic, to be significant.
Though not unfree,
it is also not a meaningful expression of his

—

will. 134

Just what Sher might mean by claiming that an agent's

genuine exercise of autonomy must be

a

"meaningful

expression of his will" is not entirely clear.

It seems to

have something to do with the way in which the agent made
the choice.

In a "meaningful expression of his will," it

seems an agent must have had to exercise thought or
ingenuity, or take a risk, or do something difficult, and
his doing one of these things seems to be

a

sign that the

choice really expressed who he was, or something like that.

Whatever the agent's meaningful expression is though,
thought,

ingenuity, risk-taking, etc., are suitable criteria

for it.

This suggests

a

principle about free acts, and

modification to EC1
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a

GEA

S's choice. A, is a genuine exercise of
autonomy =df. S had to exercise thought
or ingenuity, or had to take a risk, or
do something difficult, to choose A.

EC2

S

deserves X for choice A if i) A is a
genuine exercise of autonomy, ii) s
freely chooses A, and X is a predictable
consequence of A.

EC2 appears to handle problems of type
of type

(2)

(1)

Problems

include the person who gets terminal lung cancer

from smoking, and the ice fisherman who does not just lose a
truck, but actually dies from driving on the ice in late

spring.

In such cases,

the consequence is fairly strongly

predictable, but the disvalue is far higher than what is

intuitively deserved.

Sher's response is that this shows

that the intrinsic disvalue of certain consequences is far

higher than the positive intrinsic value of genuine
exercises of autonomy.
To say that personal autonomy is a great good is
not to deny that suffering and death are great
evils.
Thus, when a free act's consequences
include such misfortunes, there comes a point at
which the value they inherit from the agent's
exercise of freedom is outweighed by their
intrinsic disvalue. 135

This seems to suggest a sort of "cap" on the amount of

disvalue from

a

free act's consequence that a person can

deserve; it cannot be more than the original value of the

autonomous act (or choice)
EC3

deserves X for choice A if i) A is a
genuine exercise of autonomy, ii) S
freely chooses A, and X is a predictable
consequence of A, iii) the intrinsic
disvalue of X is not greater than the
intrinsic value of A.
S
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EC3 thus handles problems of type

(1)

and

There

(2)

are plenty of examples that fit into problems
of type

The mobster who predictably gets away with murder,

(3)

the

corporate executive who predictably gets away with

embezzling

a

fortune,

predictably made

a

etc.

Sher imagines that Adams has

fortune through the exploitation of the

poor and uneducated.

Here is the passage where he explains

why Adams does not deserve his riches.
The positive value of the agent's exercise of
freedom is plausibly said to be offset by the
negative value of the way he has exercised that
freedom. Although it is good that Adams has acted
freely, it is bad that he has freely chosen to do
what is wrong. And because this is bad because
it would have been far better if Adams had not
made this choice--it would also have been better
if the consequences of the choice had not played
themselves out. 136

—

Sher seems to reason as follows.
to act autonomously,

Although it is good

it is bad to choose to do wrong.

Because Adams's choice is not the best, it would be better
if the consequences had not occurred.

Part of the

consequences are that Adams gets rich.

better if he had not got rich.
solution,

So it would be

Before discussing Sher's

it will be worthwhile to discuss the fourth type

of problem.
Finally, problems of type

(4)

suffered a broken leg while saving
over by a truck.

Johnson has predictably

.

a

child from being run

Johnson does not deserve his broken leg

because
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Although it is good that Johnson has chosen
freely, and good also that his choice was a
virtuous one, it is bad that the price of virtue
is harm or injury to a good man.
It would have
been far better if Johnson had not had to choose
between injury and saving the child; and so it
would have been better also if the conseguences of
his choice had not played themselves out. 137
Sher remarks,
of wrong acts,
acts,

about cases of benefits received because

and harms suffered as a result of virtuous

that

even if neither agent has suffered a misfortune
whose disvalue is great enough to outweigh the
value of his free choice, both actions have other
aspects whose disvalue seems to do just this. 138
This suggests that a slight modification of clause

(iii)

EC3 will cover these cases.

I

Using the terminology

of

suggested above, it seems that clause (iii) should be

restated as follows:
The overall value of A is not
negative

iii')

This way of putting the matter is more general than the

original.

It includes cases where the intrinsic disvalue of

X is greater than the intrinsic value of A, but it also

includes cases where there is some other aspect of A which

makes its negative results outweigh its positive ones.
Thus,

it is designed to take care of problems of types three

and four.
So EC3,

along with GEA seems to be Sher's final account

of free choice as a desert base.

Of course,

it is

insufficient to cover all cases of desert, but other than
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that,

Sher appears to think there are no problems with
it.

Here are the two principles, updated and side by
side.

GEA

S's choice, A,

is a genuine exercise of
autonomy =df S had to exercise thought
or ingenuity, or had to take a risk, or
do something difficult, to choose A.
.

EC3

deserves X for choice A if and only if
A is a genuine exercise of autonomy,
ii) S freely chooses A, and X is a
predictable consequence of A, iii') the
overall value of A is not negative.
S

i)

My problems with the account are these:
restrictive.

B)

A)

GEA is too

EC3's third clause does not solve the

problems raised by problem types (2-4)

(The disastrous

.

results of carelessness, the spoils of evil, and the harm
from self-sacrifice.)
(A)

For instance,

suppose

to be disqualified because
I

I

I

miss

deadline.

a

I

deserve

knew when the deadline was, and

did not get my task done by that time.

According to GEA,

this does not count as a genuine exercise of autonomy

because (leaving aside the question of whether it was

meaningful expression of my will)
thought or ingenuity, nor take

it pass by.

did not have to use

I

a risk,

difficult, to miss the deadline.

a

nor do anything

It was quite easy to let

Yet it does seem to me that my failing to meet

the deadline could have been a genuine free choice made by
me.

It was free in the important way that acts are

sometimes said to be free, in that
that

I

got the task done on time.

from doing the task,

I

I

could have seen to it

No disaster prevented me

just did not do it.
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Further,

it

seems that

I

do deserve the bad results that arise from my

freely missing the deadline.

So this is a genuine case that

GEA rules out.
In general,

it seems that many genuine cases of

deserving bad things would be ruled out by GEA.

Note that

this is an important class of desert, because Sher does

think that people can deserve bad things for their foolish
free actions.

One of his examples that he claims his

account handles just fine has to do with

a

person who

chooses to drive his truck on a frozen pond after there has

been a lot of warm weather.

That person,

thinks Sher,

deserves the expected bad result, that his truck will break

through the ice.

Thus,

this defect of GEA needs to be

addressed before EC3 can work.
(B)

Even if there is some satisfactory version of GEA,

clause three of EC3 is unsuited to its task.

The usual

convention is that the intrinsic value of an act is the
value of the act itself, the extrinsic value is the value of
its consequences,

and that the sum of the extrinsic value

plus the intrinsic value is the overall value.

Sher holds

that acting freely has a certain amount of intrinsic value,

and that this intrinsic value somehow gets transferred to
In addition,

the outcome of the free choice.

recognizes that an outcome has

a

Sher

certain value irrespective

of what it might have inherited from the free choice that

caused it to occur.

So Sher seems to claim that when the
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sum of a free act's intrinsic value plus extrinsic value
is
negative, then the person does not deserve that outcome for
that act.
For this account to make any sense at all,

it must be

assumed that various free choices have differing amounts of
intrinsic value.

For assume that all free choices have the

same intrinsic value.

Then certain intuitively correct

desert judgments will be shown incorrect.

For instance,

imagine that the intrinsic value of any free choice is only
moderate, around ten units of value.

This low value will do

fine for showing that people do not deserve the disastrous

results of merely careless

(though genuinely free)

acts.

Sher mentions that a daredevil does not deserve paralysis
for trying to leap a twenty-foot chasm,

that a heavy smoker

does not deserve lung-cancer, and that a fisherman who

drives on ice without testing it does not deserve to lose
his life

(just his truck).

On Sher's account, with the

intrinsic value of free choice set at ten, all of these
examples work.

Certainly the results from being paralyzed,

from having cancer, and from dying, are negatively far

greater than ten units of value.

However,

there are

certainly some decisions we make whose results are

moderately disastrous, that we do deserve.
losing his truck is

a

case in point.

The fisherman's

Sher agrees that the

fisherman who drives on the ice deserves to lose his truck,
though not his life.

But even the loss of a truck has got
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to be negatively greater than ten units of value.

Only a

very rich fisherman would not mind spending ten to
twentythousand dollars in such a case.
Raising the intrinsic value of free choices enough so
that cases such as the fisherman's truck work out does not

work either.

Then the value will be so high that there will

be cases of where the desert will be too harsh a punishment.
So it must be that the intrinsic value of free choice
is not fixed,

but varies from case to case.

Sher does seem

to have this in mind in his discussion of cases of genuine

autonomy.

Recall that a truly free choice is supposed to

involve some risk, or thought, or ingenuity, or difficulty.
It makes a kind of sense to think that the more risk,

thought,

ingenuity or difficulty involved, the more valuable

the free choice.

But it hardly seems that there would be

enough difference between the values of various free choices
that could be made to account for the wide range of values
of deserts.
In any case,

consider the person who makes

free choice, that required much ingenuity:

and get away with it.
any merit?

bank?

a

difficult

to rob a bank

Why should we think this decision has

What is so good about freely choosing to rob a

It seems to me that in this case,

freedom is a

necessary condition for ascribing desert, but that it
certainly is not sufficient for concluding that the expected
consequence of succeeding is deserved.
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There is another, deeper problem with clause (iii’).
It does not really work for cases

all,

in introducing these cases,

(3)

and

First of

(4)

Sher admits that in neither

case is it true that the outcome is sufficiently tragic to

outweigh the value of the agent's exercise of freedom. 139
is not that the actual value is negative,

It

since the "other

aspects" of the cases whose disvalue is great are only

counterfactual considerations.
the unscrupulous Adams,

made

a

in the case of

it would have been better if he had

different choice than he actually did , and in the

case of the heroic Johnson,

had had

For instance,

a

it would have been better if he

different choice than he actually did.

A little

reflection will make it abundantly clear that introducing

counterfactual considerations into this account of desert
will do more harm than good.

According to Sher, the Johnson

case is not one that is ruled out by clause (iii'), because
the actual value of X plus A is positive.
a

state of affairs

(not physically possible for Johnson to

achieve, but still possible in some sense)

been better.

However, there is

that would have

That is the state of affairs where Johnson was

not forced to choose between death of the infant and a

broken leg.

One such state of affairs is much better than

what actually happened.

Therefore,

since it would have been

much better if that (call it 'ideal') state of affairs had
happened,

Johnson does not deserve the broken leg.

This

case clearly shows that Sher is appealing to counterfactual
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situations to keep his account.

besides clause (iii

1

We need some further clause

).

If s had performed some other choice
than A, the outcome would not have been
better than it actually was.

iv)

Even this is not quite strong enough, because in the

Johnson case, there was no other choice for him to make.
What Sher compares the situation to is one where Johnson did
not have to make such a terrible choice.

I

am not sure

exactly how to incorporate that consideration into the

expected consequences account, but that hardly matters, for
this attempt to make it work is obviously flawed.
a

different kind of case.

I

Consider

can choose to donate my estate

to the charity of your choice.

Unfortunately, though my

estate is not pitiable, it is nowhere near the size of Bill
Gates's.

So even though

I

do donate my estate,

some predictably good consequences,

better if

I

it would have been far

had not had to choose between donating my

estate, or donating less.
I

and it has

It would have been far better if

could have donated an estate the size of Bill Gates's to

that charity.

Because those consequences would have been so much

better it follows, on my latest reconstruction of Sher's
account,
I

that

I

do not deserve whatever honors or accolades

get from the donation of my mediocre estate.

the fact that if

This is

had had more money to

crazy.

Clearly,

donate,

that would have been much better, can have no
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I

bearing on whether

I

and actually did do.

deserve anything for what

I

was able to

It should be quite clear that any

account that follows the reasoning Sher uses in the Johnson
case will rule out every instance of desert.

There will

always be a state of affairs that is such that it would have

been much better if that state of affairs had happened
instead of what actually did happen.

But this does not

properly affect the desert at issue.
Finally,

an objection to clause

must be predictable.
instance,

(ii)

,

that the outcome

This simply is not true.

For

take Adams and his exploitation of the poor and

uneducated.

It is predictable that this will make him rich.

—

the

exploited masses revolt and Adams loses his fortune.

It

But,

suppose that something unpredictable happens

seems quite obvious that the revolution, though

unpredictable,

is just what Adams deserves for his

exploitation.

However,

according to Sher's account, this is

not a deserved outcome for Adams' free choice to exploit the
workers, because it is not predictable.

Autonomous Action is Not

a

Desert Base

The misguided reasoning displayed in the argument for

free choice as a desert base, and the failure of the

expected-consequences account itself, lead me to believe
that free choice is not, after all, a desert base.

A re-

consideration of the putative examples of free choice as
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a

desert base shows that each of them can be explained as some
other kind of desert.

Here are the examples.

Wilson, who knowingly submitted his
application late, deserves to be
disqualified.
Harris, who did not bring his raincoat,
now deserves to get wet, while Georgina,
who did bring her umbrella, deserves to
stay dry.
Simmons, who did not study for his exam,
now deserves to fail.
Given the warm weather lately, anyone
who is crazy enough to drive their
vehicle on the ice deserves to have it
fall through.
Persons who resourcefully seize
opportunities deserve the resulting

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

benefits
Persons who carefully make and execute
plans deserve success.
Persons who forego immediate benefits in
expectation of longer-range gains
deserve those gains.

6)

7)

It seems to me that anyone who accepts any of

(1-7)

above as legitimate desert claims can do so without appeal
to Sher's expected consequences account of desert.

instance,

although

(1)

is really too vague to be sure about,

it could be a case of desert due to laziness.

and

(7)

For

Examples

(6)

seem to me to examples of desert due to diligence or

hard work or effort.

Example

(5)

could either be a desert

due to the possession of certain character traits such as

boldness and resourcefulness, or again desert due to
diligence,

vaguely.

it is hard to tell because it is stated so

Finally,

claims

(2-4)

seem to me to be based on a

presumed standard of rationality.

That is, the appeal of

these claims comes from the sense that it seems somehow
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that people who behave irrationally should, suffer,

while those who behave rationally should benefit.

very similar to deserts due to moral behavior.

It is

Those who

transgress the moral code deserve punishment, while those
who stick with the code deserve reward.

Here,

is not morality,

the person "crazy

but rationality.

Thus,

the standard

enough" to disregard rational warnings about the danger of

thin ice deserves to suffer, while the person who brings an

umbrella when she has reason to believe it will rain
deserves to stay dry.
I

Similarly for the test-taker, though

think this case needs to be spelled out more fully.

instance,

a

person who does not study for

a test

is justified in his surety that he will "ace" it,

deserve to fail.

For

because he
does not

But if we assume the test-taker not only

has not studied, but also needed to study, and knew he

needed to study, then it seems irrational for him to expect
to pass it without studying.

This aspect of desert due to rationality is enforced by

clause

(ii)

of Sher’s expected consequence account, where it

is required that only the expected consequences of free

behavior can be deserved.

After all, it is rational

decision-making that produces accounts of expected outcomes
and tries to act on them.

We can act perfectly freely even

in being willful and irrational,

and since usually the

positive outcomes of such behavior are quite unexpected,
Sher's account rules them out.
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In addition to this covert appeal to rationality,

Sher's expected-consequences account also appeals to
diligence.

The second clause of GEA requires that genuine

acts of free will are either,
of ingenuity.

risky,

difficult, or in need

Most choices that are risky, difficult, or

need ingenuity, are choices that will require much hard
work,

or diligence,

However,

for their outcomes to be successful.

there can be all sorts of free choices that do not

require such hard work.

Thus,

I

think that GEA makes desert

due to diligence seem like desert due to free choice.

Once it is realized that all the putative claims of

desert due to free choice can be explained as desert due to
some other desert base, and once it is seen how the expected

consequence account makes covert appeals to rationality and
diligence, then

I

think there is no reason to accept it.

For one thing, we can account for desert without it, and for

another,

any plausibility in the formal expected-

consequences account can be shown to be due to its

incorporation of other desert bases.
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CHAPTER

5

DILIGENCE AND VIRTUE
In this chapter

effort

(diligence)

I

will examine the relationship between

and desert, and then since diligence is a

kind of virtue, the relationship between virtue and desert.

Why the Diligent Deserve the Goods
Of all the desert bases, diligence is perhaps the most

compelling.

Some have even maintained that diligence is the

only legitimate desert base. 140

In his book,

Desert, George

Sher tries to provide an answer to the question of why the

diligent deserve what they deserve.
bases themselves need justification.

justification for diligence as
in this chapter,

then,

a

He thinks that desert
So he provides a

desert base.

My first task

will be to evaluate Sher's claims

about the justification of diligence. 141

According to Sher, the solution to the puzzle about why
people deserve what they diligently strive for is suggested

by an examination of what it is that they deserve through
their diligence.

What is deserved through diligence is

whatever goal that diligence is aimed at.

Sher writes,

"what any hard worker deserves is just the outcome he has

striven to produce." 142

The question of why the hard worker

should get what she is striving for can be answered.

First,

like other desert-claims, desert for diligence does not

imply that anyone has any moral obligations to see to it
that a diligent worker get what she deserves.
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In itself, diligent effort creates no
entitlements.
It does however, seem to confer
upon one's goal a value it would otherwise
lack ... As clarified, the thesis whose rationale we
want to understand is that diligent efforts confer
value upon their intentional objects 143
.

The thesis that diligent efforts confer value upon

their intentional objects is quite similar to the thesis
that desire confers value upon the object of desire.

This

thesis has its most famous exposition in the work of Ralph

Barton Perry, Realms of Value.

There Perry holds that any

object has value (positive or negative) so long as someone
takes interest (positive or negative)

in it

144
.

For Sher,

this parallel suggests an explanation of the idea that the

diligent are deserving.

Sher thinks that diligence is

closely related to desire, so that if it is true that desire
confers value upon a goal, then diligent effort to achieve
that goal could be said to magnify that value.

Because even idle desires are thought to confer
some value on their objects, and because diligent
striving is in some sense an extension of desire,
we may conjecture that the far greater value of
the objects of diligent striving is somehow a
function of the way diligent striving surpasses
mere desire 145
.

Although Sher depends on the thesis that desires confer
value, he does not assume that only desire confers value,

and he also tries to justify that thesis.

His explanation

of the idea that desires confer value provides the first

premise of his argument to show that the diligent deserve to
achieve the goals toward which their efforts are directed.
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Sher's argument starts with a premise that he thinks
is
a

precondition for morality itself,

intrinsically valuable

146
.

"

that persons are

Since persons care "intensely and

complexly" about themselves and other things, Sher thinks it
is plausible to believe that if persons have intrinsic

value,

then what matters to them also has intrinsic value.

He writes.

Not only are the beings to which morality ascribes
fundamental value capable of taking other things
to have value, but their taking those other things
to have value is central to what makes them
valuable.
Thus, it does seem natural to hold that
a portion of their value devolves upon what they
value--that some of the absolute value of persons
is transferred to, or inherited by, the things
they care about 147
.

Thus,

Sher has argued that if persons have intrinsic

value,

then the things they take interest in have intrinsic

value.

That is, he takes it that he is proving something

similar to Perry's claim about the conference of value by
interest, but his reason why is that people are, themselves,

intrinsically valuable.

This view is different from

Perry's, because on Perry's view,
in you,
I

if no one takes interest

then you have no value; but on Sher's view, you and

have value independently of any interests.

hand,

if

I

do take interest in you,

(presumably)

On the other

then your value

is enhanced.

Sher's next task is to show that diligence confers a
lot more value than mere desire confers.

After all, he

notes, we do distinguish between those who desire strongly,
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but do not work,
do work.

from those who desire equally strongly and

We think it far better for the latter to
get what

they want than the former to get what they want. 148

According to Sher, there are two reasons that diligence
confers far more value than desire, and he thinks that

these

reasons show that diligence acts like a species of desire,
in that it magnifies the value that is conferred by
desire.

His two reasons for why diligence confers much more value

than mere desire are

(1)

"sustained effort stems from will

and judgment as desire typically does not," and

(2)

"sustained effort forecloses other options as mere desires
do not." 149

An understanding of Sher's conception of

a

person is

needed to understand the importance of these reasons.

According to Sher,
Since our lives are constituted by our actions,
our time and energy are thus the very stuff of
which we fashion our lives. Hence, any agent who
devotes a major portion of his time and energy to
achieving a goal is quite literally making that
goal a part of himself. 150
So it appears that one reason that the diligent ought
to get what they deserve is that their diligent efforts to

achieve

a goal

have made that goal a part of them.

Presumably, Sher's reasoning is something like this.

achievement of

a goal

is a part of a person,

is intrinsically valuable,

If the

and the person

then it would be a bad thing if

that person were not to achieve that goal.
if the person had lost a part of herself.
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It would be as

So the person

ought to get the goal she diligently strives for,
so she

deserves it.

Here,

then,

is my first interpretation of

Sher's Argument for Diligence.
People are intrinsically valuable.
If people are intrinsically valuable,
then the things people desire are
intrinsically valuable.
If the things people desire are
intrinsically valuable, then the goals
toward which people diligently strive
are highly intrinsically valuable.
If the goals toward which people
diligently strive are highly
intrinsically valuable, then people
deserve to get the goals toward which
they diligently strive.
Therefore, people deserve to get the
goals toward which they diligently
strive

(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

I

Premise

believe that this argument is suggested by the text.
(1)

is the "precondition for morality."

Premise

displays Sher's belief that the intrinsic value of

(2)

person

a

can be "transferred" to the objects that person desires.

Premise

(3)

captures Sher's view that diligent effort

magnifies the value transferred by desire.

Premise

is

(4)

based on the notion that someone who is diligently striving
to achieve a goal is "quite literally making that goal a

part of himself," and so deserves to get that goal.
However, premise

writes,

(2)

is highly implausible.

Sher

"some of the absolute value of persons is

transferred to, or inherited by, the things they care
about." 151

(By "absolute" value,

in mind intrinsic value.)

I

can only think Sher has

Taking Sher's concept of

transference seriously leads to bizarre results.
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If

I

have

some money,

and

transfer it to your account, then

I

have less money than before.

I

According to Sher, then,

take interest in something,

value goes out of me and into the thing

cared about
value,

a lot of things,

just like

I

no sense at all.

will

If you inherit money from me,

then that money is no longer mine.

whenever

I

I

some of my intrinsic

care about.

I

If

I

could run out of intrinsic

could run out of money.

But this makes

Surely my intrinsic value cannot be

decreased by my taking interest in something.
So the value of what is cared for is not transferred

from person to object by desire, but must be created by
desire.

But then it is unclear why anyone would think that

this is "absolute," or intrinsic value.

Intrinsic value is

the value something has regardless of its usefulness to

people,

regardless of the interest people take in it.

Intrinsic value is value-in-itself

.

The value a thing has

because of the interest people take in it is extrinsic
value,

person.

and so not "absolute" value.

It is value-for-a-

this argument fails in premise

Thus,

intrinsic value of

a

(2)

.

The

person cannot be transferred to the

objects she cares about.
However,
this mistake,

although Sher's reasoning does seem to make
I

think there is a similar argument that

maintains Sher’s key points without making any highly
implausible claims about transfers of intrinsic value.
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This

Second Argument for Diligence is suggested by Perry’s
view
about what states of affairs have intrinsic value. 152
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

The state of affairs that a person
desires an object is intrinsically

valuable
If the state of affairs that a person
desires an object is intrinsically
valuable, then the state of affairs that
a person diligently strives for goal
g
is intrinsically valuable.
If the state of affairs that a person
diligently strives for goal g is
intrinsically valuable, then people
deserve to get the goals toward which
they diligently strive.
Therefore, people deserve to get the
goals toward which they diligently
strive

However, both of the arguments suggested so far suffer

from a grave defect.

desire confers value.

They depend upon Perry’s view that
Few would accept this view, because

it makes it too easy to come by value.

For instance,

if a

sadist is positively interested in torturing babies, then

torturing babies has value.
Thus,

This seems just plainly false.

Perry's view is, at the least, highly controversial.

It is not the kind of premise on which one wants to rest

such an important argument.

Another weak link in the two arguments presented is the
contention that we deserve to get what we strive for because
our striving increases the value of that thing.

One may

wonder why the fact that diligent striving increases the
value of an object is any reason to think that, therefore,
the person deserves to receive that value.

We do not in

general assume that just because some object has value for
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someone,

that the person deserves to get it.

instance,
I

do now.

mean

I

Otherwise,

for

deserve to have rather more material wealth than

I

Similarly,

if a statue has value,

deserve to have that statue.

value is increased.

that does not

Suppose that statue's

It certainly does not follow that

more deserving of it than when it was less valuable.

I

am

Thus,

it appears to me that this whole project of showing that the

objects of diligent striving acquire more value the harder
we work for them is rather pointless.

What we need to show

is that the harder we work for our goals,

deserve to have them.

the more we

But that is not accomplished by

showing merely that the object itself acquires value.
There is another possible way to interpret the
argument,

and it does not require the controversial "Perry

Premise," that desires confer value.

Furthermore, this

Third Argument for Diligence does not assume that as an
object increases in value, so does

a

person's desert for

that object.

People are intrinsically valuable and
constituted by their actions.
If people are intrinsically valuable and
constituted by their actions, then
people deserve to get the goals toward
which they diligently strive.
Therefore, people deserve to get the
goals toward which they diligently
strive

(1)
(2)

(3)

Since this argument does not make use of the "Perry
Premise,

"

it avoids the issue of whether intrinsic value can

be inherited by the objects of interest.
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Instead,

this

argument takes seriously the notion that "you are what
you

diligently try to do."

Consistent with a line of thought

that Sher has expressed before, we may reason as follows. 153

Given that it is true that you are intrinsically valuable,
then what you diligently try to do is intrinsically valuable
too,

since it is also part of you.

At any rate, this

appears to be the upshot of Sher's discussion of the

importance of diligence to what constitutes

a person.

He

writes,

They [the diligent] ought to succeed because their
sustained efforts are substantial investments of
themselves--the ultimate sources of value in the
outcomes they seek. 154

—

Here are the rationales for the premises.

Premise

(1)

follows from the Kantian conception that people are ends in

themselves

("a

prerequisite for morality is that people

matter"), plus Sher's notion that a person is largely the

sum of her or his actions.

The rest of the work of this

argument is done in premise

(2).

Sher's concept of

personhood is important as well, but
Premise

until last.

(2)

I

will put that aside

makes use of Sher's notion that

when people diligently strive toward

a goal,

they invest a

substantial portion of their limited, and valuable
resources.

They ought to be compensated for such

expenditures.

The best compensation is, of course,

achieve that goal.

to

This interpretation of the argument

rests heavily on the words quoted above, about sustained
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efforts being substantial investments of the persons

themselves

155

Perhaps Sher thinks that this premise is strengthened

by the belief that the things people strive for are

increased in value by the very fact of their striving for
them.

If so,

then premise

the "Perry Premise."

(2)

would make

a

covert appeal to

Nevertheless, given the controversial

nature of the view that interest confers value,

should not make use of this kind of appeal.

I

think Sher

Thus,

the

"Perry Premise" appeal aside, it seems to me that Sher's

reasoning for
makes

a goal

(2)

a

depends upon his notion of how a person

part of herself.

One problem with Sher's justification is this.

He

claims that a diligent worker is "quite literally making
that goal a part of himself." 156
to work hard towards a goal,

But it is clearly possible

and yet not achieve that goal.

It is even possible to work supremely hard and yet not

succeed.
hard,

Thus,

it is not always true that as a person works

she makes the goal a part of herself.

For if she does

not achieve the goal, then it cannot be a part of herself.
In such a case,

it could be said that the person is trying

to make the goal a part of herself,

but is failing.

So it seems that when it comes to the justification of

the view that a person should achieve the goal she

diligently strives for, that one cannot appeal to the fact
that the goal is part of the person.
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Otherwise it would

turn out that this justification only works for
people who

actually achieve their goals.

Someone who works hard but

does not achieve her goal could not be said to deserve it,

because she has not made it part of herself.

But clearly,

in many cases we would say that even though the person
did

not achieve the goal, and so has not made it part of her,
she nevertheless deserved to achieve that goal.

Perhaps the claim could be modified.

Sher could claim

that when a person is diligently striving for a goal, it is

not that he is actually making that goal a part of himself,

but that he is attempting to, that makes him deserve the
goal.

But people do not generally deserve a thing just

because they are attempting to achieve it.

Thus,

it is not

the attempt that makes a person deserving, but the quality

A diligent attempt

of the attempt.

deserving than

is clearly more

half-hearted attempt.

a

But now the attempt

to justify desert for diligence is circular.

It starts with

the assumption that when a person diligently strives toward
a goal,

himself.

the person is trying to make that goal a part of

The next claim is that it would be a good thing

for the person to succeed.

The reason why is that it is a

But this is just what was to be proved:

diligent attempt.

that the diligent are deserving.

possible to make

a

it does not seem

non-circular argument without appealing

to the "Perry Premise,

controversial.

Thus,

"

and yet this premise is too

Any argument that appeals to the "Perry
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Premise

to conclude that the diligent are deserving has
the

following characteristic.
than its premise.
Finally,

Its conclusion is more plausible

This is a defect.

Sher seems to be fundamentally confused when

he concludes that because our lives are constituted by our

actions,

that therefore we are constituted by our actions.

He seems to be confusing a person with a person's life.

Clearly though,

a

person is not the same as her life.

A

person is constituted by her body and (some would say) her
But a person's life is filled with all sorts of

soul.

events.

her life,

Thus, when a person tries to make a goal a part of

she is not "quite literally" trying to make that

goal a part of herself.

It is not as if the goal will

become another one of her body parts. 157

person is simply confused, and premise

Sher's concept of a
(1)

is false.

So it seems to me that all three interpretations of the

diligence argument fail.

Perhaps

Sher's reasoning, but so far as
In any case,

I

I

have not understood

can tell,

it is mistaken.

since diligence is a species of virtue,

I

will

next consider Sher's more general argument for the

legitimacy of desert claims based on virtue.
Why the Virtuous Deserve the Goods

When George Sher takes up this subject, he appears to
think that the question to ask is,

"Can we show that it is a

good thing for the virtuous to be rewarded?"
W.

D.

He notes that

Ross claimed that there was value in "the
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proportionment of happiness to virtue,
"Ross,

" 158

but says, that

typically, offers no defense of this claim.

do better?" 159

Can we

Sher writes,

[M]
argument rests on two premises.
It
assumes that (1) persons derive (some of) their
worth from the fact that they seek value, and that
(2) the intentional objects of persons' desires
and efforts derive value from the fact that they
are sought by beings with worth. 160
•

•

•

Sher claims that seeking value is "part of what confers

worth on person,

"

so "we can conclude that the happiness of

the specially virtuous has special value." 161

In addition,

Sher claims that "the moral virtues that interest us are all

heightened and concentrated propensities to seek forms of
value.

" 16 ^

For instance,

about good results.

moral virtue is

a

the generous person seeks to bring

So each case of a person exhibiting a

case where,

"the person exemplifies,

to a

higher degree than others, the value-seeking propensity that
is crucial to the worth of persons." 163

Therefore,

"we may

reasonably suppose that he acquires greater worth than do
others from his possession of it." 164

Sher finishes the

argument with the following reasoning:
But if a virtuous person does have greater worth
than others, then his desires and sustained
efforts will be able to confer correspondingly
more value on their objects. Thus, however good
it is that an ordinary person's desires are
satisfied, or that his diligent efforts succeed,
it will be even better if the person who is
satisfied or successful is especially virtuous.
When this is the case, his happiness will have
special value. 165
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At this point, Sher starts considering
objections to
his argument.
He appears, therefore, to think that

he has

shown that the virtuous are deserving.

Here is my

interpretation of the argument suggested by the above text:
1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

Seeking value confers worth on persons.
If seeking value confers worth on
persons, then the virtuous are worth
more than the non-virtuous
If the virtuous are worth more than the
non-virtuous, then the happiness of the
virtuous is more valuable than the
happiness of the non-virtuous.
If the happiness of the virtuous is more
valuable than the happiness of the nonvirtuous, then it ought to be the case
that the virtuous are happy.
If it ought to be the case that the
virtuous are happy, then the virtuous
deserve happiness.
Therefore, the virtuous deserve
happiness 166

Here are Sher's rationales.

premise

(1)

A)

When people seek value, they seek that

which results from their seeking.
(1)

He gives three reasons for

B)

In addition,

brings together the concepts of being

a

premise

moral subject

and a moral object, thereby expressing the "compelling

Kantian idea that morality is somehow rooted in
reciprocity."
agency,

C)

Premise

(1)

accounts for the fact that

rationality, sentience, and consciousness are

necessary conditions for "full human worth"--because they
are necessary for the ability to seek for value,

and for the

ability to consider oneself an "I." 107
For premise

(2),

Sher notes that the moral virtues "are

all heightened and concentrated propensities to seek forms
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of value."

Some examples that he gives are:

the fair-

minded, honest person seeks to do what is right.

right is to increase value.
to do good.

Thus,

The generous person seeks also

the virtuous all seek value to a greater

extent than the non-virtuous
worthy,

To do

Since seeking value makes us

.

seeking more value makes us more worthy. 168

To explain

(3)

Sher makes use of what

have called the

I

"Perry Premise," from his argument for diligence.

The Perry

Premise states that objects acquire value through our desire
for them.

Since the virtuous have more value than the non-

virtuous, what they desire acquires more value.

Everyone

desires happiness, so happiness acquires more value for the

virtuous than the non-virtuous. 169
Since even the non-virtuous have value (because they

seek value), the objects of their desires acquire value, and

therefore they ought to get those objects.

strengthened for the virtuous, so premise
Premise

(5)

is not explicitly in the text.

in all of his other arguments,

the 'ought*

The case is
(4)
I

is true.

170

assume that as

Sher thinks that the sense of

in the antecedent is captured by the concept of

desert
I

think that this argument fails.

The rationales for

the first two premises are so hard to understand that

I

will

not bother to try to comment further on them, and the third

premise depends upon a rationale
at length in Chapter Five.

Thus,
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have already criticized

I

I

will make just two

points about this argument.

First of all, Sher's argument

does not "do better" than Ross in showing that there is

value in proportioning happiness to virtue.

In fact, Ross

does offer some argument for his view, and it appears that

Sher has completely overlooked it.

Secondly, even if it can

be shown that it ought to be the case that the virtuous are

happy (and

I

think a case can be made along the lines that

Ross does in The Right and the Good, rather than lines that
Sher attempts)

,

this fact is irrelevant to the question at

hand, which is,

"Why do the virtuous deserve to be happy?"

Showing that it is good for the virtuous to be happy is not
at all the same as showing that the virtuous are deserving.

When he is considering what things are good, Ross makes
an argument to show that pleasure is not the only good.

asks us to consider two different possible worlds.

He

The

worlds are alike in the amount of pain and pleasure they
contain,

as well as the amount of virtues and vices.

The

difference is that in the first world, it is the virtuous
who are all happy, and the vicious who are miserable,

whereas in the second world, the vicious are happy and the
virtuous are miserable.

He writes

(plausibly),

that "very

few people would hesitate to say that the first was a much
171
better state of the universe than the second ."

It seems

to me that an argument along these lines is far more likely
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to show that it is good for the virtuous to be happy than

anything that Sher presented.
Desert Bases Cannot be Justified
I

think it is very hard to prove that the virtuous are

deserving; and as
attempts,

I

have tried to show with George Sher's

although we can always ask for the justification

of a moral claim, we will not always get one.

Eventually

there have to be some primitive claims that are justified

only by appeal to intuition or to the claim’s alleged self-

My view is just such

evidence.

matter of fact,

I

primitive claim.

a

As a

think that my view has the benefit of

showing how the desert bases are closely related.

Many

people do not pay enough attention to desert because they
think that it is just a collection of disparate intuitions
that have no unifying theme.

I

hope to show that view is

mistaken
Since

take the connection between virtue and desert

I

as primitive,

I

can not present an argument for its truth.

Nevertheless, there are some facts that support it, such as

existence of the book When Bad Things Happen to Good
People 112

,

a

contemporary theodicy.

Implicit in the title is

the idea that good people do not deserve bad things.
course,
often,

this world is not ideal,

But of

and it is very clear that

and maybe even more often than not, bad things happen

to good people.

Another fact that indirectly helps my case

is Sher’s weak attempt to show that the virtuous deserve the
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goods.

He ends up using as premises propositions that are

either opague, or far less clearly true than what he is

trying to prove.

When

a

claim is truly primitive, then

attempts to justify it are likely to run into problems of
this sort.
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CHAPTER

6

THE VIRTUES
In this chapter

I

claim that the abundance of apparent

desert bases makes desert seem little more than
at best,

bundle of,

loosely connected intuitions, and that this makes

principle PJD appear ad hoc.
I

a

As a solution to this problem,

propose an account of the desert bases that is relatively

restrictive:

desert is due to the fit between one's

previous deserts and receipts, one's virtuous and vicious
behavior, and one's potential for developing virtues in the
future.

Since they are so important to my view about the

true desert bases,

the bulk of this chapter centers on my

account of the virtues and vices.
The Plurality of Desert

Consider the amazing variation in the bases of the

different desert claims listed in Chapter Three:

past

actions of all sorts, including hard work, good work,

successful work, evil deeds, risk-taking, and careful
planning; the past receipt of suffering, bad luck, and

undeserved benefits; many characteristics of the deserving,
such as beauty, moral worth, personhood, talent, being
interesting, being an expert, being fair and just; and
lastly,

having fulfilled some set requirements for the

desert--being entitled to it.
claim must have

a

Thus,

desert base,

any reason will do.

although every desert

it may appear that just about

Furthermore, since
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I

have shown that

George Sher's attempts to justify the various desert bases
fails for each desert base, and since Sher's is the only
serious,
bases,

sustained attempt to justify the various desert

it appears that intuition is the only arbiter between

competing accounts of the desert bases.

Feinberg claimed

that "the facts which constitute the basis of a subject's

desert must be facts about that subject ," 173 but this is

clearly too general to be useful.

Some facts about me, such

as the fact that my middle name was chosen because it was my

mother's uncle's first name, or the fact that
hair,

I

have brown

do not seem to be important for any desert claims

about me.

It does not seem reasonable that

I

should deserve

anything on the basis of those facts.
These appearances lend a disreputable air to JD, the

claim that distributive justice is achieved when each person
gets what she or he deserves, because they make it appear
that JD can accommodate most any intuition about justice.
Thus,

principle JD appears ad hoc, because it is so easy to

manipulate its content by choice of desert bases.
like to remove the appearance of ad hocery from JD.

I

would
I

would

like to offer principled reasons to accept certain desert

bases and to reject others.

Sher claimed that "what a

person deserves is always determined either by what they
174
have done, or by what, in some important sense, they are ."

I

think that this statement is on the right track, but that

the "important sense" of what a person is can be specified:
120

what is important is that people are good people.

think

I

that what makes a person a good person is possession of the

virtues,

and avoidance of the vices.

Furthermore, since

virtues and vices are dispositions to act, insofar as

action is an exemplification of

a

virtue or

a vice,

a

past

then

that past action will also modify the desert of the agent.

my view (roughly)

So,

is that all desert is based upon

the possession of virtues and vices.

However,

there are

some auxiliary principles which modify this basic claim,
I

so

think it will be clearer to start with a discussion of the

virtues and vices themselves, whose features motivate these
modifications.

There are two main tasks that need to be

accomplished in an adequate account of virtue:
account of the nature of virtue, and
the virtues themselves.

influenced by Aristotle.

(2)

a

(1)

an

specification of

My view of the nature of virtues is
However,

there may be many

philosophers who disagree with the Aristotelian conception
of virtue.

Some of these would probably also disagree with

my modified Aristotelian view, as might some who consider
themselves to be Aristotelian.

If so,

then these

philosophers will also disagree with my view of the desert
bases.

In fact, my claim is that the disagreements should

be linked.
a virtue,

base.

So,

For instance,

if you do not think that beauty is

then you should not think that beauty is a desert

while

I

will present a virtue/vice theory to give

substance to my view that the desert bases are all and only
121

virtues or vices, if your view of the virtues is different
from mine, then your view of the desert bases will also be

different from mine.

That is no objection to my theory, so

long as the desert bases are linked to the possession of

virtues and vices in the way that

I

say they are.

Some Notes on the Nature of Virtue

Virtue theory is

theory about the evaluation of

a

rather than of acts or states of affairs.

persons,

A virtue

is a disposition to act in certain ways under certain

conditions.

Part of what makes a particular act the

exemplification of
act.

a

virtue is the motive that produced the

For example, Kant makes a distinction between the

grocer who does not overcharge his customers from the motive
of self-interest,

and the grocer who does not overcharge

from the motive of duty

himself this way,

I

175
.

Although Kant does not express

think this distinction corresponds to

17b
the difference between performing a virtuous action

(the

action of the grocer who does not overcharge from the motive
of duty)

and performing a neutral action (the action of the

,

grocer who does not overcharge from the motive of selfinterest)

.

Thus,

part of what makes an action an instance of a

virtue is the motive that produced it.

another requirement, that the motive be part of

disposition to act.

there is

However,
a

general

It cannot be a one-time circumstance,

but must be a developed habit.
122

For instance,

consider an

habitual thief who has spent most of his adult life
stealing.

Imagine that on one occasion,

in the midst of a

theft that was going well for him, he had a change of heart,
and decided to abort his mission.

The next day, however, he

went on with his schedule of stealing

(a

new house, not the

one where he had had an attack of conscience)

.

Even if the

motivation for his aborting his theft was love of duty, or
love of his fellow humans, or the realization that he should

not steal, etc., his action would not indicate that he

possessed the relevant virtue, because it was clearly not
part of his disposition to be motivated to refrain from
stealing even though in that case, he did exemplify

a

virtue

A comprehensive and influential conception of the
virtues can be found in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.

Aristotle makes several points about the nature of virtue
before listing the virtues themselves.

Since his remarks

are consistent with, but also more extensive than, what

have said above,

I

I

have summarized four main points below.

First, Aristotle distinguishes between two main kinds

of virtue, moral and intellectual

177
.

Intellectual virtue is

developed through learning, but moral virtue is developed
through habit.

We are not born with the moral virtues, but

acquire them through performing virtuous actions.
instance,

For

"we become just by performing just actions... We
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may sum it all up in the generalization,

'Like activities

produce like dispositions.'" 178
Second, Aristotle makes it clear that what makes a

person virtuous is not the mere performance of virtuous
actions.

The mind of the performer must be in the correct

state as well.

"Actions,

to be sure,

temperate when they are such as

would do.

are called just and

a just or

temperate man

But the doer is just or temperate not because he

does such things but when he does them in the way of just

and temperate persons." 179

There are three conditions to be

fulfilled for the doer to be virtuous.
(1) The agent must act in full consciousness of
what he is doing.
(2) He must 'will' his action,
and will it for its own sake.
(3) The act must
proceed from a fixed and unchangeable
disposition. 180

From this, it follows that the action of

person can appear identical to the action of
person.
lie,

For instance,

a
a

non-virtuous
virtuous

if some person's normal habit is to

but on one occasion tells the truth, the liar might

appear to be virtuous.
is not enough,

The actual instance of truth-telling

by itself, to allow an accurate judgement of

the merit of the utterer.

be judged virtuous,

In this case,

the liar is not to

even though he told the truth.

To

become virtuous, the liar would have to become in the habit
of always telling the truth

(and consciously,

own sake)

124

and for its

Third,

according to Aristotle, virtue is neither

feeling nor a capacity, but a certain disposition

dispositions are virtues?

person

a

181
.

a

Which

The dispositions which make a

good person, and make that person function well

182
.

Possession of the virtues is necessary for humans to
flourish.
Fourth, Aristotle appears to claim that virtue is

always a mean between two extremes.

Thus,

for every virtue,

there will be two associated vices.

Now virtue is concerned with passions and actions,
in which excess is a form of failure, and so is
defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a
form of success; and being praised and being
successful are both characteristics of virtue.
Therefore, virtue is a kind of mean, since as we
have seen, it aims at what is intermediate 183
.

In my view, Aristotle's third point is problematic.

The third point seems to imply that humans are like tools

they have particular functions, and the virtues are what

allow them to perform those functions well.

For instance,

the characteristic function of the saw is what it was

designed to do.
is to cut things,

Thus,

the characteristic function of a saw

and so a virtue of the saw is sharpness.

If we apply this to people,

then there is a characteristic

function of persons, and the virtues allow each person to

achieve that function.

However,

it does not appear that

there is a characteristic function of persons.
like tools in at least one important respect:

We are not
we were not

we
designed to do anything, either well or poorly, because
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were not designed.

So,

the virtues are not those

dispositions which allow us to achieve our function.
Let me note a tension between the conception of a good

person, and the conception of a person that is good for some

particular task

(a

good boxer, a good military commander, a

good philosophy professor)

Above,

.

I

with Aristotle's notion that there is

expressed disagreement
a

characteristic

function of people, and that the virtues are what allow us
to achieve that function.

I

found this notion unacceptable,

because it does not seem that, in general, people have

characteristic function.
is,

Thus,

a

the judgment that a person

overall, a good person does not seem to require some

conception of what that person is good for.
hand,

On the other

it is often the case that a person must fulfill a

particular task, or profession.

In such cases,

we clearly

do judge that so-and-so would make a good doctor, or a good

lawyer, or a good carpenter.

Furthermore, we also make

judgments of desert with respect to these concepts.

It

seems to me that there is a difference between judging a

person good overall, and judging
However,

I

a

person

a

good doctor.

do think that the judgments of desert that are

made in the more narrow contexts (good doctor, good boxer)
still depend on the virtues that
chapter,

I

enumerated in the last

as do the judgments about desert made in the

context of judging

a

person good overall.
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Of course, what makes a person good overall is not the

same as what makes a person a good boxer, otherwise it would
be clear that someone like Mike Tyson would not only be

judged not
boxer.

good person, but that he would be judged

a

a

poor

Since we distinguish between the judgment that Mike

Tyson is

a

good boxer (probably true), and the judgment that

Mike Tyson is

a

good person (probably false)

,

we must have

different standards.
I

think that this tension between the virtues that make

for a good person,

and the virtues that make for

boxer, or good lawyer, etc.,

a

good

is mirrored by the conflict

between judgments of desert for

person overall, and for

a

person as a boxer, or lawyer, etc.

a

For instance, measured

by most boxing standards, Mike Tyson is one of the great
boxers

(hardest hitting at least)

as such.

raping

,

and deserves recognition

However, he also deserved his prison sentence for

a woman,

and the fact that one of his self-admitted

unforgettable punches was not even in the ring
his

(now)

knocked

(he

ex-wife into the walls of their apartment)

indicates that he is not deserving of many good things as

moral person

184
.

Aristotle’s fourth point, about virtue being
mean,

is also problematic.

a

kind of

Although he does mention again

and again that virtue is a mean, it is not clear that he
185

Furthermore, whether or not Aristotle

really believes it

.

truly affirms it,

it is simply false.
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As Aristotle himself

admits,

there is no way of committing adultery in

Adultery is always

way.

a vice,

or what way it is committed.

a

moderate

no matter when, with whom,

In addition,

the virtue of

justice is not presented as a mean, and neither are the

intellectual virtues.

Thus,

clearly can be "tripled up"
two extreme vices)

while some virtues and vices
(the virtue as the mean between

in a useful way,

I

will not follow this

device when presenting Aristotle's list.
The Virtues and Vices

Aristotle notes that not all virtues and vices have
names,

and that some of the names he uses do not fit

exactly.

He then goes into a detailed discussion of the

moral virtues, and then the intellectual virtues.

I

have

listed the virtues below, with related vices across from
them where appropriate.

(The quotations indicate names that

Aristotle made up because there was not any in common
use

186
.

Virtue
courage
temperance

liberality

magnificence
proper pride
proper ambition
good temper

truthfulness

Vice
cowardliness
rashness
"insensibility" (extreme
asceticism)
self-indulgence
meanness
prodigality
stinginess
vulgarity
undue humility
empty vanity
unambitiousness
excess ambition
"inirascibility"
irascibility
mock modesty
boastfulness
128

ready wit

boorishness
buffoonery
surliness
obsequiousness
bashfulness
shamelessness

friendliness

modesty

There is another kind of moral virtue, justice.

But

this virtue is actually comprised of several closely related

virtues.

One sense of 'justice'

is that of "virtue entire."

It is possible to be virtuous in one's private dealings,

while not being virtuous in relation to one's neighbor.

Aristotle says,
...justice is often thought to be the greatest of
virtues... It is complete because he who possesses
it can exercise his virtue not only in himself but
towards his neighbor also; for many men can
exercise virtue in their own affairs, but not in
their relations to their neighbor 187
.

However,

there are also other meanings of 'justice'

which indicate separate virtues not already listed above.
There are at least two separate kinds of justice:

distributive, and rectif icatory
Finally,

188
.

there are five major, and three minor

intellectual virtues:

Science, Art,

Practical wisdom,

Intuitive reason, and Philosophic wisdom, and excellence in
deliberation, understanding, and judgment

189
.

Since it may

not be clear what Aristotle intends by each of the five

major virtues, here is

a

brief description of them.

Science

is the capacity to demonstrate one's knowledge of necessary

truths

190
,

191
art is the capacity to make things

,

practical

wisdom is the capacity to achieve what is desired (the good
129

ends ),

192

intuitive reason is the capacity to grasp first

principles

191
,

and philosophic wisdom is scientific knowledge

combined with intuitive reason
As

I

194
.

noted above, Aristotle divided the virtues into

two broad categories, moral and intellectual.
of moral virtues, however,

From the list

it appears that he had a much

wider conception of morality than

I

do.

For instance, he

counts friendliness and ready wit among the moral virtues.
Furthermore, he counts art among the intellectual virtues.
Again,

this seems a bit of a stretch to me, but my quarrel

is not

(except for a couple of exceptions that

will

I

mention below) with the individual virtues, it is with
Aristotle's using only two categories to classify them.

I

agree that two of the important ways in which people can be

judged good are morally and intellectually, but

I

also think

that people can be judged artistically, athletically, and

socially.

I

think that there is a set of virtues for each

of these major ways of being judged good.
scheme,

I

In my virtue

keep most of the virtues listed by Aristotle, but

some of them are classified under the different categories

just mentioned, and there some other virtues that

Here is

a

table of the virtues:
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I

add.

I

Moral
courage
temperance
truthfulness
liberality
(charity)

justice
fidelity
diligence
etc

Intellectual Artistic
practical
talent for
wisdom
the fine

Social
ready wit
friend(prudence)
arts as
liness
rationality well
good temper
talent for
as for
proper
intellectual crafts &
pride
activities,
hobbies
proper
such as
painting,
ambition
science,
music.
modesty
math,
literature. leadership
philosophy,
gardening,
ability
etc
carpentry.
cooperative
the
ability
culinary
etc
arts,

Athletic
beauty
strength
hand-eye
co-

ordination
& talent
for

various
athletic
activities
etc

etc.

Most of Aristotle's virtues appear on this list, with
the exception of magnificence.

Aristotle says that "the

magnificent man is like an artist; for he can see what is
fitting and spend large sums tastefully ." 195

seem to be

a

moral virtue.

If anything,

This does not

it may be a

combination of artistic and social virtues, but
think it needs a special mention on my list.
'charity'

what

I

I

do not

Also,

I

put

in parentheses after 'liberality' because that is

understand by it.

fidelity and diligence.

I

also added two moral virtues,

These seem to me to be dispositions

that make their bearer a better person.

Finally, note that

this scheme is not meant to be an exhaustive and exclusive
list of the virtues.

other virtues
listed.

It is not exhaustive because there are

(many of them minor virtues)

that

I

have not

This list is not exclusive, because some virtues

seem to fit under more than one heading.
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For instance,

grace of movement seems to be an athletic virtue, but

perhaps is also an artistic virtue (in
instance)

Nevertheless,

.

I

a

ballet dancer,

for

think that list is complete

enough to provide substance to my claim that the desert
bases are either virtues or vices.

Remember,

if you

disagree with my chosen virtues, that is not an objection to

my view, so long as you also disagree with the corresponding
desert base.
your own.

So if you do not like this list,

That list will,

if

I

substitute

am correct, generate your

desert bases.
I

am now ready to present my view in detail, along with

some criticisms and modifications.
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CHAPTER

7

DESERT AND VIRTUE
In this chapter,

I

defend the view that desert is

determined by possession of virtues and vices.
explain what it is for an action to exemplify

present

I

a

first

virtue and

couple of technical terms that make use of this

a

concept.

Then

I

present the first version of my thesis, and

show that it succeeds in many cases.

Then

I

discuss some

problem cases that force a couple of revisions to my view.
Finally,

I

for PJD,

the principle that distributive justice is achieved

discuss some implications of this view of desert

when people get what they deserve.
The simplest view of the connection between desert and

virtue is that
a

a

person deserves good things for possessing

virtue or acting virtuously, bad things for possessing

a

vice or acting viciously, and that these two categories

exhaust the desert bases.

For a person to act virtuously,

she must perform some action which both exemplifies that

virtue,

and for which the virtuous disposition was a

significant motive.

An action that exemplifies

virtue is a typical action for that virtue.

a

particular

A virtue is

a

disposition to do certain acts, and those acts exemplify
that virtue.

For instance,

truthfulness is

a virtue,

and an

action that exemplifies it occurs when someone tells the
truth.

Or consider friendliness; it could be exemplified by

the actions involved in introducing a new member to the rest
133

of the group,

Below,

I

making the new person feel welcome.

and.

have used the notion of exemplification to define

virtuous and vicious actions.

VirA An agent,

s, performed a virtuous
action, a =df. a is an action that s
performed, a exemplifies a virtue, v,
and a significant part of s' motive for
doing a was either v, or the same
intentions that one who possessed v and
performed a would have.

VicA An agent,

s, performed a vicious action,
a =df. a is an action that s performed,
a exemplifies a vice, v, and a

significant part of s's motive for doing
a was either v, or the same intentions
that one who possessed v and performed a
would have.
Note that

order to do

possess

a

a

a

person does not have to possess

virtue in

virtuous action (nor does he or she have to

vice in order to do a vicious action)

to say that someone acted virtuously,

person’s action must "proceed from
But

I

a

This is

.

somewhat different from what Aristotle claimed.

character ." 196

a

To be able

he required that the

firm and unchangeable

think that a person can begin to act

virtuously without already possessing the virtue, that
without already having

a

is,

fixed and unchangeable character

from whence the action proceeds.

My idea is that

a

person

acts virtuously (or viciously) when she or he acts the way a

person would who had the relevant virtue

(or vice)

A

person without some particular virtue can act similarly to
the way a person would who had that virtue.

especially when

a

person is learning
134

a

This happens

particular virtue.

sze

(24

Jjt

As Aristotle said,
acts." 197

So,

"we must become just by doing just

because the person has not before now had the

disposition to be just, one just act is not enough for him
to be judged to possess the virtue of justice.

Nevertheless, that instance, if from the right motive, is a

virtuous action.

It counts positively towards his desert.

On the other hand, consider

a

person who could be said to

possess the virtue of truthfulness.

Suppose that person one

day breaks down and tells a serious lie.

If that one lie

was the only one he told, he could not be said to possess
the vice of mendacity.

Yet his action was vicious, and

counts negatively toward his desert.

need to actually possess

a

Thus,

one does not

virtue or vice in order to act

virtuously or viciously.
However,

since virtues and vices are dispositions, and

it seems that some desert is based on the possession of a

disposition without any obvious action, it is also possible
for someone to deserve without having performed the relevant

action.

Thus,

some desert is based on the possession of

certain disposition, without specifying any particular
virtuous or vicious action.
With the above definitions, the first version of the

relationship between virtues, vices, and desert can be
stated.

VD1

An agent deserves something good (bad)
in virtue of his or her action, a, or
disposition, d, only if a was a virtuous
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a

(vicious)

action,

or d is a virtue

(vice)
I

think that VD1 captures an important insight about

the connection between desert, virtue, and vice.

Furthermore, in many cases it agrees with intuitions about

when

a

person is deserving.

For instance,

the following

desert claims from Chapter Three all have either virtuous or

vicious actions, or virtues or vices for their grounds.
Jones deserves her success; she's worked
hard for it.
Walters deserves the job; she's the best
qualified applicant.
Baker deserves to win; he's played
superbly.
Miss Vermont deserves to win; she's the
prettiest entrant.
Anderson deserves his twenty-year
sentence; he planned the murder.
Brown may have known she wouldn't be
caught, but she still deserves to be
punished.
Benson deserves some good luck; he's a
fine person.
McArthur deserves a hearing; he's an
expert on the subject.
Martin deserves to be punished; he lied
to Jackson and Burns about ringing up
yesterday.
Nolan deserved the prize for her
efforts; her painting was by far the
best
McKenzie deserves to go to jail; he
robbed that old lady.

1.

3.
6.

7.
8.
9.

12.
14.

22.

23.

25.

The ground of claim

Claim

(1)

is diligence,

a

moral virtue.

appeals to a set of virtues which the candidate

(3)

possesses.

Included are probably several social virtues,

plus some intellectual and (perhaps) moral virtues.

grounds of
beauty.

(6)

and

(7)

Claims (8),

The

are athletic virtue and physical
(9),

(22),
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and (25)

seem to be grounded

in various moral vices

(it is

hard to know for sure, since

these claims are very sketchy, but it is at least

plausible)

Claim

.

(12)

is grounded in the goodness of

Benson, which would presumably indicate that he possesses

several virtues.

Claim

(14)

is grounded by an intellectual

virtue.

claim

(23)

is grounded by artistic virtue.

Finally,

Problems for the Simple View
I

think that VD1 is on the right track about the

relationship between virtue and vice to desert.

However,

there is a range of very plausible desert claims whose

desert bases cannot be considered virtues or vices.

Here

are four cases where the subjects seem deserving, but it is

not the case that the desert is due to virtuous or vicious

behavior
Case

disaster.

1:

Suppose an innocent person suffers a natural

For instance,

out by a tornado.

some compensation.

suppose a farmer's corn is wiped

It seems that now this person deserves

This is not deserved because of any

virtue, but because of the past receipt of the person.

Of

course, one reason the disaster is undeserved is that the

person was innocent, and so did not deserve such
But the disaster happened.

a

mishap.

The person did not get her just

desert
Case

2:

Suppose a rich,

famous athlete murders a guy,

and the victim's parents then sue him for millions of
dollars.

They deserve recompense for the loss of their
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child,

and it is only fitting that the murderer's fortune

should be forfeit to them.

The parents' desert is not based

on anything that they have done

(or failed to do)

.

It is

based on the wrong that was done to them.
Case

3:

Imagine that

a

married couple with

child find that their marriage cannot work.
divorce.

They get a

There were no beatings, intimidations, or

adulterous acts.

The two found that they had irreconcilable

differences in religions, politics, etc.

a

young

Neither party has done anything particularly bad

to the other.

along.

a

In this case,

They could not get

suppose that the wife had not pursued

career after marriage, so that after the divorce, she had

no means of supporting herself or her child.

money,

a job,

day-care for her child.

deserves to get these things.

She needs

It seems that she

This desert is based, not on

her virtue, but on her need.
Case

4:

In Chapter Three,

presented the following

I

desert claim involving bad luck as

a

desert base, taken from

Sher's list of initially plausible desert claims:
13.

Gordon deserves some good luck; she's had only bad.

To flesh out this example a bit,

imagine that Gordon has

been playing bridge with some friends.

She's played well,

but all night has had only miserable hands, each less than
ten points.

To make matters worse,

very good hands either.

her partner has not had

It is plausible to think that

because Gordon has had bad luck all evening, she deserves
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some compensation.

It seems that she deserves to get a

better hand.
So here are four cases of desert that seem to involve

grounds other than either virtue or vice.
grounds are

(1)

suffering

a

at the hands of an evil man,

Instead,

natural disaster,
(3)

need,

and

(4)

(2)

the

suffering

bad luck.

While it might appear that these cases are four separate
reasons to reject VD1,

I

think that each of these four cases

has something important in common with the other three.

In

each case, there has been a poor fit with respect to the
subjects' past deserts and past receipts.

In case

(1),

the

farmer had done nothing to deserve such a natural disaster.
The same is true of the parents in case

(2)

They had not

done anything to deserve the severe harm imposed upon them
(not to mention upon their son--he had not done anything to

deserve being murdered) by the rich athlete.

In case

(3),

the separated mother did not deserve to be in such need--she

was as innocent as her husband in their divorce.
in case

(4),

that evening,
once.

Thus,

Finally,

Gordon had been playing well, and long enough
that she should have got a good hand at least

while there were different reasons for the poor

fit between desert and receipt in each case,

it was that

poor fit that was the ground for the desert.
So it is clear that desert is affected by receipts as

well as virtues and vices.

The fit between what a person

has previously deserved and received is a feature that
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I

think must be taken account of in all desert no matter
what
other desert bases there are.

It is independent of desert

bases, but is fairly empty until those bases have been

specified.

The match between desert and receipt is part of

the fundamental concept of desert.

require

deserver,

a

a desert,

All desert claims

and a reason why the deserver

deserves the desert, as well the correct match between past
receipts and deserts.
So VD1 is an incomplete account of the determinants of

desert.

There is another factor that must be incorporated

into the account.
Past Receipts
To modify VD1,

need the concepts of

must introduce some new concepts.

I

a

virtue desert-level and a vice

desert-level, each of them time-relativized.

what

a

I

person deserves at

a time,

These indicate

based upon all his or her

virtuous and vicious dispositions and behavior up to that
time.

I

also need to make use of the concepts of a goods-

received-level at
time.

a time,

and

a

evils-received-level at

a

These indicate the total amount of good and bad

things that the person has received up to that time.
Finally,

received,

I

need

a

comparison between the goods deserved and

and the evils deserved and received.

measures of how well
up.

time.

a

person's deserts and receipts match

They determine whether
Roughly,

These are

a

person deserves anything at

the idea is that people are deserving of
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a

good things only if they have done virtuous actions, or have

virtuous dispositions, and have not yet received anything
good for them; and that people are deserving of bad things

only if they have done vicious actions, or have vicious
dispositions, and have not yet received anything bad for
them; otherwise they are not deserving of anything.

A person's Virtuous Desert Level at

a time is the

amount of good things that she deserves in virtue of her

virtuous dispositions or actions up to that time.

This

Virtuous Desert Level is independent of any goods that she
might have already received, but to determine her actual
deserts,

this must be modified by her past receipts.

So,

a

person's Goods-Received Level at a time is the amount of
good things that she has received for her virtuous

dispositions or actions up to that time; and

a

person's

Deserved Goods Match is computed by comparing her Virtuous
Desert Level to her Goods-Received Level.

If a person's

Virtuous Desert Level is higher than her Goods-Received
Level,

then her Deserved Goods Match is positive,

indicating

that she still deserves some goods for her virtuous

dispositions or actions that she has not received.
other hand, if

a

On the

person's Goods-Received Level is higher

than her Virtuous Desert Level, then her Deserved Goods

Match is negative, indicating that she has received more
good things than she deserves for her virtuous dispositions
or actions.

Finally,

if a person's Virtuous Desert Level is
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equal to her Goods Received Level, then her Deserved Goods

Match is zero, indicating that she has received exactly the
goods she deserves for her virtuous dispositions or actions.
For convenience, a person's Deserved Goods Match is

represented by a real number,

n,

between -1 and +1.

positive, then the larger the value of

n,

If n is

the more her

virtuous dispositions or actions have not been rewarded.
n = +1,

If

then she has not received any of the goods that she

deserves for her virtuous dispositions or actions.
negative,

then the smaller the value of

n,

If n is

the more goods

she has received in excess of what she deserves for her

virtuous dispositions or actions.

If n = -1,

then she has

not deserved any of the goods that she has received for her

virtuous dispositions or actions.

A person's Vicious Desert Level and Evils-Received
Level together determine his Deserved Evils Match.

concepts correspond to

a

These

person's Virtuous Desert Level,

Goods-Received Level, and Deserved Goods Match,
respectively, except that they involve vicious dispositions,

vicious actions, and deserved evils rather than virtuous
dispositions, virtuous actions, and deserved goods.

receipt plays the same role in determining

a

Past

person's

Deserved Evils Match as it does in determining his Deserved
Goods Match.
Lastly,

a

represented by

person's Deserved Evils Match is also
a

real number between -1 and +1.
142

If a

person's Vicious Desert Level is higher than his Evils-

Received Level, then his Deserved Evils Match is positive,
indicating that he still deserves some as yet un-received
goods for his vicious dispositions or actions.
hand,

On the other

if a person's Evils-Received Level is higher than his

Vicious Desert Level, then his Deserved Evils Match is
negative,

indicating that he has received more evil things

than he deserves for his vicious dispositions or actions.
Finally,

if a person's Vicious Desert Level is equal to his

Evils-Received Level, then his Deserved Evils Match is zero,
indicating that he has received exactly the evils he
deserves for his vicious dispositions or actions.
These concepts are summarized below, where
agent,

and

t

s is an

is a time.

VRDL s's Virtuous Desert Level at t =df. the
amount of good things that s deserves in
virtue of s's virtuous dispositions or
actions up to t.

VCDL s's Vicious Desert Level at t =df. the
amount of bad things that s deserves in
virtue of s's vicious dispositions or
actions up to t.
GRL

s's Goods-Received Level at t =df. the
amount of good things that s has
received for s's virtuous dispositions
or actions up to t.

ERL

s's Evils-Received Level at t =df. the
amount of bad things that s has received
for s's vicious dispositions or actions
up to t.

DGM

s's Deserved Goods Match at t =df. a
number, -1 <= n <= +1, such that n
represents the degree to which s has got
the goods that s deserves up to t, where
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n =

0 indicates an exact match
between desert and receipt of goods,
(ii) n > 0 indicates that s has not
received all the goods that s deserves,
and (iii) n < 0 indicates that s has
received more goods than s deserves.

(i)

DEM

s's Deserved Evils Match at t =df. a
number, -1 <= n <= +1, such that n
represents the degree to which s has got
the evils that s deserves up to t, where
(i) n = 0 indicates an exact match
between desert and receipt of evils,
(ii) n > 0 indicates that s has not
received all the evils that s deserves,
and (iii) n < 0 indicates that s has
received more evils than s deserves.

With these definitions,

I

can present the relationship

between virtues, vices, virtuous and vicious actions, past
receipts, and desert.

Roughly,

the relationship is this:

one's virtuous dispositions or actions make one deserving of

good things so long as one has not already received them;
one's vicious dispositions or actions make one deserving of

bad things so long as one has not already received them; and
if one receives an undeserved evil,

something good in compensation.
VD2, below

addition,

VD2

:

(again,

s is

an agent,

then one deserves

This idea is expressed in
t

is a time,

x is a desert)

VD g and VD E

.

VD G

deserves something good at t if and
only if
s's Deserved Goods Match is
(1)
positive at t, or
s's Deserved Evils Match is
(2)
negative at t.

VD e

s deserves something bad at
only if

s
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t

if and

and in

s's Deserved Evils Match is
positive at t.

(3)

The three parts of VD2 capture the three general kinds
of desert:
to clause

reward, punishment, and compensation.
(1),

if you have done something virtuous,

possessed a virtue, before now, then you deserve
now if you have not already been rewarded.
clause

reward

According to

then you deserve punishment now if

you have not already been punished.

Finally,

according to

if you have received more evils then you deserve

(2),

up to now,

a

or have

if you have done something vicious before now,

(3),

or have possessed a vice,

clause

According

then you deserve compensation now for having

received those evils.
In VD2,

there is no clause about your now deserving

something bad for having previously received more goods than
you deserved, because

I

do not think that you do deserve

evils for having received more goods than you have

virtuously deserved.

Compensation is not symmetrical.

Though we do deserve recompense for undeserved bad fortune,
we do not deserve to be punished for undeserved good

fortune.

Of course,

if you have received more than you

virtuously deserve, then your Deserved Goods Match will be
negative, and so you will not deserve any more goods until
you have "caught up," so to speak, with your receipts.

But

this is not the same as saying that you deserve to have some
of your receipts taken away.
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Principle VD2 explains why the deservers in cases (1-4)
above are deserving.
is negative,

case

(1)

In each case,

the Deserved Evils Match

so the people involved deserve recompense.

the farmer's corn was wiped out,

a

In

bad thing that

she did not deserve, because she had not done anything

vicious enough to deserve it.

Match is negative.
case

(2)

Thus,

her Deserved Evils

She deserves recompense.

The parents in

also had a negative Deserved Evils Match; they did

not deserve to suffer the loss of their son because of any
of their vicious actions,
In case

(3)

so they too deserve recompense.

the divorced mother has needs because of a

radical change in her living situation.

divorce was

a

In her case,

bad thing that happened to her.

the

Of course,

there was a sense in which she brought the divorce on
herself, because she willingly signed the divorce papers.

But

I

specified that in this case the divorce was

a

result

of irreconcilable differences between the husband and wife,

and that neither of them was "at fault."

Thus,

I

think this

case falls under the same general scheme that others fall
under.

The woman suffered a bad thing which she did not

deserve; her Deserved Evils Match was negative, so she

deserves recompense.
the others,

Finally,

except in scale.

case

(4)

is no different from

What Gordon suffered was

unusually bad luck at cards, and she did not deserve it.
Her deserved recompense is correspondingly small.
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But this

is still a case where her Deserved Evils Match was negative,

however slightly, so she deserves to get

a

good hand.

VD2 also has no problems with another kind of case,

where two people are equally virtuously and viciously

deserving (say they are twins), but one has received
more good things than the other.
mother)

If a third person

is in a position to benefit either of them,

a lot

(their

then VD2

will inform her that the one with the greater inequality

between past receipts and deserts is the more deserving.
So there are a range of cases that VD1 was not able to

handle, but which VD2 is successful at,

cases that VD1 was successful with.

in addition to the

Since it seems to me

that all desert depends upon what a person has received,
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do not find VD2 an unacceptable modification of VD1

However,

I

think that there is a closer connection between

desert and the virtues and vices than VD2 posits, and so

would like to strengthen the claim made there.

I

But a

stronger version of VD2 is more controversial, and will
require some modification in turn.

I

will discuss the

strengthened version of VD2, plus two objections, in the
next section.

Insipidity
I

would like to make the claim that there is a virtue

(or vice)

VD3

involved in every desert-claim:
(A)

s is deserving if and only if
s has some virtue or vice; and

(B)

VD G and VD E

.
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I

VD3 is more restrictive than VD2 in two ways.

according to VD2,
a

virtue or

a

a

First,

person does not actually have to possess

vice in order to deserve something.

It is

sufficient that the person has, on one occasion, acted like
a

virtuous or vicious person (so long as this act makes the

person's DGM or DEM positive)
requires not only that

a

VD3 requires more.

.

person act like

It

virtuous or

a

vicious person, but that the person actually have some

virtue or vice.

Second, VD2 does not even require that a

person act like a virtuous person in order to be deserving
of something good.

According to clause

(2)

of VD2,

if a

person had not performed any virtuous or vicious actions,
but had received some disaster, then the person would

deserve recompense.

Thus,

in clause

(2),

there is no

connection between virtue and desert, and there is no more
than a fairly tenuous connection between vice and desert.
To deserve a positive desert,

it suffices that the person

has refrained from any vicious actions and has suffered

disaster.

On the other hand,

a

according to VD3, it is not

enough just to be needy, or to be suffering.

The person

must also have some virtue (it does not necessarily need to
be innocence)
It might appear that there is a clear counter-example

to VD3:

imagine a person who has no virtues and no vices

characterize such

a one as

good and nothing bad.

insipid)

.

He deserves nothing

But suppose he gets hit,
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through no

(I

fault of his own, by a major disaster.

deserves compensation.

Then it seem that he

This desert cannot be based on any

virtue or vice, since it has been stipulated that he has
none.
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Furthermore, we can imagine that he has not

performed any virtuous or vicious actions.

He has truly

been insipid.
This example would show that VD3 is false, except that

this example is impossible.

It might sound reasonable at

first consideration, but upon closer scrutiny it becomes

clear that no insipid persons could exist.

There is too

close a connection between at least some of the virtues and
vices.

Although not all virtues are means, it does seem

that Aristotle was right about several of the virtues being
means,

e.g.

temperance, courage, and proper ambition.

temperate person has

a

A

disposition that is neither too

ascetic nor too self-indulgent.

There is

a

continuum along

which all dispositions concerned with seeking pleasure must
lie.

Either the disposition is to seek pleasure too often,

or too rarely,

or somewhere in the middle

(of course,

the

borders between too little, just right, and too much are
vague, but that does not matter)

Everyone must have some

disposition or other toward seeking pleasure.
must have some virtue or vice.
for courage,

So everyone

The same point can be made

the mean between cowardice and rashness, and

for proper ambition,

the mean between overweening zeal and

sloth
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Furthermore, other virtues that are not means do seem
to have complementary vices,

heartedness,

e.g.

charitableness and hard-

fidelity and infidelity, diligence and

laziness, and rationality and irrationality.

If a person is

not charitable, then she must tend toward hard-heartedness,
or at least selfishness.

A person whose word

is

untrustworthy is a person who lacks fidelity, and it seems
that everyone is either more or less diligent or lazy, and

more or less rational or irrational.
that there can be insipid adults,

show that VD3 is false.
problem,

Thus,

I

do not think

so the example fails to

But it suggests a more severe

that of the desert of children.

Children
Above,

I

argued that there could be no insipid adults,

due to the close connection between certain virtues and

vices.

But very young children have not yet had time to

develop any dispositions, and they may have no past
sufferings to make up for, so it would appear that on my
account, very young children almost never deserve anything.

But this seems wrong,

so it seems that there is a problem

with my account.
It does seem that in many ways,

the same things that adults can.

children cannot deserve

For instance,

it is absurd

to think that a very young child could deserve a large

promotion, or first prize in a body-building competition, or
a

Pulitzer prize.

And in part, this is because children at
150

that uge cannot posssss ths relevant virtues.

Furthermore,

children are not expected to be as moral as adults.

We

realize that they do not have the same judgment, clarity of
thought,

and training to make many of the moral decisions

that adults make.

distinction.

Both secular law and religion make this

All of this seems to have implications about

virtuous and vices in children:

it seems reasonable to

suppose that children do not have as much ability to display

virtue and vice as adults.

Therefore,

it would seem that if

VD3 is true, then children are generally less deserving (of

both good and bad things) than adults.
However,

something.

it does seem that such young children deserve

They deserve the chance to develop their budding

virtues which might someday make them deserving of those
grand deserts.
receipts,

This desert is clearly not based on any past

and is also not based in any straightforward way

on their present virtues, because children have at most the

rudiments of virtues.

I

think that this desert is based on

the potential of children to develop their virtues.

potential needs nurturing to have
developed, and so

I

a

This

chance to be fully

think that children deserve to get those

things that they need to develop their virtues based on the

potential of those virtues.

For instance, musical talent is

sometimes evident from a very young age.

In such cases,

it

seems clear that the child deserves the kind of environment

that will give him or her the chance to develop that virtue.
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Thus,

I

need to modify VD3 to take into account the desert

due a person for his or her potential virtues.

Although

introduced this modification in the context

I

of what children deserve,

think it applies generally to

I

anyone who has an undeveloped virtue through no fault of his
or her own.

For instance,

a

person may not realize that she

has the potential to be a very good runner until late in

Mavis Lungren is

life.

a

veteran runner who has set

numerous age-group records at distances from the mile to the
marathon.

She did not start running until in her fifties.

But when she did,

it was apparent very quickly that she had

a lot of talent.

She deserved the chance to develop that

running talent no less than a high-school boy who runs
sub-four minute mile.

Thus,

the modification to VD3 is

applicable to all persons, not just children.
a

person has neglected

laziness,

a

Of course,

if

virtue for most of his life through

it is not so clear that he would deserve,

age of eighty,

a

at the

all the conditions necessary to develop that

Only those virtues that have been undeveloped for

virtue.

reasons beyond the person's control, and suddenly appear
later in life, can cause the person to deserve something not

based on past receipts or previous actions.
VD4

VD Gp

:

VD Gp and VD Ep

.

s deserves something good at t if and
only if
s's Deserved Goods Match is
(1)
positive at t and s has some
virtue or vice at t, or
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(

2

)

(3)

VD Ep

s'
Deserved Evils Match is
negative at t, and s has some
virtue or vice at t, or
through no fault of s' s, s has
a potential virtue that s has
not developed, and that good
is necessary for s to develop
that virtue.

s deserves something bad at t if and
only if
s s Deserved Evils Match is
(4)
positive at t and s has some
virtue or vice at t.
'

Principle VD4 represents my most developed view about
the connection between desert, and the virtues and vices.
It takes into account three general types of desert:

reward, punishment,

and compensation; and it takes into

account the idea that those who can develop virtues deserve
to get the chance to do so.

In addition,

I

have shown that

VD4 can successfully account for a wide variety of desert

claims.

In the next section,

will discuss several alleged

I

desert bases that might appear to ground desert claims that
VD4 would not ground.

Other Alleged Desert Bases

Besides virtues, vices, and past receipt, the following
suffering,

characteristics are plausible desert bases:
need,

autonomous action, personhood, success, and

entitlement.
need,

In this section,

I

will show that suffering,

autonomous action, and personhood are not needed as

separate desert bases if VD4 is true, because VD4 accounts
for the plausibility of each of them.

that success is not a desert base.
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Then

Finally,

will argue

I

I

will argue

that entitlement is not a desert base either, but because

entitlement is more complicated, it will be discussed in the
next section.

Suffering and need seem to me to be closely related,
since many people who are in need can be said to be
suffering.

Furthermore,

if a person’s need is due to her

own negligence, then we are unlikely to think she deserves
any help.

Thus,

innocent need is more plausible as a desert

base than just general need.
suffering.

think the same is true of

I

If a person deliberately brings about her own

suffering through some vice, then it is not so plausible
that the person deserves compensation.
are not virtues or vices.

be desert bases.

Thus,

However, as

Need and suffering

on my account they cannot

have just noted, both are

I

much more plausible if they are attributed to innocent
people.

This suggests that the plausibility of these two

kinds of situation as desert-inducing can be explained by
the fact that each case is an instance of a virtuous person

being wronged.
is negative,

In each case the Deserved Evils Match

so the person deserves compensation.

(DEM)

Thus,

I

think that VD4 can account for the plausible cases of desert

involving need and suffering.

Cases

(1-4)

above are

specific instances of involving need and suffering, and

I

have shown how they are handled by my principle.

According to George Sher, autonomous action is
base. 200

a

His view is that persons deserve the expected
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desert

consequences of their freely-chosen actions.

I

have

discussed his account at some length in Chapter Four, and
showed that even the most plausible formulation of his view
had grave defects.

In addition,

the claims that appear to

have motivated Sher's account of autonomous action can be

accounted for by appeal to VD4
1)

2)

3)
4)

5)

6)

7)

Wilson, who knowingly submitted his
application late, deserves to be

disqualified
Harris, who didn't bring his raincoat,
now deserves to get wet, while Georgina,
who did bring her umbrella, deserves to
stay dry.
Simmons, who didn't study for his exam,
now deserves to fail.
Given the warm weather lately, anyone
who is crazy enough to drive their
vehicle on the ice deserves to have it
fall through.
Persons who resourcefully seize
opportunities deserve the resulting
benefits
Persons who carefully make and execute
plans deserve success.
Persons who forego immediate benefits in
expectation of longer-range gains
deserve those gains.

It seems to me that anyone who accepts any of

(1-7)

above as legitimate desert claims can do so without appeal
For

to Sher's expected consequences account of desert.

instance, although

(1)

is really too vague to be sure about,

it could be a case of desert due to laziness.

and

(7)

Examples

(6)

seem to me to examples of desert due to diligence or

hard work or effort.

Example

(5)

could either be

a

desert

due to the possession of certain character traits such as

boldness and resourcefulness, or again desert due to
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diligence,

vaguely.

it is hard to tell because it is stated so

Finally,

claims

(2-4)

seem to me to be based on a

presumed standard of rationality.

Thus,

every one of these

claims involves virtues or vices, and so Sher's account is
not only flawed, but unnecessary.

Personhood seems to be
base,

a

likely candidate for a desert

and it is not plausible to think that it is a virtue,

either.

However,

desert base.

I

think that personhood is not in fact a

Nevertheless,

I

think

I

can explain why it is

often plausible to think that personhood is
even though it is not.

Thus,

desert base,

One important thing about personhood

is that it is closely connected to morality,

and vices.

a

and the virtues

to say that something is a person

presupposes that it has the capacity for virtue and vice.
So,

it seems to me that the reason that personhood seems to

be a plausible candidate for a desert base is that the

concept contains the moral elements that are, by themselves,
desert bases.

Personhood probably requires more than moral

capacity, but it is this part that makes the person

deserving
Finally,

base.

success is sometimes claimed to be a desert

For instance,

suppose that two women are making

equally conscientious, energetic, and intelligent efforts to
find their friend's lost book, and that one of them finds
it.

Michael Slote claims that in this case, there is some

plausibility to the view that the successful searcher
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deserves something more than unsuccessful searcher, even

though the failure of the unsuccessful searcher can be

attributed only to bad luck or accident, and not some defect
on her part." 01

If the successful searcher truly deserves

something more than the unsuccessful searcher, then success
is a desert base,

because there is no other relevant

difference between the two searchers.

This would be an

objection to VD4, because success is clearly not

a virtue.

However, my view is that if the two searchers are truly just
as rational,

deserving.

diligent, etc., then they are equally
It may not be as clear that the two women have

equal desert in this case as that they have equal moral

worth in this case, but that is not an objection to VD4. 202
Since VD4 is a substantive principle, it is not trivially
and will sometimes clarify positions where are

true,

intuitions are confused.

possible to ask if

would be

a

a

And after all, it always seems

person deserves her success, which

strange fact if success were truly a ground for

desert
It is true that in the real world we tend to reward

success, but

reasons.

I

think this is for at least three different

First,

success can be a sign that a person has

been diligent, rational, etc.

Second,

it is often expedient

to reward success because it encourages good work,

and

brings about good things in general for those who do the
rewarding.

Third, very often the reward has been promised
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to the successful.

It seems to me that only the first

reason for rewarding success is legitimately concerned with
desert.

The second kind of reason has nothing to do with

morality, justice, or desert, but with prudence.

reason is entitlement, and
not a desert base.

Thus,

will argue

I
I

(below)

The third

that it is

do not think that there are good

reasons to think that success is a desert base.

Entitlement
Entitlement, that is, being entitled to something

either because of some law, or because of some moral
is not a desert base.

convention,

Many of the laws are set

up to reflect some of our intuitions about desert, in

particular laws governing criminal behavior and laws
governing civil suits.

Thus,

a

convicted criminal can

deserve the punishment that the law prescribes, and the
tobacco companies may deserve to be forced to pay both

compensatory and punishing fines to the states.

However,

in

each case, the punishment is deserved because of the

virtuous or vicious actions of those involved, not from the
fact that the law prescribes it.

Furthermore,

that one can be entitled to a thing,
For example,

fortune.

a lazy

it is clear

and not deserve it.

stick-in-the-mud inherits the family

Given the laws of this land, the lazy good-for-

nothing is entitled to that fortune.

However,

this is a

not
circumstance where the inheritance of that fortune does

seem deserved.

On the other hand, a person may be
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deserving/ but not entitled to some benefit.

might be

a

One example

devoted care-taker of an elderly millionaire.

That care-taker may deserve some benefit from the estate of
the millionaire, but may not get it because the millionaire

leaves it all to her no-good son.

Thus,

the care-taker is

deserving, but not entitled, while the son is entitled, but
not deserving, with respect to the millionaire’s estate.

Entitlement also occurs in non-legal areas.
instance,

For

if a father promises to take his daughter to a

horse show, she is entitled to go to that horse show
(assuming she does not in the meanwhile commit some

egregious crime which would leave no choice but for the
father to send her to her room for the day)

.

So,

promise-

Sometimes people even say

making confers entitlement.

you promised me that money,

things like,

"Look,

to get it."

These statements are not literally true.

so

I

deserve
The

person may be entitled to that money, but just the fact of
the promise does not make the person deserving of that

money.
The position that entitlement is not a legitimate

desert base is somewhat controversial.

defended entitlement as
those arguments.

a

Several writers have

desert base, so

I

will consider

Fred Feldman has suggested several

examples where, he claims, a person may be deserving of some
good for one main reason
good.

— the

Here are two of them

person is entitled to that

203
.
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Case

Imagine two identical twins that not only look

1:

identical, but also have highly similar pasts.

Each has had

the same advantages and disadvantages as the other in home

life and schooling.

They went to the same college, and

majored in the same discipline.

They received the same

grades and got similar jobs in the same company.

They have

also been as behaviorally identical as possible.

They have

made the same moral and immoral choices, etc.
same amount of money and are equally happy.

twin goes into the local food-mart and buys

They have the
One day each

a

lottery

The only important difference in the tickets is

ticket.

one is a losing ticket, and one is the winning

this:

ticket.

The next day,

there is one major difference between

the receipts of these twins.

The one with the winning

ticket is now a millionaire, while the one with the losing

ticket is not.
situation.

There seems to be no injustice in this

They each agreed to take part in

and one of them was very lucky.

a fair lottery,

Recall from Chapter Two the

principle about distributive justice and desert.
PDJd An institutional framework is
distributively just if and only if it
leads to distributions in which each
person's receipt is equal to his/her
desert
If you do not like talk about institutional frameworks,

then consider principle PJD.
PJD

A distribution of goods and evils,

d,

over a population of people, p, is
perfectly just during time interval, tlt2, if and only if under d, each person
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in p gets what s/he deserves durinq tl1

.

If PDJd or PJD is true,

then if some distribution of

goods is just, then each person must be getting what she or
he deserves.

Since the twins' situation is just, each twin

must be getting what he deserves.
have deserved (and received)

Up until now, the twins

the same things.

There is no

reason to think that one twin might have more virtues or
needs than the other, or that the one's past receipts were

significantly less than the other's.

the reason why one

So,

twin deserves the millions that he has just won is that he

purchased the winning lottery ticket in

a fair lottery.

He

deserves the money only because he is entitled to it.
Case

2:

Again,

imagine identical twins with identical

past actions, past receipts, virtues, etc.
aunt, who for her own reasons,

They have a rich

decides to leave three

fourths of her fortune to the twin named "Abigail," and only
one fourth to the twin sister named "Lisa."

Suppose that

Lisa is outraged, and steals one third of the money that

Abigail received.

Now Lisa is satisfied, since each twin

has the same amount of inherited fortune as the other twin.

However, Abigail now has a legitimate complaint against
Lisa.

Lisa stole money that was not hers, and Abigail

deserves to get it back.
claims.

So there are two competing desert

Lisa's claim is that she deserved to receive just

as much of her aunt's fortune as Abigail

— Abigail

deserve three fourths of that fortune.

On the other hand,
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did not

once the will was drawn up and executed, Lisa no longer

deserved that money.
did not deserve it.

When she stole it from Abigail, Lisa

According to Feldman, while we might

agree that before their aunt's will was made the sisters

deserved equal portions from the fortune, after the will
became active, the twins' deserts changed.

Clearly then,

since there was no change in the virtues, past receipts, or

past actions of either of the twins, the operative desert
base must have been entitlement.
I

find both of these cases utterly unpersuasive, but

especially the second.

I

will respond to it first.

First

of all, wills are arbitrary and entirely legal in nature.

See my comments above.

The mere fact that a person has been

willed something hardly seems to provide any reason to think
that she or he deserves it, or that it is fitting that she
or he receive it.

Second,

the case is needlessly

complicated by the introduction of the theft.
even on

a

view where entitlement is not

will be conflict.

On the one hand,

a

Of course,

desert base, there

the twins are equally

deserving of the money, but this conflicts with the legal
claims of the sisters.

So there is conf lict--Lisa deserves

as much money as Abigail,

but Abigail is entitled to the

amount specified in the will, and that is more than the
amount to which Lisa is entitled.

The implicit judgment is

that it was wrong for Lisa to steal the money from Abigail.
If we agree with this,

we need no recourse to desert.
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After

all,

there is no direct connection between what

a

person

deserves, and what that person is permitted to do.

Deserts

do not entail moral oughts.

Thus,

it might be the case that a)

Lisa is deserving of an equal

amount of fortune to Abigail,
fortune than Lisa

c)

stole from Abigail,
and

back,

b)

there is no mystery why

Abigail is entitled to more

Lisa is not entitled to the money she
d)

Abigail is entitled to get her money

it was morally wrong for Lisa to steal the

e)

money from Abigail.
In case

(1),

it is my view that the lottery does not

produce a just distribution of goods.

Thus,

it is not the

case that there is no injustice in the one twin getting

millions and the other getting nothing.
two main reasons why case

I

think there are

appears plausible, but

(1)

that they are based on confusion and error.

First,

I

think

it is an

important feature of the example that the lottery is deemed
to be fair,

and fairness is often equated with justice.

in this case,

But

that would be a confusion between two

different kinds of justice, procedural and distributive.

Distributive justice is the kind of justice that PJD is
about:

the distribution of goods and evils throughout a

population.

According to PJD, there is more justice in

a

population where the goods and evils are distributed
according to desert than in

a

population where they are not.

Procedural justice is different.

It is concerned with the

methods used to bring the distribution about.
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If the

methods are appropriate, then procedural justice is done.
The distinction between procedural and distributive justice
is often clearest in a court of law.

criminal trial.

Consider the Simpson

In that case, many people think that

justice was not done.

They think that Simpson did not get

the verdict that he deserved.

The outcome was not

distributively just, though the method used to achieve it
was procedurally just.

The judge did not favor the

prosecution or defense, the jury was not rigged, the
specific procedures dictated by the law were all carried
through.

Thus,

if there was a miscarriage of justice,

was not in the procedural realm.

So,

it

it is clear that it is

possible for distributive justice to be violated even while
procedural justice is maintained.
I

think that this is what happened in the lottery case.

The lottery was fair,

favor any participants

and procedurally just.

It did not

(except on the basis of the number of

tickets bought, which is part of the rules)

.

Nevertheless,

distributive justice was not maintained, because the goods
were not distributed according to desert.

So,

the fact that

the lottery was procedurally just had no bearing on whether

or not the lottery was distributively just, but this may

have been obscured by the fact that the lottery was

considered "fair," which is ambiguous between the two kinds
of justice.
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Someone who is not confused by the ambiguity of 'fair'

may still think that in the lottery case, the results were
just because the participants all consented to take part.

None of the lottery-ticket buyers were in any way threatened
or harassed about their purchase.

Each agreed to risk a

small amount of money on a negligible chance of winning a

huge amount of money, therefore the lottery was just.

philosopher who has articulated
Michael Slote.

a

One

position like this is

He claims.

If certain equalities or inequalities are freely
consented to, then the society that creates these
equalities or inequalities can be perfectly just,
no matter whether those equalities or inequalities
are deserved or not 204
.

For example,

suppose that each member of a group is

equally deserving, but that one member is very well-liked,
and so everyone freely consents to give this popular person

more than she deserves.

In this case,

the distribution of

goods is perfectly just even though one person gets more

than she deserves, and the rest get less than they

deserve

205
.

Thus,

it appears that Slote would accept that

the lottery case is just,

and that PJD needs to be modified

to take into account free consent.

could be made, but

I

Such a modification

think it would be a mistake

206
.

I

think

that Slote is mistaken to include consent in his account of

justice.

In the example above, my intuition is dead-

opposite of Slote'

s:

the undeserved extra goods that go to
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the popular woman make the distribution unjust,

and the fact

that everyone agrees makes no difference to that injustice.
Of course, we have to be careful when considering this

case.

It is so sketchy that we might be inclined to agree

that it is just for the popular woman to get extra goods

because we think that she must possess some extra virtue
that makes her so well-liked.

But it has been stipulated

that everyone is equally deserving, so if this woman has

more social virtues that lead to her being so popular, then
she must have counterbalancing vices that make her desert no

more than anyone else’s.

Given that each member is equally

deserving, it seems unjust for the goods to be distributed

other than equally to all.

For various reasons, we often

consent to harmful or painful situations.

I

subject myself

to the torture of writing a dissertation because of the

future gains that it will give me.

mistake to think that because
it is not painful.

I

But it would be a

consent to this pain, that

The same is true of justice.

We may for

various reasons consent to unjust situations, for instance,

when we think that happiness counts for more than justice,
or when we show mercy. 207

But that does not make the

situations we consent to less unjust.

Strangely enough, Slote seems to use this same view
that

I

hold (and that he clearly disagrees with, above) when

he argues against a view that he attributes to John Rawls.

According to Slote, Rawls’s principle of justice permits
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great differences in wealth in a population, so long as

those differences improve the lot of the worst off, even if

each is as deserving as everyone else. 208

If so,

then

Rawls’s principles clearly conflict with PJD because in that
population, the goods are not distributed according to
desert.

Slote notes that Rawls would defend his view by

appeal to what rational, non-envious people would choose in
the original position

209
,

but that Slote is unimpressed by

this defense:

Unless one already assumes that Rawls's original
position is one in which ideally just principles
would be chosen, he may be inclined to say that
this merely shows that people faced with (the
possibility of) a hard lot in life are willing to
tolerate certain injustices in order to achieve
certain results. And if one thinks that what
people deserve from society simply depends on
their conscientious efforts in behalf of society,
he might well think that the situation we are
discussing is unjust because goods are not
distributed in accordance with deserts, even
though people (in the original position ) might be
willing to accept that situation for reasons of
self-interest 210
.

Except for the part about conscientious efforts

constituting the only desert base, this seems to be exactly
what

I

might argue, both against Rawls, and against Slote'

view that justice is desert plus consent.
the upshot of Slote
so consent to)

's

point is this:

For it seems that

people may choose (and

certain principles for self-interested

reasons, but this hardly shows that those principles are
just.

Thus,

it appears that Slote 's argument may succeed
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better than he would wish.

In any case,

I

do not think that

consent alters justice in the way that Slote believes.
So,

the two reasons that the lottery case appears

plausible are

confusion between procedural and

a

distributive justice, and the mistaken view that consent
alters justice.

Otherwise,

find no plausibility in the

I

lottery case, and since what plausibility there
chimerical,
case.

is,

is

do not see any reason to accept the lottery

I

Entitlement is not a desert base.
Conclusion

With VD4

,

I

have answered the final objection that

I

mentioned in Chapter Two, about the concept of desert being
too empty,

too much of a mere appeal to disparate

intuitions,

to provide the basis for a principle about

justice such as PJD.

I

have given a substantive principle

about the nature of desert that asserts some unity among the

desert bases.

I

have shown how this principle can account

for many of the commonly made desert claims,

and defended it

against several objections.
The view that distributive justice is achieved in a

population when each member gets what she or he deserves is
augmented by the view that deserts are determined primarily
by virtuous and vicious actions.
actions,

in turn,

are based on the Aristotelian conception

of the virtues and vices that

Together,

The virtuous and vicious

I

presented in Chapter Six.

these elements constitute a plausible alternative
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to Rawls's principles of justice,

any of his arguments that
Of course,

I

and is not threatened by

presented in Chapter Two.

there is more to be done to provide a full

examination of PJD, but that work must be left for another
time.

Here,

it suffices to show that there is a plausible,

desert-based conception of justice where the appeal to
desert does not make the whole view unacceptably mysterious.
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distribution be less just than others? Thus, my formulation
of the principle of justice in upcoming chapters refers to
distributions instead of institutional frameworks.

For instance, Joel Feinberg, "Justice and Personal
Desert," in his Doing and Deserving, (Princeton, NJ
John Kleinig, "The
Princeton University Press, 1970)
Concept of Desert, " American Philosophical Quarterly 8
(1971), David Miller, Social Justice, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1976), George Sher, Desert, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1987), Fred Feldman, "Adjusting Utility
for Justice, " Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
and James Owen Mcleod, On Being Deserving
(September 1995)
(University of Massachusetts Amherst Dissertation, 1995)
64.

,

,
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65.

Rawls, A Theory of Justice, page 34.

66.

Rawls, A Theory of Justice, page 124.

67.

Rawls, A Theory of Justice, page 40.

68.
This includes Joel Feinberg, John Kleinig, David
Miller, George Sher, Fred Feldman, and James Owen Mcleod.

This term was apparently coined by Joel Feinberg, Doing
69.
and Deserving, page 58.
71.
70.

Items 1-15 adapted from Sher, Desert, pages 6-7, items
16-19 adapted from Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, pages 6979, and items 20-29 adapted from Kleinig, "The Concept of
Desert," pages 70-74.

Kleinig,
72.

"The Concept of Desert," page 72.

Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, page 75.

H. Scott Hestevold, "Disjunctive Desert," American
I only
Philosophical Quarterly 20 (July 1983), page 359.
mean to follow him in treating the two cases separately.
do not mean to endorse his particular analyses.

73.

Principia Ethica, (Cambridge:
Press,
University
Cambridge
1903), page x.
74.

See G. E. Moore,

75.

Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, page 80, my italics.

See Hestevold,
Sher, Desert, p. x,
76.

"Disjunctive Desert," page 359, and
for instance.

Robert Young, "Egalitarianism and Personal Desert,"
Ethics 102 (January 1992), page 320.
77.

78.
D.

Wojciech Sadurski, Giving Desert its Due,
Reidel Publishing, 1985), page 116.

(Dordrecht:

79.

Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, pages 77 and 79.

80.

Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, pages 69,

81.

Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, page 71.

82.

Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, page 71.

83.

Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, page 72.
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91.

I

For a discussion of similar entitlement and
institutional views of desert, see James Owen Mcleod, On
Being Deserving, (Unpublished dissertation, 1995)
Chapter
Three, pages 31-60.
84.

,

85.
These analyses bear significant resemblance to some
presented by Fred Feldman in his seminar of 3/15/94.

Doing and Deserving, page 71; italics added.

CO

Feinberg,

CO -O

Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, page 70.

CO CO

Kleinig,

"The Concept of Desert,

page 71.

CO KO

Kleinig,

"The Concept of Desert,

pages 75, 71.

90.

Kleinig,

"The Concept of Desert,

page 74.

91.

Kleinig,

"The Concept of Desert,

page 75.

92.

Kleinig,

"The Concept of Desert,

page 76.

93.

Kleinig,

"The Concept of Desert,

page 77.

This example will be an apparent problem for my view
well, and it appears that my solution could be adapted for
We could say that Jim's working hard was
Kleinig' s account.
a self-evaluation and on the basis of that, he deserved
something good. But he got something bad, so he deserves
recompense. Note that this solution still requires a
modification to DA8, even though it may be acceptable to
someone inclined to this analysis. DA8 thus needs revision
even given this solution.
94

'

;

.

95.

Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, page 92.

96.

Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, page. 92-93.

97.

Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, page 93.

98.

Miller,

99.
81,

Social Justice, pages 92-93.

65See Mcleod, On Being Deserving, Chapter Four, pages
view.
Miller's
for another critical evaluation of

Geoffrey Cupit, in Justice as Fittingness (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1996), presents a similar analysis, and
"And what does not affect the status
credits Miller for it:
more or
of the deserver what does not make the deserver
on--cannot
less worthy of respect, admiration, and so
is
function as a basis of desert," (page 38). His account
100.

—
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similar enough that it is subject to the same objections
that I will make against Miller.
101.
Miller, Social Justice, page 88.
The similarity of
these to Feinberg's responsive attitudes is evident, as the
attitudes listed by Miller form a subset of those listed by
Feinberg in Doing and Deserving
_

.

102.

Miller,

103.

Italics added.

104.

Miller,

Social Justice, page

105.

Miller,

Social Justice, page 86.

106.

Miller,

Social Justice, page

CO

107.

Miller,

Social Justice, page

CD CO

Social Justice, page 89.

CO cd

108.
W. N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, (New Haven and London,
109.

Miller,

110.

Miller, Social Justice, page 85.

111.

Miller,

Social Justice, page 86,

112.

Miller,

Social Justice, page

CO

113.

Miller,

Social Justice, page

oo <o

114.

Miller,

Social Justice, page 89.

Social Justice, page 70.

footnote

6.

CT>

Princeton University
115.
George Sher, Desert (Princeton:
37-52.
Three,
Chapter
Press, 1987),
pp.
On Being Deserving, pages 90-98,
very similar treatment of Sher.
116.

See Mcleod,

for a

However, upon reflection it is not so clear all
deserts do require free will, particularly deserts that are
compensations for wrongs done to a person.
117.

118.

Sher,

Desert, page 38.

119.

Sher,

Desert, page 39.

120.

Sher,

Desert, pages 39-40 my italics.

121.

Sher,

Desert, page 40.
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.

Sher,

Desert, page 40.

123.

Sher,

Desert, page 41.

124.

Sher,

Desert, page 39.

125.

Sher,

Desert, pages 40-41.

126.

Sher,

Desert, page 40.

127.

Sher,

Desert, page 41.

128.

Sher,

Desert, page 42.

129.

Sher,

Desert, page 42.

130.

Sher,

Desert, page 44.

131.

Sher,

Desert, page 45.

132.

Sher,

Desert, page 47.

133.

Sher,

Desert, page 45.

134.

Sher,

Desert, page 45.

135.

Sher,

Desert, page 46.

136.

Sher,

Desert, pages 46-47.

137.

Sher,

Desert, page 46.

138.

Sher,

Desert, page 46, my italics.

139.

Sher,

Desert, page 46.

140.
116.

See Wojciech Sadurski,

Giving Desert Its Due, page

On Being Deserving, pages 98-105,
very similar treatment of Sher on diligence.
141.

See Mcleod,

142.

Sher,

Desert, page 54.

143.

Sher,

Desert, page 54.

for a

Ralph Barton Perry, Realms of Value (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1954), page 3.
144.

145.

Sher,

Desert, page 55.

146.

Sher,

Desert, page 57.
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Sher,

Desert, page 58.

148.

Sher,

Desert, pages 58-59.

149.

Sher,

Desert, page 60.

150.

Sher,

Desert, page 61.

151.

Sher,

Desert, page 58.

Ralph Barton Perry, "Value as Any Object of Any
Interest, " reprinted in Wilfrid Sellars and John Hospers,
Readings in Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1970), page 144.
152.

153.

Sher,

Desert, pages 38-40.

154.

Sher,

Desert, page 62.

155.

Sher,

Desert, page 62.

156.

Sher,

Desert, page 61.

157.

I

owe this point to Fred Feldman.

Ross,
University Press,

The Right and the Good,
1930), page 27.

158.

W.

159.

Sher,

Desert, page 132.

160.

Sher,

Desert, page 144.

161.

Sher,

Desert, page 143.

162.

Sher,

Desert, page 143.

163.

Sher,

Desert, page 143.

164.

Sher,

Desert, page 144.

165.

Sher,

Desert, page 144.

D.

(Oxford: Oxford

On Being Deserving, pages 118-123,
very similar treatment of Sher on virtue.
166.

See Mcleod,

167.

Sher,

Desert, pages 142-143.

168.

Sher,

Desert, pages 143-144

169.

Sher,

Desert, page 144.

170.

Sher,

Desert, page 144.
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for a

171.

Ross,

172.

Harold

People,

The Right and The Good
S.

page 138.

Kushner, When Bad Things Happen to Good
Schocken Books, 1981)

(New York:

173.

Feinberg,

174.

Sher,

Doing and Deserving, page 59.

Desert, page 150.

175.
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals,
translated by H.J. Paton, (New York: Harper & Row, 1964),
page 65.

176.
I should note that by ’virtuous action,' I do not mean
to literally claim that the action is virtuous.
The term is
shorthand for 'an action that exemplifies a virtue.'

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, reprinted in
Introduction to Aristotle, ed. by Richard McKeon, (New York:
Random House, 1947), Book II, 1, 1103a, page 331.
177.

178.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II,
pages 330-332.

1,

1103a-b,

179.
337.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II,

4,

1105b,

180.
337.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II,

4,

1105b, page

181.
338.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II,

5,

1106a, page

182.
339.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II,

6,

1106a, page

183.
339.

Aristotle,

6,

1106b, page

Nicomachean Ethics, Book

II,

page

The New

David Remnick, "Kid Dynamite Blows Up,"
184.
Yorker, (July 14, 1997), page 46.

For instance, when Aristotle remarks that adultery is
never virtuous, no matter how carefully it is done,
Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, 6, 1107a, page 341.
185.

186.
344

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book II,

187.
399.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book V,

179

7,

1,

pages 3411129b, page

188.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book
pages 401-403.

V,

1130b-1131a,

2,

189.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book VI, 6-7
pages 429-432, 434-438.

,

9-11,

190.
426.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book VI,

2,

1139b, page

191.
428.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book VI,

4,

1140a, page

192.
429.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book VI,

5,

1140b, page

193.
430.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book VI,

7,

1141a, page

194.
431.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book VI,

7,

1141b, page

195.
380.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book IV,

2,

1122a,

196.
336.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
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Book II,

4
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1105a page

197.
336.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
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Book II,

4
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1105a page

"Desert:
See Fred Feldman
Or will receive.
" Mind 104
Wisdom,
Received
Some
of
Reconsideration
pages 63-77
1995)
198.

page

,

(January

.

,

owe this example to Fred Feldman.

199.

I

200.

Sher,

201.

Slote,

Desert, pages 37-52.
"Desert,

Consent,

and Justice," page 328.

But
Slote, "Desert, Consent, and Justice," page 328.
See
base.
desert
a
as
success
I think he ultimately rejects
his footnote #14 in the same article.
202.

am grateful to Fred Feldman for these examples,
though he does not agree with my views about them.

203.

I

204.

Slote,

205.

Justice,"
Adapted from Slote, "Desert, Consent, and

"Desert, Consent,

and Justice," page 333.

page 334.
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I also think it would be fairly difficult to
accomplish.
It is not at all clear that the notion of
consent could be spelled out in a clear way. Take for
instance, the problem of actual versus implied consent.
This point was mentioned by Fred Feldman in his seminar of
Spring 1994.

206.

The view that mercy and justice always conflict is not
without controversy, but it is fairly plausible that they
See H. Scott Hestevold, "Justice to Mercy,"
can conflict.
Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 46 (December
281-91; George W. Rainbolt, "Mercy: An Independent,
1985)
Imperfect Virtue, " American Philosophical Quarterly 27
169-73; Alwynne Smart, "Mercy," Philosophy 43
(April 1990):
345-59; Claudia Card, "On Mercy, " Philosophical
(1968):
182-207.
Review 81 (1972):
207.

,

:

,

"Desert, Consent, and Justice," page 341.

208.

Slote,

209.

See Chapter Two for a discussion of this.

210.

Slote,

"Desert, Consent, and Justice," page 342, my

italics
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